Integrated Decision Support System for Infrastructure Privatization under Uncertainty using Conflict Resolution by Kassab, Moustafa
Integrated Decision Support System for Infrastructure Privatization 




















presented to the University of Waterloo 
in fulfillment of the 
thesis requirement for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy 
in  









Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2006 
 
 





I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, 
including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners. 
 









Infrastructure privatization decisions have an enormous financial and social impact on all 
stakeholders, including the public sector, the private sector, and the general public. 
Appropriate privatization decisions, however, are difficult to make due to the conflicting 
nature of the objectives of the various stakeholders. This research introduces a multi-
criteria decision-making framework for evaluating and comparing a wide range of 
privatization schemes for infrastructure facilities. The framework is designed to resolve 
conflicts that arise because of the varying points of view of the stakeholders, and 
accordingly, determine the most appropriate decision that satisfies all stakeholders’ 
preferences. The developed framework is expected to help in re-engineering the 
traditional conflict resolution process, particularly for construction conflict resolution and 
infrastructure privatization decisions. The framework provides decision support at the 
management level through three successive decision support processes related to 1. 
Screening of feasible solutions using the Elimination Method of multiple criteria decision 
analysis (MCDA); 2. Analyzing the actions and counteractions of decision makers using 
conflict resolution and decision stability concepts to determine the most stable resolution; 
and 3. Considering the uncertainty in decision maker’s preferences using Info-gap Theory 
to evaluate the robustness of varying uncertainty levels of the decisions. Based on the 
research, a procedure and a decision support system (DSS) have been developed and 
tested on real-life case studies of a wastewater treatment plant and a construction conflict. 
The results of the two case studies show that the proposed DSS can be used to support 
decisions effectively with respect to both construction conflicts and infrastructure 
 iv
privatization. The developed system is simple to apply and can therefore save time and 
avoid the costs associated with unsatisfactory decisions. This research is expected to 
contribute significantly to the understanding and selecting of proper Public-Private-
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1.1  Introduction 
According to the World Bank (Houskamp and Tynan, 2000), since 1980, a growing number of 
countries have encouraged greater involvement of the private sector in infrastructure systems. In 
addition to citing the main advantage of creating a competitive environment that will reduce the 
overall cost, proponents of privatization have argued that the private sector will be more efficient 
and better at financing the large investment needed. These claims have not been supported by 
evidence from comparative studies or independent scientific reviews with respect to the actual 
performance of the public and private sectors. This lack of evidence is especially notable in the 
water industry due to its lack of a systematic methodology for choosing the most appropriate 
privatization scheme, particularly since the majority of the contracts in question are confidential. 
 
Infrastructure privatization has a wide variety of alternative approaches ranging from partial 
operational contribution of services or materials to complete ownership and management of 
assets. The selection and evaluation of a proper model for optimization is a crucial part of any 
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infrastructure system. The most popular approach used in the selection of a scheme is the 
competitive method. To date, there have been no systematic processes or selection criteria to 
guide decision makers (DMs) in the public sector when they are trying to make an informed 
selection. Privatization contracts are generally ambiguous, and in particular, they lack specific 
details for dispute resolution procedures (Catley-Carlson, 2002). 
 
Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) methodologies provide a comprehensive set of 
decision tools that may help to guide privatization selection decisions. These methods have been 
found to be highly useful in scientific research and in practical problem solving. When used 
together with the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution and the Information Gap Theory, they 
may yield a remarkable tool for dealing with the uncertain negotiation-based process of 
privatization. This research, as such, develops a systems methodology for evaluating and 
comparing a wide range of privatization methods and schemes. The methodology establishes 
multiple criteria that reflect stakeholders’ preferences when comparing alternative solutions. 
Various MCDA studies are carried out in order to determine optimum privatization schemes that 
satisfy stakeholders’ requirements. 
 
1.2  Research Motivation 
The National Science Foundation (NSF, 2004) has estimated the total US investment in civil 
infrastructure systems at $ 20 trillion. In Canada, recent studies by the National Round Table on 
the Environment and the Economy have estimated that water and sewer infrastructure will require 
significant investment in excess of $ 50 billion for upgrading or restoring to an acceptable level. 
Only half of the cost will be recovered from user fees (Li, 2001). Many of these infrastructure 
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systems are eroding due to aging, excessive demands due to population increase, lack of 
maintenance and rehabilitation due to government inefficiency, and expenditure cuts. However, 
the demand for these services continues to rise dramatically. The renewal of aging infrastructure 
systems is a difficult proposition at all government levels due to the eroded quality of the 
infrastructure; the high cost of maintenance, rehabilitation, expansion; and other financial 
constraints. Many governments are recognizing their inability to effectively provide infrastructure 
service and are searching for alternatives to managing and financing these essential services. 
Hence, they are opening the door partially or completely for private investors to participate in this 
crucial area. Various Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) programs have been adopted by some 
governmental authorities and are playing a growing role in the implementation of infrastructure 
rehabilitation, with both successes and failures. 
  
Infrastructure projects possess unique characteristics; they differ with respect to function, 
uncertainty, risk, and cost. Although PPP systems of privatization show a high potential for 
success and have been adopted in many countries, they could lead to disaster if they are not 
properly studied, selected, and implemented. The proper evaluation and selection of PPP 
programs is crucial. 
 
 To date, public-sector decision makers (DMs) have lacked both a complete set of selection 
criteria and a systematic process for determining appropriate decisions. Furthermore, these 
decision-making processes need to reflect stakeholders’ values, avoid any unnecessary risk, and 
use a systematic dispute resolution procedure to support quality selections. 
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Without the implementation of a proper rational and comprehensive selection process for 
choosing the optimum alternative and avoiding future disputes, the extensive expansion of 
privatization could lead to failure. To date, the selection process is not systematically executed. It 
lacks an organized, systematic process for matching the appropriate privatization scheme with the 
specific needs of the public sector. 
 
In general, the selection process suffers from the following procedural problems (Catley-Carlson, 
2002; Gleick et al., 2002): 
• The selection process does not consider the effects of all related criteria and variables that 
could affect infrastructure projects. 
• Most contracts used are ambiguous. 
• Most privatization procedures lack detailed procedures for resolving disputes when the 
projects are implemented, such as specifying who resolves disputes and setting out rules 
and procedures for dispute resolution. 
• The selection process has an increased potential for political conflict (e.g., disagreements 
with foreign investors). 
• The selection process lacks a clear procedure with criteria known in advance. 
• Because of the ambiguity of the contracts, the private sector can raise the cost of its 
proposals, so that the public sector pays much more than initially expected. 
• The selection process lacks risk assessment models (Catley-Carlson, 2002). 
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A key purpose of this research is to develop a framework to enable the DMs in the public sector 
to make better decisions when evaluating and selecting appropriate privatization schemes in order 
to save time and money for the public sector. 
 
 
 1.3  Research Objectives and Scope 
The objectives of this research are to provide an understanding of the procedure for privatization 
selection and evaluation, and to develop a decision support framework to help DMs in the public 
sector decide upon the appropriate privatization schemes that satisfy stakeholders’ requirements. 
Specific objectives include the following: 
• Identifying the various Public Private Partnership (PPP) schemes used in the privatization 
process; 
• Developing systems methodologies by integrating MCDA and Graph Model techniques 
for evaluating and comparing a wide range of PPP schemes, considering all  stakeholders’ 
values; 
• Integrating information gap theory (Info-gap Theory) for dealing with missing 
information or future uncertainty associated with infrastructure projects; 
• Experimenting with various MCDA tools, genetic algorithms (GAs), conflict resolution 
methods, and info-gap theory to develop an encompassing model for optimizing 
privatization decisions.  
• Developing and testing a decision-support system (DSS) based on real-life 
water/wastewater infrastructure privatization case studies; 
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• Experimenting with various MCDA tools, genetic algorithms (GAs), conflict resolution 
methods, and info-gap theory to develop an encompassing model for optimizing 
privatization decisions.  
 
The following aspects and concepts are utilized in the design of the proposed DSS:  
1. Consider both numeric and non-numeric criteria that are important in the selection of 
a proper privatization scheme. 
2. Use a filter or a pre-processor to eliminate or screen out infeasible alternatives. 
3. Use an appropriate MCDA method, such as the elimination method, to compare and 
rank feasible alternatives.  
4. Incorporate the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution into the DDS for carrying out 
strategic analyses. 
5. Extend the Graph Model methodology with Genetic Algorithms (GAs) optimization 
as an approach to optimizing decisions when the number of feasible solutions is large. 
6. Extend the DSS to consider the impact of uncertainty on decision-making using the 
Info-gap Theory approach. 
7. Implement the proposed decision methodology in a new, user-friendly, DSS, and 
experiment with case studies in wastewater infrastructure and construction conflict to 
test and improve it. 
 
The research was developed to be useful in infrastructure privatization projects as well as in any 
multi-criteria decision-making process. Figure 1.1 provides a flow chart for the privatization 
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process. The present research focuses on Steps 2 and 3, which are the most critical for 















1.4   Research Methodology 
This research develops a comprehensive decision-making methodology for evaluating and 
selecting the privatization method that best satisfies stakeholders’ preferences. To achieve the 
desired objectives, the research follows the methodology depicted in Figure 1.2.  
• Step 1: Literature Review 
  A comprehensive literature review is conducted with respect to the following: 
1. Privatization methods in infrastructure projects with examples,  
2. MCDA methods and their processes, 
Figure 1.1: Stages of the Privatization Process 
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3. Conflict resolution techniques, and  
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• Step 2: Procedure 
         The following procedure needs is implemented: 
1. Problem identification; 
2. Identification of criteria, constraints, and alternatives; 
3. Design of a model of a decision support tool for selecting the best privatization 
scheme using MCDA, the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution, and the Information 
Gap Theory; and   
4. Experimenting with the artificial intelligence tool of Genetic Algorithms for decision 
optimization. 
• Step 3: Analysis and Validation 
    The model is analyzed and validated using case studies in different appropriate sectors.  
• Step 4: Discussion and Conclusions 
    The results are discussed, conclusions are drawn, and recommendations are made for future 
    work.  
 
1.5   Thesis Organization 
Chapter 2 presents a review of the literature about decision-making tools, in particular, Multiple 
Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) techniques, followed by a review of advanced decision 
support tools for optimizing decisions and dealing with conflict, uncertainty and lack of 
information, such as the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR), Info-gap theory, and 
Genetic Algorithms (GAs). Chapter 3 discusses infrastructure privatization, present various forms 
of Public-Private-Partnerships (PPP), and concludes with a brief description of the advantages 
and disadvantages of privatization. Chapter 4 presents the framework of the proposed decision 
 10
support system, followed by experimentation using the main components of the developed DSS: 
MCDA, the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution, info-gap theory, and GAs. Chapter 5 then, 
presents the implementation stage of the developed DSS model as prototype software, as well as 
its main components, input, and output, using a case study of a construction conflict for 
validation. Chapter 6 is devoted to the application of the DSS for infrastructure privatization 
using a case study of the Hamilton Wastewater Treatment Plant. The way in which the developed 
prototype can be used to suggest the best privatization option is explained. Finally, Chapter 7 is a 










This chapter presents the fundamentals of decision-making, particularly Multi-Criteria 
Decision Analysis also known as Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA). It then 
presents a comprehensive review of MCDA models for evaluating and comparing different 
infrastructure privatization schemes. It provides a review of various MCDA techniques and 
procedures, together with a survey of existing decision-supporting software. This section is 
followed by a review of advanced decision support tools for optimizing decisions and dealing 
with conflict, uncertainty, and lack of information, such as the Graph Model for Conflict 
Resolution (GMCR), Information Gap Theory (Info-gap Theory), and Genetic Algorithms 
(GAs).  
 
2.2 Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis 
Some simple and relatively unimportant decisions can be made based on a single governing 
factor called a single criterion. However, given the complex interactions among the 
economical, social, and political aspects of modern life, it becomes difficult, if not 
impossible, to solve real-life problems without a consideration of multiple factors. Therefore, 
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an MCDA process is involved. Recently, there has been a growing interest in using MCDA 
tools in many domains, where they provide the capability of dealing with complex decision 
problems. 
 
MCDA is the process of reaching a decision through the consideration of available 
alternatives, guided by many measures, rules, and standards, called criteria (Zeleny, 1981). 
Criteria can be quantitative, clear, and easy-to-measure, such as marks, size, and price, or 
qualitative and hard-to-measure, such as satisfaction, colour, and taste.  Even when criteria 
are of the former type, conflict may arise among the decision makers (DMs) about their 
priorities and preferences with respect to the criteria. Accordingly, an appropriate decision 
process should consider both types of criteria and also take into account the variability in 
DMs’ preferences. 
 
2.2.1  The Structure of MCDA 
The process of structuring MCDA problems has received a great deal of attention. von 
Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986) called problem structuring the most difficult part of decision 
aid. Keeney (1992) and Hammond et al. (1999) proposed a systematic analysis method, 
called value-focused thinking, which provides an excellent approach to this aspect of MCDA. 
 
Despite the variations in the terminology and notation used by different researchers, the 
general process of multiple-criteria decision aid is defining objectives, arranging them into 
criteria, identifying all possible alternatives, and then measuring consequences. A 
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consequence is a direct measurement of the success of an alternative according to given 
criterion (e.g., cost in dollars and volume in cubic metres). 
 
The basic format of a typical MCDA problem established by carrying out the above 
processes is shown in Figure 2.1. In this figure, A = {A1, Ai, · · ·, A3, · · ·, An} is the set of 
alternatives, and Q = {1, 2, · · ·, j, · · ·, q} is the set of criteria. The consequence for criterion j 
of alternative Ai is expressed as Cj (Ai), which can be shortened to ijc  when there is no 











2.2.2   Multiple-Criteria Decision-Making Process  
The decision-making process in MCDA is defined as a dynamic process that involves a 
complete search of information (Zeleny, 1981). The basic steps in the decision-making 
process are shown in Figure 2.2. 
 
  Alternatives (A) 
  A1 A2 … Ai …. An 
1       
2       
.       
.       
 
      
.       








q       
i
jc
Figure 2.1: The Structure of MCDA 
j 
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The decision-making procedure shown in Figure 2.2 is general and can be used with both 















• Step 1: Identify the Problem 
 A typical approach to problem definition in the civil service is to hold a series of meetings 
over a period of time until the task is accomplished. Different group decision techniques 
can be employed: 
 
- Brainstorming technique: This technique provides creative collaboration by means of the 
presentation of a large number of ideas. However, due to its open discussion atmosphere, 
Figure 2.2: Decision-Making Process  
 Make a Decision 
Identify the Problem 
1 
2 
Identify the Alternatives 
3 




Evaluate the Decision 
6 
Conduct a Sensitivity Analysis
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some group members may influence the discussion trend, and accordingly, the final 
decision may become a compromise agreement.  
 
- Nominal Group Technique (NGT): As the term “nominal” (meaning silent and 
independent) suggests, NGT refers to a process that brings individuals together but does not 
allow them to communicate verbally. The advantages of this technique are that it minimizes 
influences and treats participants equally through voting (Hwang, 1987).  However, this 
technique limits creativity, diversity, and synergy. 
  
- Research survey: A research survey can take various forms, including telephone and face-
to-face interviews, as well as mailed or web-based questionnaires. A survey can cover a large 
geographic area and provide anonymity. However, the respondents may misinterpret 
questions, which may distort the results. 
 
- The Delphi method: This technique is based on collecting ideas from intensive 
questionnaires that provide feedback from respondents interspersed with controlled opinion 
feedback (Hwang, 1987). This method is tedious and consumes a considerable amount of 
time and effort. 
 
• Step 2: Identify the Alternatives  
The second step is to specify the alternatives or options. Alternatives are often formulated 
on a go or no-go basis and are not final. They can always be revised. For example, project 
funding is often conducted in this way. 
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• Step 3: Establish Evaluation Criteria  
The criteria and sub-criteria are the measures of performance by which the alternatives will 
be judged. Before criteria are finalized, a provisional set of criteria needs to be assessed 
against a range of qualities. These qualities include completeness, redundancy, 
operationality, mutual independence of preferences, double counting, size, and impact 
occurring over time. Organizing the criteria in a hierarchical way facilitates scoring the 
alternatives against the criteria and examining the overall results at the level of the objectives. 
This hierarchical representation is often referred to as a value tree, as shown in Figure 2.3 
(Dodgson et al., 2000). The process of assigning weights to the criteria is fundamental to the 













With respect to the obtaining of alternatives and criteria, it is worth mentioning Keeney’s 
approach of “Value-Focused Thinking” (Keeney, 1992), in which he introduces long-term 
values as principles for evaluating the actual or potential consequences of actions that reflect 


























short-term values. The long-term values range from ethical principles that must be upheld to 
guidelines for preferences among choices.    
 
• Step 4: Evaluate Alternatives 
To evaluate the alternatives, a consistent numerical scale for the assessment of criteria needs 
to be set up so that better levels of performance lead to higher score values. One possibility 
(global scaling) is to assign a score of 0 (worst level) to 100 (best level). Another way is to 
approach the issue indirectly by eliciting from the DM a series of verbal pairwise 
assessments expressing a judgment of the performance of each alternative relative to each of 
the others, as used in the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Dodgson et al., 2000). Another 
approach is Elimination Methods (MacCrimmon, 1973; Radford, 1989). This technique 
offers the capability of ranking the decision criteria in an order of preference without using 
quantitative weights. 
 
There are two types of preference expressions: weights, which are based on criteria, and 
values, which are based on consequences (Chen, 2006; Chen et al., 2007). With respect to 
consequences, a standard feature of multi-criteria analysis is a performance matrix, or 
consequence table, in which each column describes an option or alternative and each row 
gives the performance of the alternatives against each criterion. The individual performance 
assessments are often numerical but may also be expressed ordinally, as “bullet point” scores, 
or by color-coding. Table 2.1 shows a simple example. The table is used by an owner to 
decide which contractor (bid) to choose. It shows the performance of a number of the 
different bidding contactors with regard to a set of criteria thought to be relevant to the 
owner’s choice among different contractors’ bids. These criteria are previous experience, 
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resources availability, reputation, financial strength, number of drawbacks, and price. As can 
be seen, some of these criteria are measured using cardinal numbers (price, number of 
drawbacks), some are expressed in binary terms (a tick indicates the presence of a particular 








A value represents the preferences of a DM with respect to a consequence. There are several 
ways for a DM to express preferences based directly on consequences. Among them, the best 
known are utility-theory-based definitions (Fishburn, 1970; Keeney and Raiffa, 1976) and 
outranking-based definitions (Roy, 1985). It should be kept in mind that some MCDA 
methods do not usually distinguish between consequences and preferences. For example, 
Nijkamp et al. (1983) gave scores the same meaning as preferences based on consequences. 
Some normalization methods can be regarded as transformations from consequences to 
preferences.   
 
Consequences, which represent objective measures of alternatives based on criteria, may be 
numerical data or simply nominal. Consequences must be distinguished from values. In 
determining consequences, the DM should not think of his or her opinion (what preferences, 
contributions, impact, or satisfaction are associated with a consequence). Values are refined 
Table 2.1:  Performance Matrix 
Alternatives 
      Contractor A Contractor B Contractor C Contractor D Contractor E 
Previous experience  √ √   
Resources availability  √ √ √  
Reputation √  √   
Financial strength *  *   






Price ($) 50,000 45,000 47,000 38,000 42,000 
√: the presence of a feature; *: the best financial strength; : the next best; all contractors that scored less 
than best or next best have been eliminated 
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data obtained by processing consequences according to the needs and objectives of the DM. 
The relationship between consequences and values can be expressed as 
     ( )i ij j jv f c=                                  (2.1) 
where ijv  and 
i
jc  are value and consequence, respectively, and (.)jf  is a mapping from 
consequence to the relevant value. Greater values of ijv  indicate increased preference.  
 
• Step 5: Evaluate the Decision   
A decision can be evaluated by an examination of different results throughout the decision 
process. Essential objectives, criteria, and DMs’ preferences should be logically reflected in 
the decision.  
 
• Step 6: Conduct a Sensitivity Analysis 
A sensitivity analysis provides a means of examining the extent to which vagueness about the 
input or disagreements among people make any difference in the final overall results. An 
important characteristic of MCDA models is that they are often remarkably insensitive to 
many specific scores and weights. This feature is often easily demonstrated through a 
sensitivity analysis. 
 
2.3 MCDA Methods 
MCDA techniques are distinguished from one another principally in terms of how they 
process the basic information in the performance matrix. Some of the MCDA techniques that 
are most relevant to the evaluation of an infrastructure proposal are the merit points systems, 
linear additive models, linear goal programming, the multiple attribute utility theory, and the 
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analytical hierarchy process (Ababutain, 2002). These techniques are discussed briefly in the 
following sections. For a discussion regarding other approaches to solving MCDA problems, 
one can refer to research by authors such as Belton and Stewart (2001), Hipel (1992), Hipel 
et al. (1993, 1999), Hobbs and Meier (2000), Roy (1996) and Saaty (1980, 2001). 
 
2.3.1 Merit Points Systems 
The merit points systems (MPS) method is the most common professional technique used for 
evaluating infrastructure and construction bid proposals. Many large agencies, such as the 
Untied States Army Corps of Engineers and the World Bank, utilize this technique in making 
infrastructure decisions, such as determining qualified bidders (Ababutain, 2002). This 
method is based on assigning relative weights to the relevant criteria. The next step is 
establishing a relationship between the total score of those features and the bid price. The 
winning bid will be the one that receives the lowest number of price-per-merit points. An 








A revised form of MPS could be established through the assignment of merit points to the bid 
price along with other technical features. In this case, the highest number of points is 
assigned to the lowest price. Accordingly, the winning bid is the one that scores the 
       Table 2.2: A Merit Point System Example 
 Points 
Technical Feature Total Bid A Bid B Bid C 
1. Previous experience 25 20 15 25 
2. Equipment availability 15 12 12 10 
3. Reputation for completing projects on time 20 15 10 10 
4. Staff qualifications 15 15 12 10 
5. Reputation for quality 25 12 7 10 
Total points 100 74 56 65 
Bid price ($)  500,000 450,000 470,000 
Price per merit point ($)  6,756.7 8,035.7 7,230.7 
Rank  1 3 2 
 21
maximum number of points. Although this model is easy to use and apply, it suffers from the 
drawbacks of subjectivity used in assigning points and the lack of established relationships 
between different attributes. 
 
2.3.2 Linear Additive Models 
A linear additive model is used when the criteria are independent of one another and when 
uncertainty is not formally built into the MCDA model. The linear model shows how an 
alternative’s values based on many criteria can be combined into one overall value. The value 
score for each criterion is multiplied by the weight of that criterion, and then the weighted 
scores are added together. However, this simple arithmetic is appropriate only if the criteria 
are mutually independent, and it makes sense to add weighted values across criteria for a 
given alternative.  
 
In linear additive models, MCDA techniques commonly apply two stages of numerical 
analysis to a performance matrix that has cardinal criteria expressed as values: 
• Scoring: the expected consequences of each alternative are assigned numerical values. 
• Weighting: for each criterion, a numerical weight is assigned to define its relative 
contribution to the final decision. The overall preference score or value for each 
alternative is simply the weighted summation of its values for all the criteria. Letting the 
preference value for alternative i on criterion j be represented by ijv  and the weight for 
each criterion be wj, then for q criteria, the overall score, vi, for the ith alternative, is  




i i i i i i
q q j q
j
v w v w v w v w v w v
=
= + + + + = ∑                (2.2) 
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Thus, scoring and weighting are the most challenging aspects of MCDA techniques. 
The above method is suitable if all data can be expressed quantitatively. For some decision 
problems, criteria or alternatives are hard to express entirely in a quantitative form or are not 
feasible in different situations. It is then recommended that the Elimination Method be used, 
which has the advantage of allowing the alternatives to be ranked without using quantitative 
weights. An example illustrating this method is presented in Section 4.4.1.   
 
2.3.3 Linear Goal Programming 
Linear goal programming (LGP) is a branch of a widely used set of decision-making 
techniques called mathematical programming. It is based on specifying an objective function 
for each of the selection criteria that emphasizes quantitatively what is to be achieved while 
considering any constraints (economical, social, political, or technical) on the project. LGP is 
utilized to find a “satisfying" solution to a decision problem that meets a set of aspiration 
levels rather than maximizing all objectives (Forgionne, 1990). The best proposal or scheme 
is the one that optimizes (maximizes or minimizes) the desired output while considering the 
predetermined constraints. 
 
Although this method of decision-making is straightforward and has been used in many 
operational research studies, it suffers from many drawbacks, such as the difficulty the 
ordinary decision maker has in formulating complex functions and constraints. This lack of 
skill explains the absence of mathematical programming for widespread use at the 
professional level (Libretore, 1987; Ababutain, 2002). In addition, many objective functions 
and constraints in infrastructure projects, such as social benefits and the environmental 
impact, are hard, if not impossible, to quantify in a straightforward manner. To overcome 
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these disadvantages, many research studies propose combining other decision-making 
techniques with LGP (Lotfi et al., 1992; Al-Ariami, 1993; Khoramshahgol and Steiner, 1988; 
Ababutain, 2002).  
 
2.3.4 Multiple Attribute Utility Theory  
The breakthrough in multiple attribute utility theory (MAUT) is the work of Keeney and 
Raiffa (1976). They developed MAUT, in which a set of procedures allows DMs to evaluate 
alternatives against multi-criteria. Their procedures contain three building blocks: the 
performance matrix, the procedures to determine whether criteria are independent of each 
other, and the methods of estimating the parameters in a mathematical function. The third 
characteristic allows the estimation of a single number index, U, to express the DM's overall 
valuation of an alternative in terms of the value of its performance based on each of the 
separate criteria.  
 
What makes the Keeney and Raiffa model potentially demanding to apply is, first, that it 
takes uncertainty formally into account, building it directly into the decision-support models, 
and, second, that it allows attributes to interact with one another in ways other than a simple, 
additive fashion. It does not assume mutual independence of criteria. Although well regarded 
and effective in its most general form, it is relatively complex and annoying to implement 
and highly subjective, time consuming, costly, and frustrating to apply (Forgionne, 1990; 





2.3.5 The Analytical Hierarchy Process 
The Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) was developed by Thomas L. Saaty (1980, 1990) in 
the 1970s. It is one of the most popular methods used for making a decision when there are 
multiple alternatives and criteria (Zahedi, 1986; Golden et al., 1989; Shim, 1989). AHP uses 
procedures for deriving the weights and the scores achieved by alternatives, which are based, 
respectively, on pairwise comparisons between criteria and between alternatives. Thus, for 
example, in assessing weights, the DM is posed a series of questions, each of which asks how 
important one particular criterion is relative to another for the decision being addressed. 
 
The strengths and weaknesses of the AHP have been the subject of substantial debate among 
specialists in MCDA (Barzilai, 1997, 1998; Zahedi, 1986; Golden et al., 1989; Shim, 1989; 
Goodwin and Wright, 1998; and French, 1988). More recently, Saaty (2001) has developed 
the Analytic Network Process (ANP), which is a generalization of AHP.  
 
2.3.6 Outranking Methods  
Outranking methods originated in France through the work of Bernard Roy and his 
colleagues starting in 1960 (Roy, 1973, 1985, 1996), and have been applied to a fair degree 
in some European countries (Roy and Vanderpooten, 1996). They depend on the concept of 
outranking, where one alternative outranks another if it outperforms the other with respect to 
enough criteria of sufficient importance (as reflected by the sum of the criteria weights). All 
alternatives are then assessed in terms of the extent to which they exhibit sufficient 
outranking with respect to the full set of alternatives being considered, as measured against a 
pair of threshold parameters (Dodgson et al., 2000). The main concern voiced about the 
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outranking approaches is that they are dependent on rather arbitrary definitions of what 
precisely constitutes outranking and of the ways the threshold parameters are set and later 
manipulated by the DM (Dodgson et al., 2000). 
 
2.3.7 Fuzzy Sets 
A different response to the imprecision that surrounds much of the data on which the 
decision-making process is based has been to look at the popular field of fuzzy sets 
developed by Zadeh (1972, 1973). Fuzzy sets attempt to capture the idea that the natural 
language of discussion is not precise. Examples of fuzzy expressions are “fairly attractive” or 
“rather expensive”, not simply “attractive” or “expensive”. Fuzzy arithmetic then tries to 
capture these qualitative assessments using the idea of a membership function, through which 
an expression (e.g., “fairly”, “mostly”, “very”) belongs to the set of “attractive” alternatives,                
with a given degree of membership lying between 0 and 1. 
 
Fuzzy MCDA models develop procedures for aggregating fuzzy performance levels using 
weights that are sometimes also represented as fuzzy quantities. More details and examples 
can be found in Chen and Hwang (1992) and also Roy (1985, 1996). However, some 
researchers have criticized these methods as being difficult for non-specialists to understand 







2.3.8 MCDA Software Survey and Results 
Decision support systems (DSS) are computer-based systems that furnish interactive support 
during the decision-making process. During the search for the best decision, they allow the 
user to retrieve data, test alternative solutions, and analyze and explore the impact of these 
changes. Jelassi and Foroughi (1989), Thiessen and Loucks (1992), and Kilgour et al. (1995) 
provide overviews and comparisons of existing decision- and negotiation- support systems (a 
name for DSSs developed for use in negotiations). DSSs gain their unique recognition from 
their capability of dealing with decisions that require human judgment and that cannot be 
solved by the computer alone (Olson and Courteny, 1992).  
  
A summary of a survey conducted by the OR/MS Today journal with respect to the decision 
analysis software available on the market is shown in Table 2.3. The study found that 19 
companies produce 28 different packages. Many of the vendors of multiple packages have 
developed very robust interfaces between their products. These features allow a user to 
implement a particular package for its intended purpose and then efficiently share the 
required information with another specialized product. 
 
The survey led to a number of conclusions (Maxwell, 2002):  
• The vast majority of the software is written for use with the Windows operating 
system. Three packages (Analytica, Netica, and TreePlan) have Mac OS versions. Netica 
has a version that runs under both the LINUX and Solaris operating systems. Three 
packages (Joint Gains, Opinions-Online, and Web-HIPRE) are offered as web-based 
applications. 
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• Ten of the packages have variants designed to support group elicitation, and eight 
packages support decentralized group activities. 
• Some of the packages indicate limitations on the model size and complexity that the 
software will support. Potential users should research these constraints carefully in the 
context of the types of models they are intending to construct. 
•  In general, decision analysis software has one of the two emphases: 
1. the elicitation and analysis of complex multi-criteria value functions, focusing on 
the second and fourth stages of the decision-analysis process, or 
2. the elicitation and analysis of uncertainties, emphasizing the third and fourth 
stages. 
The split across packages is roughly even, with 15 vendors offering approaches for 
eliciting value functions graphically and 10 vendors indicating they can do so for 
probabilities. One package, Expert Choice 2000, 2nd Edition, indicates that it supports the 
entire spectrum of elicitation graphically, as well as displaying analysis results graphically. 
In fact, the vast majority of the packages indicate that analysis results can be displayed 
graphically. 
 
• With regard to a software package's ability to support sensitivity analysis, 10 vendors 
indicate that their software has the capability of defining the probabilities and/or weights 





Table 2.3: Decision Analysis Software Survey (Maxwell, 2002)






















































































































































 Specific applications 
Analytica y y y y y y y y y y Business models 
cdpGEO 1.0 y y n y n y n n n n Resource allocation, portfolio management 
Criterium DecisionPlus (CDP) 3.0 y y n y n y n n n n Resource allocation, discrete choice, portfolio management 
Crystal Ball 2000 n y y n n n n n n n Financial analysis, budgeting and cost estimation, forecasting 
DATA 4.0 y y y y y y y y y y Cost-effectiveness analysis of healthcare options, environment 
Decision Explorer y y n y y y - y - y Strategy development, stakeholder analysis, project definition 
Decision Programming Language (DPL) y y y y y n y y n y Strategic business modeling under uncertainty 
DecisionPro 4.0 y y y y y y y n n n - 
The DecisionTools Suite y y y y y n n - y y Portfolio investment analysis, drilling decisions in oil and gas 
EQUITY y y n n n y y y n n Resource allocation 
Expert Choice 2000, 2nd Edition y y y y - y n n n n Resource allocation, IT portfolio management, project mgmt 
Frontier Analyst y n n n n n - - - - Performance measurement and resource allocation  
HIVIEW y y n n n y y n n n Evaluation of alternative MCDA 
Hi Priority y n n y n y y n y n Resource allocation, R&D budgeting, mergers 
Impact Explorer y y n y y y - y - - Risk analysis, option prioritization 
Joint Gains y n n n n y y n n n Multiple stakeholder negotiations 
Logical Decisions for Windows 5.1 y y n y n y y n n - Discrete choice, multiple stakeholders, engineering design 
Netica y y y y y y y n n n - 
NoRegrets y n n y n y y n y n Multiple stakeholder negotiation support 
OB Run y n n y n n y y y n Discrete choice with scenarios or stakeholders 
OnBalance y n n y n y y n y n Discrete choice scenario or stakeholders 
Opinions-Online n n n n n y y n n n Course evaluation, participatory policy analysis, voting 
PRIME Decisions y y n n n n y n n n Evaluation of discrete choices under incomplete information 
Risk Detective y y y y y y y n n y All 
TreePlan n y y y y n n - - - Sequential decision problems under uncertainty 
WINPRE y y n n n y y y y n Evaluation of discrete choice alternatives under incomplete info. 
Web-HIPRE y n n n n y y n n n Evaluation of discrete choice alternatives, multiple stakeholders 
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• The ability to exchange data with commercial applications, such as EXCEL and 
ACCESS, continues to increase. One package, Decision Explore, provides XML-based 
import and export functionality. Approximately five packages indicate that they support 
Monte Carlo simulation as a method for solving their models, and a significant number 
indicate that linear programming is now integrated into their tools. Netica continues to 
offer algorithms that present probability distributions for a network using data, 
subjective techniques, or a mixture of both. In addition, a number of packages advertise 
improved sensitivity analysis capabilities. 
 
• For problems involving multiple stakeholders and multiple competing attributes, tools 
that emphasize group support and value elicitation are probably most appropriate. 
Problems involving large uncertainties, diagnosis, complex interdependencies, or risk 
analysis would benefit most from tools such as Influence Diagrams, Bayesian Networks, 
or one of the Monte Carlo modeling tools. 
 
Whichever tools are selected, they should be intuitive to the user and should support easy 
iteration during the various stages of the decision-analysis process (Maxwell, 2002). 
 
2.4 The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution  
Infrastructure privatization is a complex multiple-criteria decision having multiple decision 
makers (DMs). It usually involves a resolution of a conflict among different concerned 
stakeholders with different socio-economic, political and technical backgrounds and interests. 
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Dealing with such decisions is very serious: any mistake can cause a catastrophe and, in 
many cases, irreversible damage. 
 
Finding the best tool for resolving social and economic conflicts, such as ones dealing with 
infrastructure privatization, is the aim of many researchers worldwide. They have developed 
many formal modeling techniques for systematically studying conflicts that have two or more 
DMs, each of whom can have multiple objectives. In particular, the graph model for conflict 
resolution (Fang et al., 1993) constitutes an expansion and reformulation of conflict analysis 
(Fraser and Hipel, 1984), which, in turn, is an extension of metagame analysis (Howard, 
1971). Other related techniques for describing human conflict include drama theory (Howard, 
1994, 1999), which allows one to consider the role of emotions in conflict resolution, and 
hypergame analysis (Fraser and Hipel, 1984; Bennett, 1980; Wang et al., 1988). These 
approaches to strategic decision-making situations can be considered as belonging to a 
branch of game theory that is quite distinct from more traditional methods based on the 
classical work of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953). Hipel et al. (1993) furnish an 
overview of the use of game theory models in engineering decision making while Hipel et al. 
(1999) explain the roles of the graph model for conflict resolution and of other operational 
research tools for refining and selecting courses of action to solve a given problem within a 
systems engineering context (Sage, 1991, 1992). The final decision in a graph model 








2.4.1  The Graph Model Methodology 
The graph model methodology consists of three main stages (Fang et al. 1993): modeling, 
stability analysis, and output interpretation, including sensitivity analyses. 
 
a) Modeling 
The first step is modeling. The graph model for conflict resolution represents a conflict as 
moving from state to state (the vertices of a graph) via transitions (the arcs of the graph) 
controlled by the decision makers (DMs). A graph model for a conflict consists of a directed 
graph and relative preferences for each DM taking part in the dispute. Let N = {1, 2, 3… n },  
denotes the set of DMs, and S = { }1 2 3,, , ..., ns s s s  denotes the set of states, or possible 
scenarios of the conflict. A collection of finite directed graphs G = {G1, G2, …Gn}, where 
{ }( , ),i iG S A i N= ∈ , can be used to model the course of the conflict, where the nodes are the 
states, and the arcs are the state-to-state transitions controlled by the DMs. If DM i can 
unilaterally move in one-step from state s to state 's , there is an arc with an orientation from 
s to 's  in  Ai. 
 
Formally, for each DM, i ∈  N, ( ){ }1 2 1 2 1 2, : , ,iA S S s s s s S s s⊂ × = ∈ ≠  is the set of state 
transitions or arcs controlled by DM i. For s1, s2 ∈S and s1 ≠  s2 , ( s1, s2 ) is an arc in DM i’s 
directed graph (S, Ai ) if DM i can cause, in one step, a transition from state s1 to state s2.  In 
this case, s2 is reachable for i from s1. One of the states in each conflict is the status quo, or 
initial state (designated as s0 ), and the conflict evolves as individual DMs unilaterally cause 
transitions among states. 
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The other component of a graph model is each DM’s preferences among states. A DM’s 
preference can be expressed in a relative sense by pairwise comparisons of states, through 
which a DM prefers one state to another or is indifferent between them. In general, for each 
DM , i ∈N, a preference relation i  expresses each DM’s preferences over S. The i  can be 
decomposed into a pair of binary relations {
i , i∼ }.  
 
Conventionally, DM i strictly prefers s1 to s2, written s2 i  s1, if and only if s2 i  s1 but not 
s1 i  s2. Also, DM i is indifferent between s2 and s1, then s1 i∼  s2, if and only if s2 i  s1 and 
s1 i  s2. These preference relationships possess the following properties: 
1. 
i
 is asymmetric: for any s1, s2 ∈S, s1 i  s2 and s2 i  s1 cannot hold true 
simultaneously. 
2. 
i∼  is reflexive and symmetric: for all s1, s2 ∈S , s1 i∼  s1, and if s1 i∼  s2  then s2 i∼  s1. 
3. {
i , i∼ } is complete: for all s1, s2 ∈S, then at least one of s1 i  s2, s2 i  s1, or  s1 i∼  s2 
is true. 
 
Preference information can be either transitive or intransitive. The Graph Model can handle 
both transitive and intransitive preferences. However, in most real-life conflicts, DMs’ 
preferences can be assumed to be transitive, and thus expressed as a ranking of the states 
from most to least preferred, where ties are allowed.  
 
Based on DM i’s preferences over states, the set S, can be partitioned into two sets, relative to 
a particular s ∈S, as follows: 
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{ }( ) :i m m is s S s s+Φ = ∈  is the set of all states sm,  that DM i prefers to state s;  and                                  
{ }( ) : ii m ms s S s s≤Φ = ∈   is the set of all states sm, that DM i finds equally or less preferred 
to state s. 
 
 In the Graph Model, DM i’s reachable list Ri (s), is the set of all states that DM i can 
unilaterally reach from state s ∈S, in one step.  Hence, the concept of unilateral improvement 
is built upon a DM’s preferences and on his or her reachable list. Accordingly, Ri (s) can be 
divided into two subsets: 
( ) ( ) ( )i i iR s R s s
+ += ∩Φ  is the set of unilateral improvements from state s for DM i; and 
( ) ( ) ( )i i iR s R s s
≤ ≤= ∩Φ  is the set of unilateral disimprovements from state s for DM i.  
 
b) Stability Analysis 
The stability analysis of a conflict is carried out through a determination of the stability of 
each state for every DM. A state is stable for a DM iff (if and only if) that DM has no 
incentive to move from it unilaterally under a particular behavioural model, usually referred 
to as a stability definition or solution concept. A possible resolution or equilibrium in the 
graph model is a state which all DMs find to be stable under that particular stability 
definition. 
 
A stability definition or solution concept defines how DMs may behave in a conflict in which 
each DM aims to achieve his or her goals. Because people may behave differently under 
conflict, a rich range of solution concepts have been defined. Solution concepts reflect 
different styles of behaviour (Fang at al., 1993) that incorporate a DM’s level of foresight, 
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willingness to make strategic concessions, risk attitude, and knowledge of others’ preferences 
(Kilgour et al., 2001). Table 2.4 outlines the solution concepts available for the Graph Model. 












Fang et al., (1993) define and mathematically compare the solution concepts listed in Table 
2.4 within the framework of the Graph Model. These solution concepts are applicable to 
models with two or more DMs. The first column gives the names of the solution concepts, 
and their acronyms. The second column contains a brief description of the way the solution 
concept is defined. The last four columns characterize the solution concepts qualitatively, 
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Limiting case of limited move stability as 









Table 2.4:  Solution Concepts and Human Behavior (Hipel et al., 2002)  
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c) Output Interpretation and Sensitivity Analyses 
The findings from the stability analysis stage can be interpreted in terms of the real-world 
conflict by analysts, actual DMs, or interested parties. New insights or information may 
sometimes justify recalculation; one can make appropriate changes in the model and re-
analyze it before continuing with the study. In sensitivity analyses, changes in the model 
parameters are made systematically to assess the robustness of the stability results. In other 
words, sensitivity analyses are used to answer “what if” questions. 
 
2.4.2.  The Decision Support System GMCR II   
Software packages have been designed to assist in interactive decisions involving multiple 
DMs . Some are based on metagame analysis, such as CONAN (Howard, 1989) and 
INTERACT(Bennett et al., 1994), others are based on conflict analysis, such as Decision 
Maker (Decision Maker, 1996) and SPANNS (Meister and Fraser, 1994). Recently, a DSS 
software has been based on the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (Fang et al., 1993), 
namely GMCR II (Hipel et al., 1997; Fang et al., 2003a, b). The advantages of GMCR II, 
which will be used in this research, are that it is embedded with an engine that utilizes the 
Graph Model for Conflict Resolution methodology, and its mathematical solution concepts 
help support the decision-making process and resolve conflict among different players 
concerned with a competing decision.  
 
GMCR II is a powerful analysis program that applies the concepts developed in the Graph 
Model for Conflict Resolution. It calculates the stability results of the solution definitions 
listed in Table 2.4. GMCR II (Hipel et al., 1997; Fang et al., 2003a, b) is written in C++ and 
is implemented on a Windows operating system platform. It offers three functionalities: easy 
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modeling management, convenient and effective analysis procedures, and display of results. 
Figure 2.4 depicts the structural design of the software. It consists of a modeling subsystem, 























The input is the basic information concerning the conflict under analysis, such as the parties 
involved; their options; specification of infeasible states; preferences for the generated 
feasible states; and other special information, including irreversibility among states. 
 
The modeling subsystem processes this information and generates the necessary information 
for the analysis engine. For every DM involved in the conflict, the engine performs a stability 
analysis for each feasible state in the conflict for each solution concept in Table 2.4 and then 
calculates the equilibria. The output interpretation subsystem responds to user requests by 




3. Irreversible moves 
4. Infeasibilities and indistinguishable states 
5. Preferences  





   
User Interface
Modeling Subsystems 
- Decision makers and their options 
- Generation of feasible states 
- Calculation of allowable state transitions 




- Status quo analysis  
Output Interpretation Subsystem 
- Individual and group stability 
- Equilibria 
- Coalition analysis 
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controlling which output is displayed via the user interface on the monitor.  More details 
about the use of GMCR II can be found in Fang et al. (2003a, b) and Hipel et al. (1997). 
 
2.5 Information Gap Theory      
This section introduces the idea of using information gap (info-gap) modeling (Ben-Haim, 
1985, 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2001a,b, 2006) into infrastructure privatization decision 
analysis and decision making. It is used in the formal consideration of the uncertainty that 
exists between what we know about a system and what we would like to know (Mack, 1971). 
This process will enable the DM to predict how credible and robust the privatization decision 
is with respect to the uncertainty caused by the lack of related information. Decision making 
under uncertainty is particularly important in privatization decisions in which some 
stakeholders are uncertain about their preferences among the options.  
 
2.5.1  Uncertainty and MCDA 
Uncertainty has been tackled through various approaches, including interval judgments 
(Saaty and Vergas, 1987), fuzzy logic (Zadeh, 1972, 1973), information gap models (Ben-
Haim, 1996), stochastic differential equations (Cox and Miller, 1965), Bayesian techniques 
(Ludwig, 1996) and multi-attribute utility theory (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976).  With the 
exception of multi-attribute utility theory, commonly referred as MAUT, and fuzzy sets 
theory, there has been little formal treatment of uncertainty in MCDA. However, the use of 
MAUT is restricted to problems involving probabilistic choice, in which case, a cardinal von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function applies (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953; Luce 
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and Raiffa, 1957). Detailed discussions of these uncertainty methods are given by Morgan 
and Henrion (1990), Zadeh (1972), and Restrepo et al. (1993).  
 
The info-gap model is completely non-probabilistic; it captures a DM’s preferences and 
attitude toward risk without resorting to “non-intuitive probabilistic concepts of gambling 
and indifference between lotteries” (Barzilai, 1997). Information gap theory utilizes convex 
modeling, which is particularly valuable since utility functions are not required (only value 
functions are necessary) and robust alternatives can be identified. Other advantages of using 
this approach are its ability to quantify the robustness of privatization alternatives (policies) 
with respect to uncertainty, and to identify policy alternatives that, while capable of coping 
with attribute variability, still achieve minimum requirements with respect to stakeholders’ 
values. Hipel and Ben Haim (1999) explain how info-gap models can be used in 
environmental and water resources management.  
 
2.5.2  Methods of MCDA with Uncertainty  
Because of the different types of available information (e.g., probabilistic/non-probabilistic, 
cardinal/ordinal, deterministic/stochastic), different MCDA techniques have been developed 
as shown in Table 2.5 (Levy, 2001). Which technique to use depends on the features of the 
decision problem. For example, ELECTRE methods (Roy, 1973) employ information in a 
fuzzy context, the AHP approach (Saaty, 1990) elicits ratio judgments, and the Elimination 
























Techniques for decision making under certainty include Optimal Control Theory, Cost- 
Benefit Analysis (CBA), Elimination Methods, and Multi-Attribute Value Theory (MAVT). 
The remaining five approaches in Table 2.5 – Interval Methods, Entropy Techniques, Multi-
Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT), and Information Gap Methods – apply to decision-making 
under uncertainty. 
 
It should be noted that all nine techniques listed in Table 2.5 could be used to help make 
decisions when the criteria are expressed in dollars. However, the treatment of decision 












































































Type of Impact          
Economic impact X X X X X X X X X 
Social impact   X X X  X X X 
Environmental impact   X X X  X X X 
Distribution of impact   X X X   X X 
Feasibility          
Technical & operational    X X    X X 
Legal & public policy   X X   X X X 
Type of Problem          
Physical system model X  X X   X  X 
Societal system model  X  X X  X X X 
Type of Tradeoffs          
Compensatory X X X X X X X X X 
Non-compensatory   X    X   
Type of Uncertainty          
Probabilistic uncertainty X X   X X X X  
Non-uncertainty         X 
Type of Information          
Quantitative (Cardinal) X X X X X X X X X 
Qualitative (Ordinal)   X  X     
Type of Analysis           
Extinction analysis X     X X X X 








consequences in purely monetary terms has attracted considerable criticism, particularly with 
respect to socio-environmental values and applications (Sagoff, 1988). 
 
2.5.3  Decision Robustness 
One important concept that should be considered in dealing with uncertainty and information 
gap theory is the robustness phenomenon (i.e., how robust a privatization decision is in lieu 
of missing or lack of information). Richards (1996) defines robustness as an insurance policy 
that is almost certain to pay off, but the amount of the payoff is not guaranteed. A robustness 
approach will not provide the optimal answer; rather, it offers insights that can lead to more 
adaptive and flexible strategies.  
 
The simplest set of robustness measures is the ratio of the number of “good” alternatives, 
options, or outcomes left open after an action is selected to the number of “good” alternatives 
open prior to taking the action (Gupta and Rosenhead, 1968). For example, in a planning 
situation in which the set of all alternatives is denoted by S, and the set of all acceptable 
alternatives is represented by S* (a subset of S), the set of alternatives attainable if the i th 
alternative (ai) is selected is denoted by Si, and *iS  represents the set of all acceptable 










 Figure 2.5: Categorization of Future Alternatives (Rosenhead, 1989) 
S: All Future Options
*
iS  for ai 
*S Unacceptable Acceptable 
iS  
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Rosenhead (1989) defines the robustness of an action (alternative) ai as 







                        (2.3) 
 
                            * *( ) ( ),iS S≤                                             (2.4) 
 
the robustness of any initial decision must lie between 0 and 1. The higher the robustness of 
an initial decision, the more acceptable the outcomes that remain open.  
 
2.5.4  Satisficing and Bounded Rationality 
Simon (1957, 1958, 1961, 1979) proposed a rationality framework for decision analysis 
called satisficing (a combination of the words “satisfactory” and “sufficient”). A DM who 
chooses the best available alternative according to some criteria is said to optimize; one who 
chooses an alternative that meets (or exceeds) specified criteria is said to satisfice. Of course, 
the satisficing solution is not guaranteed to be either unique or in any sense “best”. 
 
March (1978), Simon (1979), and March and Simon (1958) have noted that satisficing 
involves a bounded rationality in that decisions occur in a limited time frame, DMs are 
unable to acquire all the information they need, and DMs are not aware of all the information 
they need to know to make a decision. The term “bounded rationality” implies “somewhat 
less than perfect rationality” (Lewandowski et al., 1989). Experience shows that DMs usually 
satisfice, both in terms of failing to examine all the available information and also in the 
sense of choosing an alternative as soon as one has been found to meet minimum 
requirements against the criterion of concern (Rajabi, 1997). 
 
 42
2.5.5  Convex Models of Uncertainty 
The overwhelming volume of literature in the field of economics and the environment hold 
that decision making under uncertainty is probabilistic (Levy, 2001). However, in many large 
infrastructure projects and environmental problems, lack of information, expertise, and time 
to perform a probabilistic analysis are common as most of these problems are unique and 
have their own characteristics. Information gap theory provides the solution for this type of 
non-probabilistic uncertainty.  
 
Convex models of uncertainty are used to answer these questions; they require fewer 
assumptions and less data than probabilistic models for their formulation and verification. 
Accordingly, somewhat weaker assertions, with “starker interpretation” (Ben-Haim, 1999), 
will be accessible with convex models than with probabilistic models. Nonetheless, 
meaningful results can be obtained. 
  
In the literature, the mathematical formulation of convex models emerged in control theory 
(Schweppe, 1973), the seismic design of structures (Drenick, 1968), nuclear measurements 
(Ben-Haim, 1985), and mechanical analysis (Ben-Haim and Elishakoff, 1990). This 
formulation matches the idea of the perception of uncertainty that is common among 
economists and environmental managers. Hipel and Ben-Haim (1999), and Ben-Haim and 
Hipel (2002) used the term “information gap” models, or simply, info-gap, in place of convex 





2.5.6  Information Gap Theory/Convex Modeling  
The following example, which analyzes phosphorus levels in Lake Erie (Levy, 2001), 
describes the information gap theory and its convex modeling technique. Assume that the 
nominal (typical/anticipated) phosphorus level in Lake Erie is given by )(tP , a known 
function, and the actual phosphorus level, p(t), deviates by an unknown amount from the 
expected phosphorus level )(tP . This information may be quantified in an information-gap 
model of uncertainty. Consider the set of all phosphorous functions )(tP whose deviation 
from the nominal function )(tP is bounded byα : 
       ),( PR α { )()(:)( tPtPtP −=  }α≤  ,  ≥α  0                         (2.5) 
  
),( PR α  is a set of functions that contains all phosphorus functions consistent with the prior 
information, where α  is the uncertainty parameter, expressing the (unknown) phosphorus 
level. 
 
As explained by Ben-Haim (1996), this information uncertainty model, ),( PR α , is a family 
of nested sets for ≥α  0. This means that ),( PR α ⊆  ( )PR ,β  if βα ≤ . For fixedα , the set 
),( PR α represents a degree of uncertain variability in the lake’s phosphorus level )(tP . The 
greater the value of α , the greater the possible variation of phosphorus, soα , the uncertainty 
parameter, expresses the information gap between what is known, )(tP , and what  needs to 
be known for an ideal solution, the exact function )(tP . Robustness to uncertainty underlies 
the convex modeling approach: specified goals are attained, while at the same time the DM’s 
immunity to uncertainty is maximized. 
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Convex modeling (Hipel and Ben-Haim, 1999) is a vivid theory of uncertainty motivated by 
a severe lack of information. It does, nonetheless, have its own particular subtlety. It is 
simple enough to express the idea that uncertainty may be either pernicious or propitious. 
That is, uncertain variation may be either adverse or favorable: the robustness function is the 
greatest level of uncertainty consistent with no failure, while the opportunity function is the 
least level of uncertainty, which entails the possibility of sweeping success. If q  is a vector 
of parameters such as time, design variables, and model parameters, the robustness and 
opportunity functions can be expressed as the maximum or minimum of a set of α  values: 
 )(ˆ qα  =  max {α : minimal requirements are satisfied}               (2.6) 
 )(ˆ qβ  =  min {α : sweeping success is obtained}                (2.7) 
 
The robustness function )(ˆ qα is the immunity against failure, so a large value of )(ˆ qα is 
desirable. In contrast, the opportunity function )(ˆ qβ is the immunity against sweeping 
success, so a small value of )(ˆ qβ is desirable. 
 
Quite often, the degree of success is assessed by a scalar reward function )(uR , which 
depends on the vector q  of actions, decisions, and model parameters as well as on an 
uncertainty u  whose variations are described by an information-gap model )ˆ,( uU α . The 
minimal requirement in Equation 2.6 is that the reward be less than a critical value cr . 
Likewise, the sweeping success in Equation 2.7 is the attainment of the wildest-dream 
reward wr . The robustness and opportunity functions can be expressed more explicitly as 
),(ˆ crqα  = max { }cuUu ruqR ≥∈ ),(min: )ˆ,(αα    [Robustness function]            (2.8)      
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),(ˆ wrqβ  = min { wuUu ruqR ≥∈ ),(max: )ˆ,(αα }   [Opportunity function]          (2.9)             
 
As explained elsewhere (Hipel and Ben-Haim, 1999), the robustness function 
),(ˆ crqα decreases monotonically in the minimum required reward cr . This tendency 
expresses the trade-off between demanded reward and immunity to uncertainty: if a large 
reward is required, then only low immunity to uncertainty is possible. Conversely, the 
opportunity function ),(ˆ wrqβ increases monotonically in the wildest-dream reward wr : 
sweeping success cannot be attained at low levels of ambient uncertainty. This principle is 






























),(ˆ crqα  
Opportunity curve 
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 46
2.5.7  Convex Models and MCDA 
Suppose that prior knowledge exists about nominal (anticipated) attribute levels for an 
alternative j , i.e., the vector ),...,,( 21 njjjj xxxx = is known, but very little is known about 
how the actual attribute values deviate from these nominal levels. Then a convex model 
determines the robustness to variability of the j th policy alternative by considering the 
following three components (Levy, 2001): 
- A decision model to evaluate the overall value of each alternative, )( ixV : in this 
section, an additive value function model is employed. 
- The failure criteria, or conditions under which the alternative does not meet minimum 
requirements: the failure region may be written as )( ixV < cru . 
- The uncertainty model, or quantification of the variability inherent in the attribute 
levels: for the j th alternative, uncertainty can be modeled as a solid sphere centered 
at the point ),...,,( 21 njjjj xxxx = , with radiusα . This set, of the form 







2)( ≤   2α  },                     (2.10) 
is more likely to contain actual attribute levels as α increases. 
 
If J  is defined to be the set of decision alternatives, of which the DM must select one, then 
the evaluation of policy alternative Jj∈ is described by a vector of indicators, 
),...,,( 21 njjjj xxxx = , where n  is the number of indicators and ijx  is the performance level of 
alternative j on indicator i .  Let )(⋅iv be the value function for indicator i . Then, an 
amalgamation rule combines consistency-scaled component (marginal) value functions, 
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)( iji xv , into an overall index of value or worth, )( jxV . This result is achieved most often 
using a linear additive model, in which overall value is the weighted sum of scaled indicators: 
 






),(   =j 1, 2, 3, ....,m                               (2.11) 
 
The constant ik rescales the indicators to be comparable while at the same time indicating 
their relative importance. For the linear additive model to be a valid representation of the 
overall objective, the indicators should be preferentially independent (Keeney and Raiffa, 
1976), meaning that the level of any specific indicator does not depend on the levels of the 
other indicators. 
  
2.6 Genetic Algorithms for Multicriteria Optimization 
With recent advances in the artificial intelligence branch of computer science and the fast 
growth in computer technology, a new breed of optimization techniques, Genetic Algorithms 
(GAs), has emerged. GAs are search algorithms, developed by Holland (1975), which are 
based on the mechanics of natural selection and genetics and which search through decision 
space for optimal solutions (Goldberg, 1989). Impressed by the adaptive capabilities of living 
organisms to solve problems posed by their environment, Holland set out to abstract and 
explain the adaptive process of natural systems and to design artificial system software that 
retains the important mechanisms of natural and artificial systems. He developed a 
programming technique that operates in the same way populations evolve by following the 




Due to their perceived benefits, GAs have successfully been used to solve several 
engineering problems. Applications include the optimization of a contractor's markup 
strategy (Hegazy and Moselhi, 1994); steel truss roof optimization (Koumousis and 
Georgiou, 1994); resource scheduling (Chen et al., 1996); time-cost trade-off optimization 
(Li and Love, 1997); and resource allocations and management (Hegazy, 1999; Hegazy and 
Kassab, 2003). GAs are different from the traditional optimization procedures in the 
following respects (Goldberg, 1989):  
• During the search, GAs work with a group of possible solutions at the same time. In 
contrast, the traditional optimization procedures usually work with only one solution. 
• GAs work with the coding of the parameter set and not with the parameters 
themselves, thus allowing the use of a wide variety of parameters as decision 
variables. 
• GAs do not require gradient information about the objective function, which can be 
very difficult to obtain in many engineering problems. 
• GAs improve the search process in an adaptive manner using probabilistic transition 
rules, which guide a search easily toward a set of solutions, with improvement likely. 
These differences make GAs more robust for solving optimization problems. 
 
GAs are rooted in both genetics and computer science. Hence, the terminology used in GA 
literature is a mix of both and requires explanation (Goldberg, 1989). The strings in artificial 
genetic systems are "chromosomes" in biological systems. Chromosomes are composed of 
genes, which may take on a number of values called "alleles". In an artificial genetic search, 
strings are composed of characters (bits), which take on different values (1 or 0). 
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2.6.1 Basic Genetic Algorithms 
As shown in Figure 2.7, a standard genetic algorithm evolution process consists of the 
following steps (Hegazy and Kassab, 2002): 
1. Initialize a population of genes. 
2. Evaluate each gene in the population. 
3. Apply genetic algorithm operators (e.g., crossover and mutation) to generate offspring. 
4. Evaluate the offspring and delete members of the population to make room for the new 
genes if the offspring are fitter.  
5. If the stopping criterion is met, then stop and keep the best gene; otherwise, go back to 
Step 3. 
 
In evolution, the problem each species faces is to search for beneficial adaptations to a 
complicated and changing environment. In other words, each species has to change its 
chromosome combination to survive in the living world. In GAs, a string represents a set of 
decisions (chromosome combination), which are a potential solution to a problem. Each 
string is evaluated on its performance with respect to the fitness function (objective function). 
The ones with better performance (fitness value) are more likely to survive than the ones with 
worse performance. Then, the genetic information is exchanged between strings by crossover 
and is perturbed by mutation. The result is a new generation with (usually) better survival 
abilities. This process is repeated until the strings in the new generation are identical or until 





















Figure 2.7: Basic GA Flowchart (Son and Skibniewski, 1995) 
 
2.6.2 Genetic Algorithms Operations 
The reproduction operations of GAs represent the way in which a solution evolves. Basic 
GAs have three main operations: reproduction, crossover, and mutation (Goldberg, 1989). 
 
• Reproduction: The reproduction process allows individual chromosomes to be copied 
for possible inclusion in the next generation. The chance that a chromosome will be 
copied is based on the chromosome's fitness value, calculated from an objective 
function. For each generation, the reproduction operator chooses chromosomes that are 
 
Yes 
- Select two individuals
- Perform crossover 



















i = 0 
i =  MGen = Gen +1 
No
Crossover 
- Select one individual 
- Perform reproduction 
- Select one individual 
- Perform mutation 
i = i+ 1 
Legend: 
- Gen; current generation 
- M; population size 
- i; number of individual 
Mutation Reproduction 
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placed into a mating pool, which is used as the basis for creating the next generation. 
Because the total number of chromosomes in each generation is kept constant, 
chromosomes with lower fitness values are eliminated (Al-Tabtabi and Alex, 1999). 
  
• Crossover: Crossover (marriage) is by far a more common process (Caudill, 1991). 
The system selects two parent chromosomes, exchanges their information, and produces 
new chromosomes for the offspring. Each of the two parent genes is randomly selected, 
and the GA then calculates whether crossover should take place or not using a parameter 
called “crossover probability”. This parameter usually ranges from 0.6 to 1.0 (Al-Tabtabi 
and Alex, 1999). To produce offspring chromosomes, the exchange of information 
between the two parent chromosomes is accomplished through a random process, as 












Figure 2.8: Two-Point Crossover  
 
• Mutation: Reproduction and crossover alone can obviously generate a staggering 
number of different strings. However, depending on the initial population chosen, there 
may not be enough variety of strings to ensure that the GA searches the entire problem 
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Mutation helps prevent the population from stagnating by maintaining diversity 
throughout the GA's iterations. The GA has a mutation probability (usually less than 5%) 
that dictates the frequency at which mutation occurs (Goldberg, 1989; Holland, 1975). 
During mutation, a portion of the chromosome changes at random to generate a new bit, 













2.6.3 Other Genetic Algorithm Options 
The basic GA uses binary coding (i.e., 0 or 1) to represent the problem variables and also 
uses three operators (reproduction, crossover, and mutation) for the evolution process. Other 
options can be applied such as using real coding instead of binary coding and two operators 
instead of three, namely “crossover” and “mutation”. These two options are discussed in the 
following subsections. 
a)  Real-Coded GAs 
The genes might be coded using real-number representation as opposed to the binary coding. 
In addition to improvements in speed arising from the avoidance of the coding and decoding 
processes usually required with binary-coded GAs, real-coded GAs have other advantages. 
One of the main ones is the non-existence of redundant values in chromosomes, which occurs 
with binary coding. When the binary alphabet is used for coding a parameter belonging to a 
finite discrete set, some codes may be redundant (i.e., their decoding corresponds to values 
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that do not belong to the domain of the parameter) (Vairavamoorthy and Ali, 2000). For 
example, in the design of a water distribution system, if the number of commercially 
available diameters is 10, then when binary coding is used, a minimum of 4 bits are needed 
for coding the elements of the set of diameters. If codes 0000 to 1001 are used to represent 
the 10 diameters, then the codes 1010 to 1111 are redundant values that do not represent any 
diameter. These redundant values are inevitably generated when the crossover and mutation 
operators are applied.  
 
Another advantage of real-coded GAs is that they avoid the problem associated with the 
Hamming cliff, which is associated with binary coding (Herrera et al., 1995). The Hamming 
cliff effect is produced when the binary coding of two consecutive values differs in each one 
of their bits. For example, the strings 011111 and 100000 represent the values 31 and 32, 
respectively, and the value of each one of their positions is different. The Hamming cliff may 
produce problems, such as convergence towards local optima (Goldberg, 1991). 
  
b)  Steady-State GAs 
The steady-state evolutionary approach means that only one chromosome is replaced at a 
time, rather than an entire "generation" being replaced (i.e., the reproduction process). This 
steady-state approach has been shown to work as well as or better than the traditional 
replacement method (Rogers and Prügel-Bennett, 2000). 
  
The reproduction process among the population members takes place by either crossover or 
mutation. In crossover, two members of the population are chosen randomly in such a way 
that the probability of a member being selected is proportional to its relative merit to produce 
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a single child (Gaudill, 1991). Without violating the diversity of the random process, this 
method ensures that the best chromosomes have a higher likelihood of being selected. In the 
mutation process, one chromosome is randomly selected from the population, and then some 
of its information is arbitrarily changed. Once an offspring is generated by either method, it is 
evaluated in turn and can be retained only if its fitness is higher than that of others in the 
















Throughout the process, the entire population soon improves since fitter offspring 
chromosomes replace unfit parents (Gaudill, 1991; Bishop et al., 1991). In this case, the 
Evaluate relative merits and determine the 
worst population chromosome 
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Yes 
Last      
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Is the offspring better than 
 the worst chromosome in the 
population? 
Figure 2.10: Steady-State GA Procedure (Kassab, 2001) 
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This chapter reviews the literature that defines existing methods used in the decision-making 
process. In particular, Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) tools, the Graph Model for 
Conflict Resolution, the Info-gap Theory, and Genetic Algorithms (GAs) are discussed. 
 
MCDA techniques are effective tools for handling complex problems such as infrastructure 
management decisions because they can handle both the qualitative and quantitative aspects 
of the problem. Both traditional and non-traditional methods are presented.  Because conflicts 
often exist among stakeholders, the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution is introduced 
together with its methodology and solution concepts that can handle different kinds of human 
behaviour. Then, to deal with uncertainties with respect to stakeholders’ preferences due to 
missing information, information gap theory is presented to show its strength in identifying 
the most robust decision that satisfies the goals of all stakeholders. Finally, the techniques of 
a non-traditional optimization tool, the GA, are explained. The above decision-making tools 
are incorporated into the integrated decision support system (DSS) presented in Chapter 4, 









3.1   Introduction 
In recent years, in sectors such as transportation, water and power, an international trend 
has evolved toward involving the private sector in infrastructure systems management and 
operations.  Among the factors that have triggered the trend toward deregulation are aging 
infrastructure, escalating demands on infrastructure services due to population growth, the 
scarcity of governmental resources, the increase in globalization, and the realization by 
governments that they are unable to provide efficient services. These factors are operating 
around the world and have opened the door for private investors in more than 100 
countries (Thobani, 1999) to finance, manage, and own infrastructure projects that were 
once considered to be the sole responsibility of the governments. 
 
This chapter discusses infrastructure privatization, and, in particular, privatization of 
facilities such as water, wastewater, and power systems. It examines forms of Public-
Private-Partnerships (PPP), and concludes with a brief description of the advantages and 
disadvantages of privatization.  
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3.2   Private-Sector Involvement in Infrastructure Privatization 
According to the World Bank, many developing countries have encouraged the private 
sector to participate in infrastructure facilities, and between 1990 and 1999, more than 30 
developing countries have had at least one project completed by the private sector, as 










Governments implement infrastructure privatization for different reasons. Sanchez (1998) 
points out the following main reasons: 
• Economic 
Public funds are in short supply. Governments are facing a scarcity of the resources 
intended to finance infrastructure projects, and the gap between their infrastructure 
needs and available resources is growing. The symptoms of this problem range from 
poorly maintained transportation, water and wastewater, and power facilities to the 
partial or complete lack of essentials for life, such as drinking water, wastewater 
removal, and electricity networks. 
  
Challenged by these problems, many governments around the world have found 
complete or partial privatization to be a viable solution to their funding shortfall. These 
governments have started to implement policies and regulations to ease the way for the 
Table 3.1: Investment in Infrastructure Projects with PPP in Developing Countries (US $ billions) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Telecommunication 6.6 13.1 7.9 10.9 19.5 20.1 33.4 49.6 53.1 
Energy 1.6 1.2 11.1 14.3 17.1 23.9 34.9 46.2 26.8 
Transport 7.5 3.1 5.7 7.4 7.6 7.5 13.1 16.3 14 
Water and sanitation 0 1 1.8 7.3 0.8 1.4 2 8.4 1.5 
         Source: Roger (1999) 
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private sector to participate in public-service sectors, such as the deregulation of 
infrastructure systems and the letting of public services as concessions. 
• Pragmatic 
The private sector is very well known for its efficiency and innovation, especially in the 
field of customer-oriented service. It is capable of overcoming restrictions and obstacles, 
especially in the design-construction phase. Additionally, because of its nature as a 
profit-driven sector, it has the incentive to operate its facilities more efficiently, even 
with budget restrictions that allocate a percentage of the revenue to its target return on 
investment. However, for privatization critics, this feature represents a major drawback, 
especially for essential human services such as drinking water or sewage systems and 
even electricity. 
• Commercial 
Capital markets and innovative infrastructure financing mechanisms are expanding, as 
investors in many countries are diversifying their portfolios to achieve higher returns.   
• Social 
Proponents of privatization believe that it can help satisfy unmet basic human needs. For 
example, in Third World countries, private companies will increase the total supply of 
water to make a profit. 
• Ideological 
Privatization is also based on the belief idea that smaller government is better. 
 
Given these factors, governments around the world are increasingly turning to private 
financing to ease the burden on their budgets and to encourage better risk sharing, 
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accountability, monitoring, and management in the provision of infrastructure assets and 
services (Roger, 1999; World Bank, 2003). 
 
Globally, the decision to privatize water has been driven by several factors.  For example, 
in the United States and Canada, the decision to privatize began mainly as pragmatic and 
now is strongly ideological, as can be seen in the public policy push to privatize water on 
the part of libertarian and free-market policy institutions (Gleick et al., 2002). In Europe, 
privatization efforts were at first ideologically driven, but are increasingly characterized as 
having commercial and pragmatic advantages (Beecher, 1997). In developing countries, 
privatization efforts can be described as primarily financial and pragmatic, although some 
argue that social benefits are also significant (Global Water Partnership, 2000). As well, in 
recent years, several countries with a strong anti-capitalist ideology have chosen to explore 
water privatization for pragmatic reasons; China and Cuba, for example, have both 
recently awarded contracts to private companies to develop and operate municipal water-
supply systems and to build wastewater treatment plants (Gleick et al., 2002). 
 
3.3   Water Privatization    
Water and wastewater have traditionally been managed by governments and financed by 
the public sector and by user fees. However, due to the factors mentioned previously, 
governments are starting to push the private sector to become involved in this essential 
field, as confirmed in Figure 3.1. Privatizing water-supply and wastewater systems can 
also involve strong capitalistic incentives. The World Bank estimates that new investments 
required to provide water infrastructure over the next decade will exceed $60 billion US 
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per year (Gleick et al., 2002).  In the USA, the American Water Works Association 
released a study suggesting that $250 billon may be needed over the next 30 years just to 
update and maintain the existing drinking water system (American Water Works 
Association, 2001). In Canada, a report released by the National Round Table on the 
Environment and the Economy (Li, 2001) suggests that $50 billion CAD will be required 
in order to maintain and operate existing water and sewer utilities, with only half of the 
cost being recovered from the users. In addition, $90 billion CAD will be needed over the 









While privatizing water and wastewater systems is not a new idea and many forms of 
privatization have long existed in different parts of the world, the concept has resurfaced 
more prominently in recent years for a number of reasons: 
• Many public water agencies have been unable to satisfy the most basic need for    
      clean water for all humans. 
• Major multinational corporations have greatly expanded their efforts to take over   
            responsibility for a larger portion of the water service market than ever before. 











Figure 3.1: Number of Individuals Using Water from PPP (in millions) (Owen, 2002) 
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• Several recent highly publicized privatization efforts have failed or have generated    
       serious controversy. 
• The rapid rise in the standard of living and an increasing population have left no 
room for error, poor decisions, or mismanagement of these essential services. 
 
The privatization of water encompasses a variety of possible water-management 
arrangements. Privatization can be partial, leading to so-called Public-Private-Partnerships 
(PPPs), or complete, leading to the total elimination of government responsibility for 
water systems. At the extreme end of the scale, private water companies build, own, and 
operate water systems around the world, with annual revenues of approximately $300  
billion CAD (Gopinath, 2000). Such increasing involvement of the private sector has 
important implications for the supply of water and for human well-being. Along with 
increasing water privatization, there is also rapidly growing opposition among local 
community groups, unions, human rights organizations, and even public water providers 
(Gleick et al., 2002). 
 
 
3.4   History of Privatization 
Private involvement in water supply and its related systems has a long history. In the 
United States (USA) in the early 1800s, municipal services were often provided by private 
organizations. Toward the latter half of the nineteenth century, access and service 
problems started to surface, which led many municipalities to begin a move toward public 
control and management. This trend continued in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
until by 2000, public ownership of water infrastructure reached about 85% (Gleick et al., 
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2002; Beecher et al., 1995). In France, in the nineteenth century, the trend moved in the 
opposite direction: municipalities that had previously been responsible for providing water 
service began to contract services to private operators (Gleick et al., 2002). 
 
However, for most of the world, major privatization efforts are still a relatively new 
phenomenon, with major transfers taking place only over the last 10 to 15 years. By the 
end of 2000, at least 93 countries had partially privatized water or wastewater services 
(Brubaker, 2001). Nevertheless, less than 10% of water is currently managed by the 
private sector (LeClerc and Raes, 2001). 
 
Recently, European nations have implemented a variety of approaches. In 1989, in the 
United Kingdom (UK), for example, water supply and sewerage systems were entirely 
privatized through an asset sale (Bakker, 2004). In France, on the other hand, the 
Operation and Maintenance (O&M) and Build-Own-Transfer (BOT) forms have been 
successful. Germany and Italy are also exploring different forms of privatization. It should 
be noted that service providers in all four countries initially tried to keep prices low, but 
they have recently imposed large price increases in order to upgrade their plants and 
distribution systems (Gleick et al., 2002). 
 
The USA and Canada have moved more slowly toward privatization. The USA has long 
had a mix of privately owned and publicly regulated water and wastewater utilities, 
although an estimated 85% of residences still receive water from public agencies. With the 
failure of a few pioneering privatization decisions, such as in Hamilton, Canada, and the 
corruption scandals in large corporations such as Enron, voices calling for full 
 63
privatization have become less active, especially when it comes to vital services such as 
water and electricity. Recently, in Canada, many have called on the government to think 
carefully before considering any privatization decision. For example, in a recent book 
entitled Eau Canada: the Future of Canada’s Water, edited by Bakker (2007), more than 
16 articles by well-known academic and non-academic experts and researchers warn the 
public and government about choosing the wrong path in water privatization.    
 
In Third World countries, public water and wastewater services were the norm until the 
late twentieth century, when it become apparent that public water systems were 
consistently failing to provide universally good water and wastewater services and that the 
losses involved in wastewater treatment can be as high as 50%. Because of these failures, 
governments are increasingly seeking private-sector involvement ranging from minor 
subcontracts to full privatization.  
 
3.5   Major International Water Privatization Business  
Due to the large potential for profit from water service industries, many companies around 
the world have started to explore this business opportunity, as shown in Table 3.2. 
However, a few companies have dominated the main international water markets. Vivendi 
SA and Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux (now called Ondeo) are two companies that have 
participated in water ventures in more than 120 countries and claim to have provided 
water for more than 100 million people (FTGWR, 2000). Other companies have major 
water interests, including Thames Water and United Utilities in the UK, Bechtel and 











3.6   Forms of Privatization 
Despite the growing debate about privatization, considerable misunderstanding and 
misinformation exists about what the term itself means. Privatization can take the form of 
many different arrangements, agreements, and models. Only the most absolute form 
transfers full ownership of an operation to the private sector. Much more common forms 
leave public ownership of water resources unaffected and include transferring some 
operational responsibility for water supply or wastewater management from the public to 
the private sector. Privatization also does not, or should not, release public agencies from 
their responsibility for environmental protection, public health and safety, or monopoly 
oversight. 
 
Privatization can vary from a completely public to a completely private operation, with 
many variations in between. Some water system functions are more suitable for 
privatization than others. Table 3.3 lists several functions that could be assigned to either 
private or public enterprises, in combinations ranging from completely public to 
completely private operations. 
 
  






 by 2015 
North America 310 m 14% 65% 
Middle & South America 519 m 16% 25% 
Western Europe 389 m 38% 75% 
Central & Eastern Europe 341 m 4% 20% 
Middle East & Africa 1039 m 3% 10% 
Southeast Asia & Australasia 2041 m 4% 11% 
Middle & south Asia 1335 m  ? % 7% 
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Different countries have adopted different privatization alternatives for private-sector 
participation. Table 3.4 shows scenarios that could be developed using different 



























Smith (1999) describes some of the privatization forms as follows:  
1 Capital improvement planning and budgeting  
2 Finance of capital improvements 
3 Design of capital improvements 
4 Construction of capital improvements  
5 Operation of facilities 
6 Maintenance of facilities 
7 Pricing decisions  
8 Management of billing and revenue collection 
9 Management of payments to employees or contractors 
10 Financial and risk management 
11 Establishment, monitoring, and enforcement of water quality and other service standards 
Table 3.3: Possible Water-System Functions for Privatization 
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Investment Pr P P P Pr P Pr Pr P Pr Pr Pr Pr 
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     1- Operation and Maintenance; 2- Build-Lease-Transfer-Maintain; 3- Build-Own-Operate-Transfer; 4- Build-Transfer-Service-Maintain;  
     5- Build-Own-Operate-Remove; 6- Lease-Renovate-Operate-Transfer; 7- Design-Build-Finance-Operate; 8- Private; 9- Public;  
     10- Shared: Public/Private. 
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• Management Contracts 
Existing services and utilities are commonly privatized through the medium of 
management contracts, whereby the private sector takes over responsibility for the 
operation and maintenance of an existing facility that has previously been operated by 
the public sector. This arrangement may be especially useful when the public sector has 
a facility in need of upgrading or renovation but does not have the necessary funds 
available to carry out the work.  
 
• Build, Lease, Transfer (BLT) 
In this model, the facility is typically designed, financed, and constructed by the private 
sector and is then leased back to the government for a predetermined period at a pre-
agreed rental. Rental costs are commonly based on the costs of construction and 
financing and, according to Trosa and Schreiner (1994), will usually represent about 9-
10% of the investment costs. During the period of the lease, legal ownership of the 
facility rests with the private-sector partner, and at the end of the leasing period, the 
government typically has the option of renewing the lease, of buying out the private 
sector partner for a lump sum, or of simply walking away from the deal, leaving the 
facility in private-sector hands. The operation and maintenance of the utility during the 
lease period is typically the government's responsibility and, when operation and 
maintenance forms part of the original deal, the project may be described as build, lease, 
transfer, maintain (BLTM). The BLT model has been considered for use in different 
countries, such as Germany for the construction of motorways (Trosa and Schreiner, 
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1994), the United States for the construction of prisons (Havens, 1994), and Mexico for 
the procurement of power stations (Hollihan, 1994).  
 
• Pre-financing 
The pre-financing model is similar in many respects to the leasing model, but the major 
difference is that with the pre-financing model, the private sector initially finances and 
constructs the project, with the government paying off the full cost, including the 
financing charges, by a series of pre-agreed annual lump-sum payments over an agreed 
period (typically about 15 years). With this model, it is usual for the government to 
provide the land free of charge and also to prepare the initial route alignments in the 
case of roads and to obtain the necessary planning permissions. The government may 
prepare the final detailed design, with tenders being invited for financing and 
construction only, or the final design may be entrusted to the construction company on a 
design, finance, and construct basis. 
 
Tenders for the work are therefore comprised of an offer to finance and construct the 
works according to an agreed-upon specification in exchange for a laid-down series of 
lump-sum payments over an agreed time period. As in the case of the leasing model, the 
government may either operate the facility itself or may contract out the operation and 
maintenance to the private sector. 
 
With this approach, it is common for the ownership of the completed facility to pass to 
the government, and for the payments to begin immediately upon completion of the 
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construction work. Therefore, there is considerable incentive for the work to be 
completed in the shortest possible time. As with the leasing model, this approach has 
advantages because the developer's risk is normally limited to cost and time overruns on 
the construction contract and to fluctuations in the costs of providing the necessary 
capital. The German government has begun a program of 12 major motorway contracts 
using this model, totalling about 151 km at an estimated cost of about DM 3.89 billion 
(PFI, 1995). 
 
• Mixed Models  
A combination of the leasing and pre-financing models has been used for the 
redevelopment of the A2 motorway between Helmstedt and Berlin in Germany (Trosa 
and Schreiner, 1994). For this project, ownership of the scheme passed to the 
government immediately after construction, and the annual payments from the 
government depend on traffic flow.  Payments are calculated based on the number of 
vehicles using the road, with different types of vehicles generating different fees.  
 
The risks for the developer and for the government are thus significantly changed when 
this approach is used. Since payments are based on traffic flow, if traffic flow is lighter 
than predicted, then the developer suffers, but if traffic flow exceeds expectations, then 
government expenses increase.  Payments are therefore much more difficult to 




• Concession-Based Methods 
A wide variety of techniques have been developed based on the concept of a fixed-term 
concession, using various combinations of private-sector resources to design, construct, 
finance, and operate facilities. The concession makes provision for the ownership of the 
facility to be vested in the host government, which may occur either upon completion of 
the construction work or at the end of the concession period, depending on the terms of 
the concession agreement. It should be noted, however, that, in some cases, even if legal 
ownership is transferred upon completion of the construction phase, the operator is 
frequently required to be deemed to be the owner for taxation purposes. Upon 
completion of the concession period, the host government generally takes over 
responsibility for operation and maintenance of the facility.  
 
It is common for the concession period to include the design and construction period. As 
discussed earlier, concession-based approaches are among the oldest form of Public-
Private-Partnership programs. The terminology and acronyms used to describe 
concession-based projects are not, however, always used consistently, and different 
projects, which apparently use the same terms, may vary significantly in the actual 
contractual arrangements. On the other hand, a number of terms are virtually 






- Build, Operate, Transfer  
Build, Operate, Transfer (BOT), is often used as a generic term for concession-based 
agreements in which the facility is designed, financed, operated, and maintained by the 
concession company for the period of the concession, typically between 10 and 30 
years. The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) has produced 
detailed guidelines that discuss all aspects of the BOT family of approaches (UNIDO, 
1996). 
 
Under the "standard" BOT agreements, the concessionaire's involvement with the 
project terminates at the end of the concession period, and at this point, all operating 
rights and maintenance responsibilities revert to the host government. Legal ownership 
of the utility may or may not rest with the concession company. In many projects, legal 
ownership of the constructed facility is required to pass free of charge to the host 
government immediately upon completion of construction, but the concessionaire 
retains the right to operate the utility for the full concession period, effectively as a 
licensee. 
 
Walker and Smith (1995) contend that the Hong Kong Cross Harbour Tunnel, first 
conceived in 1958 and eventually opened in 1972, is probably the world's first modern-
day BOT project. More recently, British contractor John Laing entered into a joint 
venture in the late 1960s with the Spanish company Ferrovial for the construction and 
operation of a 109-km motorway between Bilbao and San Sebastian in Spain under the 
provisions of the Spanish government's Toll Motorway Construction Plan. Armstrong 
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(1994) reports that the 35-year concession was awarded in 1968, and the road opened to 
traffic in 1976. According to Armstrong, support provided by the Spanish government 
included: 
• A guarantee of 75% of the funds borrowed in international capital markets; 
• Subject to a premium of 0.2% per annum, a supply of foreign currency for the 
settlement of principal and interest, at the same exchange rate as that prevailing on 
drawdown, in respect of funds borrowed from capital markets; 
• An interest-free advance, equal to the difference in revenue between actual receipts 
and those for the target traffic density, subject to repayment only when traffic 
density exceeds the target by 5%; in consideration of this support, net dividends 
were capped at 10%. 
 
- Build, Own, Operate, Transfer  
Build, Own, Operate, Transfer (BOOT) describes the earliest concession model, 
although the late Turkish Prime Minister, Targut Ozal, is popularly cited as originating 
the phrase (Smith, 1999) "BOOT” in the 1980s in connection with proposals for the 
construction of power plants in Turkey. In this model, ownership of the utility rests with 
concessionaires until the end of the concession period, at which point, both ownership 
and operating rights are transferred free of charge to the host government. Host 
governments often consider legal ownership of the concessionaires to be undesirable, 




- Build, Transfer, Operate; Build, Transfer, Service, Maintain  
Build, Transfer, Operate (BTO) and Build, Transfer, Service, Maintain (BTSM) are 
technically terms that could be applied to any project in which ownership of the facility 
passes back to the host government upon completion of the construction phase. In 
practice, the terms tend to be used for projects in which the host government takes 
possession of and pays for the completed facility once construction has ended, with the 
developer being responsible for maintenance and operation of the plant for the period of 
the concession. This approach has been used for projects such as chemical waste 
treatment and waste recycling plants, which usually require very specific expertise for 
the design and operation but for which the revenue stream is difficult to predict with any 
degree of accuracy. Payment for the operation of the facility is often a combination of a 
fixed and predetermined "availability charge" covering the fixed costs of the facility, 
supplemented by a further variable charge depending on the extent of use. 
 
- Build, Own, Operate  
The goal of the build, own, operate (BOO) approach is, of course, outright privatization, 
but BOO projects are sometimes let on a concession basis for a fixed period of time with 
no provision for transfer of ownership back to the host government. In projects of this 
nature, the developer is responsible for the design, funding, construction, operation, and 
maintenance of the facility during the concession period, at the end of which several 
options might apply. Typically, the project agreement might provide for one or more of 
the following options: 
• Renegotiation of the original agreement for a further concession period; 
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• Negotiation of a new agreement on a renovate-operate basis; 
• Purchase of the facility by the host government, who may then, of course, let a 
separate lease, renovate, operate, and transfer the concession; 
• Termination of the facility, in which case, the developer may be responsible for 
decommissioning, demolition, and reinstatement of the site; in this case, the project 
may be defined as build, own, operate, remove (BOOR). 
  
An example of a project of this type is the $25 million AUD, Yan Yean Water Treatment 
Plant constructed outside Melbourne (Australia) by a Transfield-North West Water joint 
venture; the plant is required to be removed and the site reinstated at the end of the 25-year 
concession period (Young and Sidwell, 1996). 
 
- Lease, Renovate, Operate, Transfer 
The Lease, Renovate, Operate, Transfer (LROT) approach may be used when a host 
government already owns a facility that requires modernization and improvement, or it 
may be used as a "follow-up" to an existing concession once it reaches the end of the 
concession period. In this case, the private-sector operator pays a rental to the 
government, undertakes to renovate the utility to a pre-agreed standard, and in 
exchange, is granted a concession to operate the facility for a fixed period of time and to 
charge a fee for the service. The private-sector partner is responsible for financing and 
carrying out any required refurbishing work in addition to regular maintenance during 
the concession period. This approach has been widely used in some parts of the world, 
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such as for government-owned car parks and vehicular tunnels in Hong Kong and for 
water and sewage treatment plants in Malaysia.  
 
- Design, Build, Finance, Operate  
Design, Build, Finance, Operate (DBFO) is a term coined by the UK Highways Agency 
to describe its concession-based road schemes let under the Private Finance Initiative. 
The basis of the "standard" DBFO contract is defined by the Highways Agency (1995) 
in the following terms: 
The private sector partner (the DBFO concessionaire) will be 
• Responsible for the design, construction, maintenance (i.e., capital, routine, and 
winter maintenance), and operation of the project road;  
• Responsible for financing the project; 
• Granted a long-term right of access (probably 30 years) to the project road by the 
Secretary of State for those purposes; 
• Paid by the Department for delivery of specified services in the form of payments 
over the life of the contract. 
 
In addition to the free provision of any necessary land, the public sector contribution is 
likely to include some or all of the following, depending on the detailed requirements of 
particular projects: 
• A right of access to the project road without charge; 
• DBFO payments, which are expected to include traffic-related payments, usually 
based on shadow tolls (payments made by government to the private sector operator 
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of a road based, at least in part, on the number of vehicles using the road, first 
proposed in the UK by the Conservative government in 1993); lane-closure charges; 
and additional payments for initiatives designed to improve safety. 
 
Significant features of the DFBO contracts are as follows: 
• No rights of ownership are conferred on the developer, neither does the developer at 
any point acquire any interest in the land. The Secretary of State remains the 
highway authority throughout the contract period. 
• The DBFO contractor is given merely a right of access to the road, and effectively, a 
"licence" to operate it, normally for a period of 30 years. 
• Five years before the end of the operation period, a joint inspection is held to 
identify any work which the operator is required to carry out before the road is 
handed back to the Highway Agency. 
• Payment is made on the basis of traffic flow at predetermined "shadow tolls". The 
level of the shadow tolls forms an element of the DBFO tender. 
• Some protection is offered in the form of increased payments in the event that the 
public-sector partner changes the conditions under which the road operates (e.g., if 
other competing roads are upgraded during the contract period, thus reducing traffic 
flow). 
 
- Design, Construct, Manage, Finance; Design, Build, Finance, Operate, Manage  
Design, Construct, Manage, Finance (DCMF) and Design, Build, Finance, Operate, 
Manage (DBFOM) are terms used in connection with projects let by the British Private 
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Finance Initiative (PFI). These projects are very similar in many ways to build, own, and 
operate concessions.  
 
3.7   The Advantages and Drawbacks of Privatization 
Infrastructure privatization and, in particular, water and wastewater privatization, has been 
the subject of extensive controversy. Supporters include as governments, who hope to ease 
the burden of providing financial and administrative support for these services; private 
agencies looking for new opportunities in business markets; and researchers who have 
found in the idea an interesting new method for solving development problems in different 
parts of the world. On the other hand, many groups, such as environmentalists, 
researchers, unions, and in many cases, the direct customers, have criticized the trend 
toward privatization and have been totally or in part opposed to the idea of privatization as 
having no potential good for society. They believe the privatization agenda to be a game, 
with the sole beneficiary, a corporation hungry for profit and the sole loser, the public.  
 
Conflict among the groups has been seen in many places, from conferences to legislatures 
and violent public demonstrations. Pro-privatization groups and oppositions groups each 
have their own points to support their views. Figure 3.2 lists a summary of the arguments 
put forward by both sides. 
 
3.8   Summary 
The extensive cost of infrastructure systems and the strong movement toward privatization 





















 Corporations have to make profits 
 Improvements in efficiency reduce water sales and revenues 
 Efficiency programs are eventually ignored or even cancelled  
 
 Private corporations will bring money and the interest increases user costs 
 Privatization companies are mostly international 
 National sovereignty will be questioned 
 
 Corporations are corrupt 
 PUMP (Hamilton waste water plant disaster), Enron, World Com  
 
 
 Poor cannot pay 
 Privatization will lead to higher costs for water and water services 
 
 Privatization contracts are ambiguous 
 Almost all past privatization cases ended in disputes 
 
 
 Privatization contracts often fail to guarantee ecosystem water requirements  
 Privatization may be irreversible 
 Long-term contracts 
The loss of internal skills and expertise 
 Management expertise, engineering knowledge, and other    
   assets in the public domain may be lost forever 
 
Private sector will bring 
efficiency and effectiveness 
Corporate codes thwart 
corruption 
Special capability of dealing 
with customers 
Management not sensitive to 
the voters 
Private sector is 
accountable 
Access to international 
 capital markets 
Privatization 
Proponents 




all the key issues of selecting a successful proposal, such as possible alternatives, stakeholders’ 
values, and relevant criteria. 
 
In this chapter, a discussion of the infrastructure privatization trend and its history was presented, 
in particular, with respect to the privatization of facilities such as water, wastewater and power 
systems. Forms of Public-Private-Partnerships (PPP) were examined, and a brief description of 









4.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the framework of the proposed decision support system. It begins with a 
description of the main characteristics of the infrastructure privatization problem, followed by 
a presentation of the main components of the decision support system (DSS), along with its 
concepts and experimental tests.  
 
4.2 Characteristics of the Privatization Problem 
As with any decision-making problem, a privatization decision requires careful identification 
and analysis of suitable privatization alternatives, stakeholders’ needs, and assessment criteria. 
The main functions that can be privatized are ownership, investment, operation, billing, and 
maintenance. Various combinations of these functions produce different Public-Private-
Partnership (PPP) alternatives. Each of these alternatives suits specific circumstances and 
stakeholders’ preferences to different degrees. Accordingly, the three main components of the 
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privatization problem are privatization schemes and alternatives, stakeholders and their 
preferences, evaluation criteria, and ranking of preferences. These components are identified 
further in the following subsections. 
 
• Privatization Schemes and Alternatives 
As presented in Chapter 3, many privatization scenarios have been described in the literature. 
The basic water system functions that can be privatized are shown in Table 3.3. Combinations 
of these basic functions produce hundreds of different PPP alternatives; each suits specific 
circumstances and stakeholder preferences. The alternatives cover a wide range, from the 
British model of full privatization that sells and transfers the complete infrastructure-asset, 
through the French model that privatizes infrastructure management and keeps asset 
ownership in government hands, to the “full” public infrastructure, with a wide variety of PPP 
scenarios in between. 
 
• Stakeholders (Decision Makers) and their Preferences  
As a basis for the comparison and evaluation of privatization scenarios, five main interest 
groups of privatization stakeholders are listed in Table 4.1, based on the extensive 
privatization literature survey presented in Chapter 3. The first is the provincial government, 
which is currently the biggest investor in infrastructure projects in the water and wastewater 
management field. The second is the municipality or local government that owns and operates 
its own infrastructure facilities. The third is the employees of the current central and local 
water and wastewater facilities, who are normally represented by a powerful union. The fourth 
group is the consumers who make use of water services. The fifth is the environmental groups, 
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who focus on environmental protection. This group is gaining substantial strength due to its 
influence on public opinion. The key preferences of each decision maker (DM) are shown in 



















• Evaluation Criteria 
Based on the literature reviews in Chapters 2 and 3, six different categories of criteria that 
cover the qualitative and quantitative aspects of privatization have been compiled for this 
study, namely, public and social, technological, operational and administrative efficiency, 
economic, environmental, and political, along with their associated criteria or subcriteria. The 
subcriteria in each category are shown in the right-hand column of Table 4.2 and can be 
appropriately expanded or revised, as required for a given situation. 
 
Some of these evaluation criteria are numeric (quantitative) in nature, such as economic 
criteria or subcriteria. Other criteria are not numeric (qualitative) in nature such as the public 
and social aspects, technology, operational efficiency, environmental effects, and political 
Interest Groups Descriptions Major Preferences 
Provincial 
Government 
It has full responsibility for the privatization of public infrastructure and 
partial responsibility at the local level. It is accountable to the public and 
tries to reach a compromise between the interests of provincial 




This group can be the municipal government of a city or rural area. It 
may wish to privatize its infrastructure assets and thereby increase 
business efficiency. It prefers to manage them directly for regional 
development. 
Private partners to have 
less influence  
Employees 
This group is concerned about privatization due to fear of loss of job 
security after privatization. It is also interested in enhancing its own 





This group is generally concerned about service quality, system 
management, and cost and strongly demands improvement in efficiency. 
In addition, it is concerned about the trade-off between the public 
interest and creation of monopolies due to privatization.  




This group is concerned about environmental protection and about 




Table 4.1: Stakeholder Groups in Privatization (Loxely, 1999; Kay and Metz, 2001; Park, 1999; 
the World Bank Group, 1999; Catley-Carlson, 2002; Gleick et al., 2002: Owen, 2002)  
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criteria. For this thesis, through the use of proper decision-analysis tools, extra effort therefore 
















• Ranking of Preferences 
 Different stakeholders have different preferences for each criterion and its attributes. For 
example, the provincial government prefers supporting “reduction in government subsidies”, 
while the municipalities do not like the idea of the private sector interfering in their essential 
services. In addition, in the case of the British model of full privatization and asset sale, job 
security is the main concern of the employees’ group. Accordingly, the stakeholders’ 
preferences are classified into six levels that represent the various degrees of acceptance or 
Table 4.2: Privatization Criteria and Subcriteria. (UNIDO, 1996; Loxely, 1999; Lobina and 
Hall, 2001; Kay and Metz, 2001; Park, 1999; the World Bank Group, 1999; Catley-Carlson, 
2002; Gleick et al., 2002: Owen, 2002)  
  Evaluation Criteria  Subcriteria 




 Concerns about low-income users  
 Increase in service coverage  
 Governmental ability to control fees  
 Reduction in the inequality in infrastructure between regions  
 Consumers’ opportunity to supervise and provide feedback  
 Integrated provincial development  
  Technology 
 
 
 Technological development 
 Expertise of employees 
 Introduction of advanced technology  
 Long-term accumulation of technology  





 Improvement in efficiency due to competition  
 Prevention of bureaucratization  
 Elimination of political intrusion  
 Elimination of corruption 
 Welfare of employees 
 Job security 





 Securing investment resources 
 Reducing government subsidies  
 Monopoly and profits 
 Cost reduction due to competition  
 Recognition of the economies of scale  
 Degree of risk transfer 
  Environmental Effects 
 
 Applicability of strict environmental standards  
 Establishment of efficient environmental regulation systems  
 Regional management of local infrastructure   
 Consumers’ involvement and observation  
  Political 
 
 
 Percentage of foreign ownership  
 Trade with another country  
 Access to specific areas (e.g., industrial)  
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rejection as follows: 1 = very bad, 2 = bad, 3 = normal, 4 = good, 5 = very good and 6 = 
excellent. This numerical score facilitates the process of data management and manipulation 
on a spreadsheet. 
 
4.3  Design of the Proposed Decision Support System 
Based on the literature reviews carried out in Chapters 2 and 3, a decision support system 
(DSS) for infrastructure privatization has been structured. The main components are shown in 
Figure 4.1, and the development of each component is described in the following sections. 












 Figure 4.1: Components of the Decision Support System 
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The advantages of the DSS design include the following: 
1. Use of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution approach as a basis for the proposed 
DSS; the graph model technique is implemented in a more transparent way; 
2. Consideration of both numeric and non-numeric criteria within the Elimination 
Method of MCDA; 
3. Extension of the Graph Model with Genetic Algorithms (GAs) optimization as a new 
way to calculate stability and thereby optimize decisions; 
4. Extension of the GA-Graph Model to consider the impact of uncertainty in the decision 
makers’ payoff values using the Info-Gap theory approach 
5. Implementation of the proposed “GA-Graph Model-Info-Gap” approach in a new 
friendly computer system and experimentation with it in case studies. 
 
Elimination Methods of 
MCDA
Graph Model for 
Conflict Resolution 
Optimization 
(e.g., Genetic Algorithms) 
Info-Gap Theory 
• Removal of infeasible alternatives 
• Ranking of feasible alternatives 
• Numeric and non-numeric criteria 
• Game theory: action and counteraction 
• Optimizing moves and countermoves 
• Uncertainty 
• Decision robustness 
New 
DSS 
Figure 4.2 Considerations in the Design of the Proposed DSS 
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4.4 Components of the Proposed Decision Support System 
The privatization problem is clearly described using the identified PPP alternatives, criteria, 
stakeholders, options, and preferences, as described in Section 4.2. To establish the credibility 
of this framework for decision making, the main techniques shown in Figure 4.2 were 
experimented with. These techniques include the Elimination Method for Multiple Criteria 
Decision Analysis (MCDA), the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution, the Genetic Algorithms 
technique for optimization, and the Information Gap Theory for uncertainty assessments. An 
examination of each method is presented below. 
 
4.4.1 MCDA: The Elimination Method 
Privatization decision problems are often complex, with many criteria and alternatives to be 
considered. Measures of progress towards objectives cannot be expressed entirely in 
quantitative form or are not feasible in certain situations. Under these circumstances, a series 
of techniques under the general title of Elimination Methods (MacCrimmon, 1973; Radford, 
1989) offer the ability of ranking the privatization alternatives in order of preference without 
using quantitative assessments and weights. The advantage of the selected Elimination 
Method in the case of privatization is that it provides the ability to eliminate some of the 
alternatives that do not meet certain threshold values of acceptance. This feature is especially 
useful in privatization problems because stakeholders can have specific acceptance thresholds 
or a logical combination of many thresholds. Background information and examples 
illustrating these methods can be found in MacCrimmon (1973) and Radford (1989).   
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The Elimination Method in MCDA constitutes a generalization of the “preference tree” 
method originally suggested by Fraser and Hipel (1988) and later reported on by Hipel and 
Meister (1995).  Although Fraser (1993) suggested the use of the preference tree in MCDA, 
the following description provides a correct approach for defining the methodology based on 
the option prioritization idea of Fang et al. (2003a). 
 
Definitions: 
 Mathematically, the Elimination Method can be defined as follows: 
Alternatives: Let A be the set of alternatives given by   
A = {A1, A2, …, Ai,…An}, where  n ≥  2 
Criteria: Let Q be the set of criteria given by 
Q = {1, 2, …,j, …q} where q ≥  2 
Evaluation: The elimination method works for either consequences or values (Section 2.2). 
For explanation purposes, the procedure is explained using consequences. 
i
jc  = the consequence of criteria i with respect to alternative A
i, such that for every i , j, and k, 
one of the following holds: 
i
jc  > 
i
kc  : criterion j is better satisfied by either alterative A
i if a higher value of j is desirable, 
or Ak , otherwise 
i
jc  < 
i
kc  : criterion j is better satisfied by alternative A
k, if a higher value of j, is desirable, or Aj 
otherwise 
i
jc  = 
i
kc : criterion j is equally satisfied by alternatives A
j or Ak. 
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It should be note that these values do not actually need to be determined but are simply a 
convenient way of distinguishing between more desirable and less desirable features of an 
alterative. The criteria can be inherently cardinal or ordinal. 
Preference Statements (threshold statement): A preference statement Ω is of the form  
i
jc  R 
i
tc   
where R is one of the equivalence relations <, ≤ , =, >, or ≥ ; while itc  is a threshold 
consequence and distinguishes the consequences of a criterion for which a set of alternatives 
are desirable. It splits a set of alternatives based on a particular criterion consequences. In 
addition, depending on the actual threshold consequences given, it is possible that some 
alternatives will be ranked equally.   
Conditional Preference Statement: A conditional preference statement Ωc is 
Ωc: Ω' IF Ω", or 
Ωc:  Ω' IFF Ω", 
where IFF means “If and only if”, and where Ω' and Ω" are preference statements. 
 
A conditional preference statement is like a preference statement except that the existence or 
form of the left-hand side (LHS) depends on the truth of the right-band side (RHS). In the 
Elimination Method, the user is asked to provide a priority ordered set of preference 
statements for the DM. Each preference statement takes a truth value, either True (T) or False 
(F), at each particular alternative. The relative importance of a preference statement is 
reflected by its position in the tree (list): a statement that occupies a higher place in the tree 
(list) is more important in determining the decision maker’s preferences. 
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The order of preferences of the alternatives can be determined in the following way: 
Let {Ω1, Ω2,..., Ωk,} be the list of preference statements; then an alternative A1∈   A is 
preferred to A2 ∈  A iff ∃ j, 0 < j≤ k, such that 
Ω1(A1) = Ω1(A2) 




Ωj-1(A1) = Ωj-1(A2) 
Ωj (A1) = T and Ωj (A2) = F 
Similarly, A2  is preferred to A1 if T and F are reversed in the last line. If there is no such j, then 
A1 and A2 are indifferent. In summary, A1 is preferred to A2 if and only if the first statement on 
which A1 and A2  have different truth values is true for A1and false for A2. 
 
Preference statements are expressed in terms of options and logical connectives. A preference 
statement can be non-conditional, conditional, or bi-conditional. A non-conditional statement 
is expressed as a combination of available options, joined by connectives, including the 
conjunction “and” or “&" and the disjunction “or”. In this sense, non-conditional preference 
statements are no different from direct specification statements. 
 
 A conditional or bi-conditional statement consists of two non-conditional statements 
connected by an “IF” or “IFF”, respectively. The truth value of a conditional or bi-conditional 
statement at a state depends on the truth values of its two non-conditional components 
according to the conditional or bi-conditional truth table defined in mathematical logic (Rubin, 






For example, according to the conditional truth table, the statement “Technical Transfer  must 
be  ≥ 8% IF Foreign Shareholders  ≤ 20% ” is True at any alternative that satisfies the 
statement and at any alternative for which the option “Foreign Shareholders > 20%”  is 
selected (which makes it false).  
 
The Elimination Method’s capacity to handle complicated logical combinations of options is 
very useful in practice, as most DMs’ preferences tend to be expressed in a few rather simple 
statements. Generally speaking, the Elimination Method can express richer and more flexible 
preference information in an ordinal fashion that overcomes many difficulties encountered in 
getting cardinal information, and hence is recommended to users who feel comfortable with 
this methodology. 
 
Once the preference statements for the problem are set and listed in an ordinal fashion, a 
ranking scheme is used to classify the alternatives by assigning a “score” Ψ (Ai) to each 
alternative according to its truth values when the preference statements are applied. These 
scores are in their highest value at the top of the tree (or list) and decrease the further down 
they are on the tree branches (or list).  If k is assumed to be the total number of statements that 
have been provided, and Ψj (u) denotes the incremental score for alternative (Ai) based upon 
the statement Ωj, then 0 < j ≤ k. Define  
Table 4.3: Truth Table 
A B -A A & B A/B B IF A B IFF A 
T T F T T T T 
T F F F T F F 
F T T F T T F 
F F T F F T T 
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         2k-j  if Ω j (Ai) = T 
           Ψj (Ai) =            
          0     otherwise 
 and 
           Ψ (Ai) = ∑ Ψj (Ai) 
 
 
The alternatives can then be sorted according to their scores, which will produce exactly the 
same ranking as the tree presentation. Again, it should be emphasized that the cardinal “score” 
plays only a temporary role in determining the ranking.  
 
The above mathematical definitions for the Elimination Method can be illustrated 
linguistically using the problem characteristics described in previous sections (Tables 4.1 and 
4.2). As shown in Figure 4.3, for simplicity, only five alternative privatization schemes are 
used. To apply the Elimination Method, these steps are followed: 
 
1. Rank the criteria from most important at the top to least important at the bottom (based on 
brainstorming). Then, score each alternative with respect to each criterion (numeric and 
non-numeric scores are possible) as shown in Figure 4.3a.  
2. Specify the threshold level of acceptance for each criterion (Figure 4.3a). For example, 
politically, the percentage of foreign shareholders of a concession should not exceed 50%.  
3. Starting with the top criterion, put an X against any alternative that fails to meet the 
evaluation factor or minimum threshold level for the criterion under construction (Figure 
4.3b). For example, the leasing alternative fails against the criterion of providing 
Technology Transfer (its score is 8%, which is less than the stipulated 10% threshold). 
4. Continue with Step 3 for all of the criteria. The final results are displayed in Figure 4.3b. 
5. Rank the alternatives according to their compliance with the elimination rules. 
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6.  To break ties, the alternative that violates more criteria should be ranked lower. 


















As can be seen from this example, the strength of this technique is its simplicity in identifying 
and eliminating less desirable alternatives. In addition, the user can use richer rules that have 
combined and/or conditional thresholds. Thus, this technique is utilized in the proposed DSS 
model as a pre-processor which can be used in the initial stage to eliminate privatization 
b) Appling the Thresholds Rules  
 Score for Privatization Alternatives 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Ranked Criteria 
Threshold 
Levels Asset Sale Leasing O & M BOT Service Contract 
Public and Social Impact    ≥ B+ B+ B- B+ B+ B- 
Technology Transfer (%)    > 10 % 15 8 13 7 12.5 
Operational Efficiency    ≥ 10% 40 15 20 30 12 
Economic Cost Reduction (millions)   ≥ 1m 1.6 1.1 1.2 0..9 1.75 
Degree of Risk Transfer to Government   < 35% 10 29 25 25 25 
Environmental Protection    > B C B C+ A B- 
Political (Foreign Shareholders)   ≤ 50% 60% 15% 9% 20% 70 
 
 
 Privatization Alternatives 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Ranked Criteria 
Threshol
d Levels Asset Sale Leasing O & M BOT Service Contract   
Public and Social Impact   ≥ B+  X   X 
Technology Transfer (%)   > 10 %  X  X  
Operational Efficiency    ≥ 10%      
Economic Cost Reduction (millions)   ≥ 1m    X  
Degree of Risk Transfer to Government    < 35%      
Environmental Protection    > B X X X  X 
Political (Foreign Shareholders)   ≤ 50% X    X 
  
2      Fails on Criteria 1, 2, 6 
5      Fails on Criteria 1, 6, 7 
4      Fails on Criteria 2, 4 
1 (Asset Sale)     Fails on Criteria 6, 7 




 O  M on 6 
a) Scoring Alternatives and Defining Threshold Levels Rules  
c) Ranking of Alternatives  
Figure 4.3: Elimination Method Example 
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alternatives that are not meeting specified rules or thresholds and to rank the remaining 
alternatives. 
 
A tree presentation of the Elimination Method for a particular DM relies on the splitting of 
any set of alternatives into two subsets so that any alternative in the first subset is preferred to 
any alternative in the second subset. This splitting process is applied successively to subsets 
defined by the truth or falsity of the preference statements in sequence, forming a decision 
tree. If the process continues long enough, a complete ranking is achieved. Whenever a subset 
of alternatives is to be split (i.e., at each level of the preference decision tree), a preference 
statement serves as the criterion governing this bifurcation. However, and as shown in the next 
example, a few preference statements can represent a rather complex tree. 
 
Using sufficiently complex preference statements, any ordering of the alternatives can be 
represented by the Elimination Method and its corresponding preference statement tree 
decision. However, some rankings may require many statements. Nevertheless, the 
Elimination Method proves itself especially useful for large models, in which the DMs’ 
preferences typically fall into regular and consistent patterns. Moreover, experience suggests 
that it closely reflects the way many people express their preferences about the outcome of a 
conflict. 
 
The preference tree presentation that corresponds to the set of preference statements given in 
Figure 4.3 is shown in the upper part of Figure 4.4, and the alternatives are ranked according 






the leaves that correspond to the alternatives under study. As can be seen in Figure 4.3, the 
preference statements are a compact representation of a preference tree. 
 
As shown in the example in Figure 4.4, the scores given at the bottom and the preference 
statement tree at the top list the states from the most preferred on the left to the least preferred 
on the right. To assign the scores, a methodology is implemented through the assigning of a 
value of 2s for each branch, where s takes the value of S = j-1, which starts from zero at the 
lowest level and increases by increments of 1 as one climbs up the branch nodes to reach the 
upper node with a value of S = n-1, where n is the number of preference statements. In the 
example in Figure 4.4, the lowest branch of the preference statement “Political (Foreign 
Shareholders) ≤ 50%“ is assigned a score of 20= 1, and the next level of branch node with the 
statement “Environmental Protection > B” is assigned a score of  21. This trend continues until 
the last upper branch node, which is assigned a score value of 2j-1 = 27-1 = 26 = 64.  
  
4.4.2 Extended Elimination Method 
After the prescreening using the Elimination Method, a short list of the more preferred 
alternatives is ready for more detailed analysis, in which more criteria and sub-criteria can be 
used, and these criteria can be evaluated according to each stakholder’s viewpoint. To carry 
out a more detailed study, one could use the Elimination Method or another suitable MCDA 
method such as the weighting score method (Edwards, 1977); the Analytical Hierarchical 
Process (AHP) (Saaty, 1980); the Analytical Network Process, (Saaty, 2001) which is an 
expanded version of the AHP procedure; or Electre (Roy, 1996). 
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For the example in Figure 4.3, one can argue that the Elimination Method compares 
alternatives based on their independent performance for each criterion, regardless of how good 
that alternative is with respect to another important criterion. For example, Alternative 5 in 
Figure 4.3 does very poorly with respect to foreign ownership but extremely well with regard 
to cost reduction. Therefore, in some circumstances a lower performance in a less important 
criterion would be compensated for to some extent by a superior performance against a more 
important concern. To help overcome this difficulty, logical statements using conjunctive 
(and), disjunctive (or), and conditional (if; if and only if) connections among criterion 
thresholds can be employed. The example given in Figure 4.5, which uses the same 
evaluations as those listed in Figure 4.3a, illustrates how this method is carried out in practice. 
 
The decision maker involved in the evaluation process in the example in Figure 4.3 might 
argue that the highest importance is that the public and social impact of a privatization 
decision on the public must be greater than or equal to B-, combined with the parameter that 
protecting the environment must have a rating of B or better. This most preferred statement 
with respect to meeting criterion thresholds is listed at the top of the left-hand column in 
Figure 4.5b. The next level of priority for a performance statement shown on the left in Figure 
4.5b is that if the foreign shareholders own 20% or less of the project, then the technical 
transfer should be greater than or equal to 8%, in order to give more flexibility to local 
shareholders. Next, the decision maker specifies that if the environmental protection is less 
than or equal to B-, then the economic cost reduction must be greater than 1.7 million dollars. 
The lowest ranked preference statement on the left in Figure 4.5b is that operational efficiency 
















In summary, using logical statements in the Elimination Method requires the following steps: 
1. Develop a preference statement by linking preference thresholds for criteria using 
conjunctive, disjunctive, and conditional logical connections. 
2. List these preference statements from most important at the top to least preferred at the 
bottom. 
3. Apply the Elimination Method as previously performed. 
Following this procedure, the alternatives are ranked as shown in Figure 4.5c. 
 
When the final ranking of alternatives in Figure 4.5c are compared to the ranking in Figure 
4.3c, one can see that the ordering has been substantially changed. For example, leasing 
(Alternative 2) is the highest ordered alternative in Figure 4.5c and the lowest in Figure 4.3c. 
Figure 4.5: Evaluation of Alternatives Using Logical Statements about Thresholds for Criteria 
 
 Privatization Alternatives 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Ranked Statements  Asset Sale Leasing O & M BOT Service Contract 
Public and Social Impact ≥ B- and  
Environmental Protection ≥ B   X  X  X 
If Foreign Shareholders ≤ 20%  then 
Technical Transfer must be ≥ 8%    X  
If  Environmental Protection ≤ B- then 
Economic Cost Reduction > 1.7M X  X   
Operational Efficiency > 15%  or  
Economic Cost Reduction ≥ 1.3M  X X  X 
 
  
3      Fails on Criteria 1, 3, 4 
1      Fails on Criteria 1, 3 
5      Fails on Criteria 1, 4 
4  (BOT)     Fails on Criteria 2 





ls on Criterion  
Fails on Criterion 4  
 
b) Appling the Thresholds Rules  
c) Ranking of Alternatives  
a)  Scoring Alternatives and Defining Thresholds (See Figure 4.3a) 
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The reason for these changes can be understood through an examination of the performance 
statements listed on the left in Figure 4.5b. It can be seen, for instance, that “Foreign 
Shareholders” has been moved from the least preferred criterion on the left in Figure 4.3b to a 
higher level in Figure 4.5b, where it is part of a conditional preference. An explanation for this 
move may be that the government is encouraging higher local ownership but may have to 
support the local owners technologically in order to improve the technical transfer mechanism 
such as providing subsidies or tax breaks. 
 
It can also be seen that in both situations the BOT (Alternative 4) is ranked fairly high because 
it does well with respect to the environment even though the technical transfer is low and the 
cost reduction is the lowest among all of the alternatives. On the other hand, the O & M 
(Alternative 3) drops from highest (Figure 4.3c) to the lowest position (Figure 4.5c) largely 
due to its poor environmental record, even though it does well with respect to national 
investments. Using the same procedure, a new preference decision tree representing extended 
Elimination Methods can be developed, as shown in Figure 4.6. 
 
The foregoing and other insights that can be gleaned from a comparison of the two analyses 
clearly show how preferences, as reflected in the ranking of criteria or preference statements, 
can dramatically affect the final results. Depending on their value systems, different 
stakeholders would rank their preference statements in different orders and thereby alter the 






























4.1.1 The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution 
The application of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution to the famous game of Prisoner’s 
Dilemma is employed to explain its capabilities and how it can be conveniently applied in 
practice to real world disputes, including privatization, constructions, environmental and other 
kinds of conflicts. The graph model uses mathematical logic and set theory to describe conflict 
situations in a graphical form (Hipel et al., 2002). Fang et al. (1993) provide background 
material on the graph model for conflict resolution, while Harary et al. (1969), and Berge 
(1973) furnish descriptions of Graph theory. The basis of the graph model is found in classical  
Public and Social Impact ≥ B- and  
Environmental Protection ≥ B 
If Foreign Shareholders  ≤ 20%  then 
Technical Transfer must be   ≥ 8% 
If  Environmental Protection ≤ B- then 
Economic Cost Reduction > 1.7M 
Operational Efficiency  >   15%  or  












Figure 4.6: The Presentation of Elimination Method and Logical Preference Statements Prioritizing 
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game theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953), metagame analysis (Howard, 1971), and 
conflict analysis (Fraser and Hipel, 1984). 
 
• Modeling 
Within the graph model paradigm, any conflict involves decision makers (DMs), their options, 
and their preferences. For simplicity, the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution is explained 
using the well-known “Prisoner’s Dilemma” dispute. This simple problem has been 
extensively studied in order to gain insight into human behavior in conflict situations, when 
one must decide whether or not to cooperate with another person (Rapoport et al., 1976; 
Axelrod, 1984; Fraser and Hipel, 1984). In this conflict, two individuals suspected of being 
partners in a crime are arrested and placed in separate cells so that they cannot communicate 
with one another. The district attorney does not have sufficient evidence to convict them for 
the crime. Consequently, to obtain a confession, the district attorney presents each suspect 
with the following offers: 
1. If one of them cooperates (C) with his partner (i.e., does not confess) and the other does 
not cooperate (D) (i.e., confesses), the one who cooperates receives a stiff 10-year 
sentence while the other can go free for proving that they committed the crime.  
2. If both prisoners do not cooperate with each other (i.e., both confess), both receive reduced 
sentences of 5 years. 
3. If both cooperate by keeping silent, each receives a lesser charge of carrying a concealed 
weapon, leading to one year of incarceration in prison. 
 
Because each decision maker (DM) in the Prisoner’s Dilemma possesses two strategy choices 
represented by C and D, the four possible states or scenarios that can take place when each 
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DM selects a strategy are written as CC, CD, DC, and DD, in which the left and right letters in 
each pair represent the strategy selection of the first prisoner (DM 1) and the second prisoner 
(DM 2), respectively. A tree representation of the four decision states is shown on the left-
hand side in Figure 4.7. From left to right in this figure, DM 1 choices are shown as strategy C 
or D. For each of these two strategy selections by DM 1, the second DM can also choose 
either C or D. The final result is the four states listed in four columns as states 1, 2, 3 and 4 or 













The modeling and analysis of the Prisoners’ Dilemma are explained below in Steps 1 to 3, and 
in Step 4, respectively. 
 
The manual calculations of the different stability concepts and equilibria for this conflict are 
as follows: 
 3
Figure 4.7: Graph Representation of the Prisoners’ Dilemma 
   * C = Cooperate (i.e., Do not confess) 
 ** D = Don’t Cooperate (i.e., Confess) 
Consequences 






























          State Ranking Preferences for DM 1:                       
          State Ranking Preferences for DM 2:                                         ( : more preferred) 

























Step 1: Determine the decision makers and options in the conflict 
As mentioned previously, this conflict (game) has two decision makers (DMs); because each 
DM in the Prisoner’s Dilemma possesses two strategy choices, represented by C and D, the 
four possible states or scenarios that can take place when each DM selects a strategy are 
written as CC, CD, DC, and DD, for which the left and right letters in each pair represent the 
strategy selection of the first prisoner (DM 1) and the second prisoner (DM 2), respectively, as 
shown on the left in Figure 4.7 and at the bottom of Table 4.4.  
 
           Decision Makers/Option                                            States  
                          1               2                3               4      
           Prisoner 1                                                 
Cooperate                                            Ya             Y               N   N 
           Prisoner 2 
             Cooperate                        Y            N              Y    N  
   
            Normal form notation                 (CC)           (CD)b           (DC)          (DD) 
            Payoff function for prisoner 1, P1 = (75, 0, 100, 50) for States 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. 




For example, State 2 has the option of CD, which represents the case of DM 1 cooperating and 
DM 2 not cooperating. 
  
Step 2: Determine the feasible states  
From Table 4.4, the total number of possible states is 2n = 22 = 4, where n is the number of 
DMs in the game. There is no infeasible state to remove.  
 
Table 4.4: List of Decision Makers, Options and Possible States 
(a) Y: Yes, N: No 
(b) C: Cooperate, D: Do not cooperate 
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Step 3: Construct the Graph Model for the DMs 
The middle portion of Figure 4.7 portrays the integrated graph model for this dispute. The 
graph model depicts how the conflict could move from one state to another, in which a node 
represents a state and an arc stands for the DM (written on the arc) who controls the 
movement from one state to another. Accordingly, four states with node numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4 
represent states CC, CD, DC, and DD, as do the four columns (from left to right) of Ys and Ns 
in the center of Table 4.4, where Y means yes, the option of cooperate is taken, and N 
indicates no, i.e., is not selected by the DM controlling the option. For instance, for the 
situation shown in Figure 4.7, DM 1 can cause the conflict to move from state 1 CC to state 3 
(DC) by deciding not to cooperate with DM 2 and thereby tell the police what happened. In 
turn, DM 2 can make the conflict evolve from state 3 (DC) to state 4 (DD) by also choosing 
not to cooperate.  
 
The movement between states 1 and 3 is unilateral on the part of DM 1 since DM 1 decides 
whether or not to choose strategy C, given that DM 2 remains at strategy C in both states 1 
and 3. Likewise, DM 1 can also unilaterally cause the conflict to progress from state 2 to 4 and 
back. DM 2, on the other hand, is in command of the movement between states 1 and 2 as well 
as states 3 and 4, as depicted in the integrated graph model shown in the center of Figure 4.7 
in which the orientation of the arc in a DM’s graph indicates the direction of the movement 
that the DM can make.  
                                                                   
The preferences of each DM are indicated by the ranking of states from the most preferred on 
the left to the least preferred on the right, as shown at the bottom of Figure 4.7. Hence, DM 1 
most prefers state 3, or DC, in which he does not cooperate with DM 2 while DM 2 cooperates 
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with him. The least preferred scenario for DM 1 is state 2, which is the reverse of state 3 since 
at state 2, DM 1 is cooperating while DM 2 is not. It should be noticed that the second most 
preferred state for each DM is state 1, or CC, in which they both cooperate with one another. 
Additionally, the cooperative state 1 is more preferred to the non-cooperative state 4, in which 
both DMs do not cooperate. Hence, compared to state 4, state 1 is a win/win situation for both 
DMs. The dilemma for each prisoner is which strategy each DM should select independently 
of the other DM’s choice. 
 
An equivalent way of representing a ranking of states is to assign a payoff for each state in 
which a higher number means more preferred. Hence, as shown at the bottom of Table 4.4 the 
payoffs for DM 1 for states 1, 2, 3, and 4 are 75, 0, 100, and 50, respectively. The payoff 
function for DM 2 is also shown here as P2 = (75, 100, 0, 50). 
 
In general, the Prisoner’s Dilemma constitutes a generic conflict which can be used to explain 
how cooperation can or cannot be brought about in a dispute. For the construction industry 
and infrastructure management, this dispute has widespread implications for dealings between 
various decision makers or stakeholders. In reality, real-world conflict is more complicated 
than the Prisoner’s Dilemma as illustrated by the real-life conflicts examined in Chapter 5. 
 
Step 4: Calculate stable states for each decision maker  
Once the model is graphically represented, the conflict analysis continues by analyzing, for 
each DM, the stability of the decision states with respect to the solution concepts noted earlier 
in Table 2.4, which represent different types of strategic thinking by DMs in conflict 
situations. The different solution concepts imply different levels of foresight, or a DM’s ability 
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to consider possible moves that can take place in the future. A DM with a high level of 
foresight thinks further ahead. Nash stability (R) has a low level of foresight, and the level of 
the foresight increases from low at the top of Table 2.4 to high at the bottom. A DM with Non-
myopic stability (NM) has the highest level of foresight. 
 
Some solution concepts, such as limited move (Lh) and nonmyopic (NM), allow strategic 
disimprovements, which occur when a DM temporarily moves to a worse state in order to 
reach a more preferred state eventually. Other solution concepts, such as Nash (R) and 
sequential stability (SEQ), never allow disimprovements. Still others, such as general 
metarationality (GMR) and symmetric metrationality (SMR), permit strategic 
disimprovements by opponents only. 
 
Different solution concepts also imply different levels of preference knowledge. Under R, 
GMR, and SMR, for example, a DM needs to know only his own preferences. On the other 
hand, under the solution concepts SEQ, Lh, and NM, a DM must know the preference 
information for all of the DMs. Finally, the top four solution concepts in Table 2.4 are used 
more commonly in practice and are easier to implement. 
 
In a stability analysis, if a particular decision state is found to be stable for all the DMs with 
respect to one solution concept (e.g., Nash stability), then this decision state is an 
“equilibrium” for that concept (e.g., Nash equilibrium). The final solution to the conflict may 
be the decision state that achieves equilibrium status for most of the solution concepts, since it 
constitutes a strong equilibrium. The mathematical formulations for the top four solution 
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concepts in Table 2.4 together with their manual calculations for the Prisoner’s Dlimma are 
given below. The notation used is as follows: 
The set of DMs, N, consists of i, j ∈  N, 
S is the set of feasible states,  
i ( )R s
+ is the set of unilateral improvements by DM i from state s,  
j 1( )R s
+ is the set of unilateral improvements by DM j from state s1. 
 
1. Nash stability  
Definition: Nash Stability (Nash, 1951): Let Ni∈ . A state s ∈  S is Nash stable for DM i, 
denoted by s NashiS∈ , if and only if R
+
i (s) = φ . 
 
Each prisoner or DM will expect that the other prisoner will stay at any state the focal DM 
will move to, and that state will be the final state.   
 
Examples of Nash stability calculations are as follows: 
- DM 2 has unilateral improvement from state 1 to state 2 ⇒  state 1 is unstable (u) for DM 2.  
- Similarly, DM 1 has unilateral improvement from state 1 to state 3 ⇒  state 1 is unstable.  
- For state 4: DM 2 has no unilateral improvement to state 3 ⇒  state 4 is stable (s) for DM 2. 
- Similarly, for state 4, DM 1 has no unilateral improvement to state 2 ⇒  state 4 is stable for 
DM 1. 
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 The overall Nash stable states for each DM are shown in Table 4.5, where s and u mean stable 
and unstable, respectively. A state which is stable for both DMs is an equilibrium and is 




 DM 1 DM 2 
Equilibrium 
1 u u  
2 u s  
3 s u  
4 s s E 
 
As shown in Table 4.5, since state 4 is stable for both DMs, it represents an equilibrium (E).  
 
2. General Metarationality 
Definition: General Metarationality (GMR ) (Howard, 1971): For Ni∈ , a state s ∈  S is 
general metarational for DM i, denoted by s GMRiS∈ , if and only if for every s1 )(sRi
+∈ , there 
exists at least one s2 ∈Rj (s1) such that s 2si  . 
 
Each DM will judge his possible moves very conservatively by considering all possible moves 
by his opponent. The focal DM will ignore his own possible counteractions.   
Examples of GMR stability calculations are as follows: 
- DM 1 has unilateral improvement from state 1 to state 3, but DM 2 can move from state 3 to 
state 4. A comparison of state 4 with state 1 reveals that the preference (payoff) for DM 1 at 
state 4 is less than the preference (payoff) at state 1: ⇒  state 1 is GMR stable for DM 1. 
Table 4.5: Nash Stability Analysis results
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- DM 2 has unilateral improvement from state 1 to state 2, but DM 1 moves from state 2 to 
state 4. A comparison of state 4 with state 1 reveals that the preference for DM 2 at state 4 is 
less than the preference at state 1: ⇒  state 1 is GMR stable for DM 2. 
- State 4 is Nash stable for both DMs ⇒  GMR stable. 





DM 1 DM 2 
Equilibrium 
1 s s E 
2 u s  
3 s u   
4 s s E 
 
As shown in Table 4.6, since states 1 and 4 are stable for both DMs, both states represent an 
equilibrium (E). 
  
3. Symmetric Metarationality (SMR) 
Definition: Symmetric Metarationality (SMR) (Howard, 1971): For Ni∈ , a state is 
symmetric metarational for DM i , denoted by s SMRiS∈ , if and only if for every s1 )(sRi
+∈ , 
there exists s2 )( 1sRj∈ such that s 2si  and s 3si  for all s3 )( 2sRi∈ . 
 
A DM who is symmetrically metarational considers not only his own possible moves and the 
reaction of his opponent to each move, but also his own counter-reactions. 
 
Examples of an SMR stability analysis are as follows: 
Table 4.6: GMR Stability Analysis Results 
 108
- DM 1 has a unilateral improvement from state 1 to state 3, from which DM 2 can react by 
moving from state 3 to state 4, and in a counter-reaction, DM 1 can move from state 4 to state 
2. A comparison of state 1 with final state 2 shows that the preference for DM 1 at state 1 is 
more than the preference at state 2 ⇒  state 1 is SMR stable for DM 2. 
- Similarly, DM 2 has a unilateral improvement from state 1 to state 2. DM 1 can react by 
moving from state 2 to state 4, and DM  2 can counter-react by moving from state 4 to state 3.  
A comparison of the initial state 1 with the last state 3 reveals that the preference for DM 2 at 
state 1 is more than the preference at state 3: ⇒  state 1 is SMR stable for DM 2. 
- State 4 is Nash stable for both DMs ⇒SMR stable foe each DM. 
 
Using the same procedure for states 2 and 3 yields the results shown in Table 4.7. As shown in 




DM 1 DM 2 
Equilibrium 
1  s  s  E 
2 u s   
3 s u   
4  s   s    E  
 
4. Sequential stability  
Definition: Sequential Stability (SEQ) (Fraser and Hipel, 1984): For Ni∈ , a state is 
sequentially stable for DM i, denoted by s SEQiS∈ , if and only if for every s1 )(sRi
+∈  , there 
exists at least one s2 )( 1
, sR Uj
+∈ such that s 2si  . 
A state is sequentially stable for a DM if and only if he is deterred from acquiring any 
unilateral improvement from this state because of a credible sanction by the opponent that 
Table 4.7: SMR Stability Analysis Results 
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could result in a state less preferred (for the original DM) than the initial state. A rational state 
is actually a subset of the sequential stability definition for the special situation in which the 
set i ( )S k
+ is empty. In other words, this stability concept is similar to the GMR concept with 
the exception that any move by the second DM should be credible and hence be a unilateral 
improvement (UI) in his preference (payoff). 
Examples of SEQ stability calculations are as follows: 
- DM 1 has a UI from state 1 to state 3, but DM 2 has a credible action (UI) from state 3 to 
state 4. An examination of the preference for DM 1 reveals that the preference at state 4 is less 
than the preference at state 1: ⇒  state 1 is SEQ stable for DM 1. 
- DM 2 has UI from state 1 to state 2, but DM 1 has credible action (UI) from state 2 to state 4. 
An examination of the preference for DM 2 reveals that the preference for state 4 is less than 
the preference for state 1: ⇒  state 1 is SEQ stable for DM 2. 
 
Using the same procedure for states 2, 3 and 4 will result the finding given in Table 4.8. The 
table shows that states 1 and 4 are sequentially stable for both DMs, which means that both 




DM 1 DM 2 
Equilibrium 
1  s  s  E 
2 u  s    
3 s u   
4  s   s    E  
 
 
Table 4.8: SEQ Stability Analysis Results 
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From Tables 4.5 to 4.8, it can be seen that only states 1 and 4 are possible equilibria, or 
compromise resolutions. Hence, each of these states represents a compromise resolution if the 
state can be reached. To achieve state 1 (CC), the cooperative equilibrium, both DMs must 
cooperate with one another to jointly cause the conflict to move from state 4 (DD) to state 1 
(CC), which is more preferred by both of them  
 
To confirm the manual calculations, the results were compared with those of the software 
GMCR II (Hipel et al., 1997; Fang et al., 2003a, b) that produced the exact same results for the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, as shown in Figure 4.8. While GMCR II is useful software, it is not 
transparent and cannot be easily integrated with external models. Therefore, in this research, a 
Graph Model is implemented on Excel as a more flexible environment, as explained in the 



















Figure 4.8: GMCR II Stability Analysis and Equilibrium 
Y= Cooperate (Don’t confess) 
N= Don’t Cooperate (Confess) 
State 1 is the most 
stable decision if DMs 
can communicate 
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4.4.4  Experimenting with Decision Optimization Using Genetic Algorithms  
The privatization problem is now structured as a graph model in which decisions are 
optimized using Genetic Algorithms (GAs) (Figure 4.9). The key challenge is to model a 




DM 1 Decision DM 2 Decision 
 
 
For the Prisoner’s Dilemma, as noted earlier and shown in Figure 4.10, P1 and P2 are the 
payoffs for DMs 1 and 2, respectively. In a payoff function, the location, (reading from left to 
right), denotes the state being considered. The number written at that location gives the ordinal 
preference (or payoff), where a higher number means more preferred. For example, the most 
preferred state for DM 2 is the second state (CD), since number 100 is written at the second 
position. Likewise, the least preferred state is the third state (DC), because a number 0 is 
shown at the third entry in the P2 payoff function.  
 
       
 
 
                        
                                                                           
 
Using this information, the Prisoner’s Dilemma was modeled on Excel as shown in Figure 
4.11. The two parties, DMs 1 and 2, are listed with their alternative decisions, [P1-01, P1-02] 
and [P2-01, P2-02], respectively. Spreadsheet equations were written to model all aspects,  
Figure 4.10: Preferences (Payoffs) for Decision Makers in Prisoner’s Dilemma 
                                                                            1    2      3      4    States (Table 4.4) 
         [Payoff function for DM 1, P1 = (75, 0, 100, 50)] 
         [Payoff function for DM 2, P2 = (75, 100, 0, 50)] 
 
             States ranking for DM 1, P1 = (3,   1,   4,    2) 
      States ranking for DM 2, P2 = (2,   1,   4,    3) 
Figure 4.9: Chromosome Structure of the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
































Figure 4.11: DSS Model for the Prisoner’s Dilemma Conflict 
Variable with possible values: 
1   Cooperate (Don’t Confess)      
2   Don’t Cooperate (Confess) 
Equation to 
determine 
payoff as a 
function of 
the decision  
Equations are 
set up for all 
stability 
calculations 
based on  the 
Graph Model  
Sum of all decision payoffs  
Variable with possible values: 
1   Cooperate (Don’t Confess)      
2   Don’t Cooperate (Confess) 
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including the calculation of the payoff values and the calculation of the stability condition 
(following the solution concepts).  
 
The preferences for every decision were modeled in the spreadsheet equations as follows: 
The payoff or preferences for DM 1 = (75, 0, 100, 50), and for DM 2, the preference (payoff) 
= (75, 100, 0, 50), as shown in Table 4.4. For example, in Figure 4.11, cells D-10 and I-10 
show a current state of decision in which prisoner 2 cooperates (does not confess) while 
prisoner 1 does not cooperate (confesses), which is represented by state DC (state 3 in Table 
4.4). Accordingly, the shaded cells next to these decisions show the preference values. 
 
As an improvement to the graph model implementation on Excel, the decision-analysis 
problem is considered here for the first time as an optimization problem. The objective 










Parameter Description Formulation 
Objective 
Function Maximize the total payoff for a DM  Cell F-2 to be maximized 
Variables 
The values representing the decision to 
[1]: Cooperate (do not confess), or 
[2]: Do not cooperate (confess). 
Cells [D-10 and I-10]  
Constraints 
1) Variables are integers 
2) Variable values are 1≥ and ≤2 
[INT] 
1 ≤ Cells [D-10 and I-10] ≥ 2 
Table 4.9: Optimization Parameters for the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
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Variables: 
 
Decision of DM 1 (P1):  choose either (1: Cooperate or 2: Do not cooperate) 
 





The objective function is to maximize the overall payoffs for all decision makers, which is 
formulated mathematically as follows: 
                                                                                                                                 , Where 
        n       is the number of feasible states. 
        P1      is the payoff for decision maker 1,  
        P2       is the payoff for decision maker 2, 
        PNash  is the bounce payoff for a decision satisfying Nash stability  = 1000 points, 
        PGMR  is the bounce payoff for a decision satisfying GMR stability = 1000 points, 
        PSMR  is the bounce payoff for a decision satisfying SMR stability  = 1000 points, and   
        PSEQ  is the bounce payoff for a decision satisfying SEQ stability   = 1000 points. 
The objective function is linked to the variables X1 and X2 as follows: 
If    X1= 1 and X2 = 1, then the payoff is Pi= 75 for P1 and Pj = 75 for P2; 
       X1= 1 and X2 = 2, then the payoff is Pi= 0   for P1 and Pj = 100 for P2; 
       X1= 2 and X2 = 1, then the payoff is Pi= 100 for P1 and Pj = 0 for P2;  
       X1= 2 and X2 = 2, then the payoff is Pi= 50   for P1 and Pj = 50 for P2. 
 
Constraints:  
The optimization constraints are included in the formulation as follows:  
   X1 is an integer and takes values 1≥ X1 ≤ 2. 
Max ∑= (Objective Function) 
n
(P1 + P2 )
n=1 
+ PNash+ PGMR + PSMR + PSEQ 
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   X1 is an integer and takes values between 1≥ X2 ≤ 2. 
 
For the non-linearity of the Prisoner’s Dilemma problem, the Genetic Algorithms (Gas) 
technique is used since many types of mathematical optimizations are suitable. To simplify the 
genetic optimization, a commercial genetic-based optimization software “Evolver v.4.02” is 
used. Evolver is a spreadsheet add-in program and works from inside Microsoft Excel 
software. Evolver has a simple interface (Figure 4.12) to allow the user to easily specify the 
objective functions, variables, and constraints by highlighting the corresponding spreadsheet 
cells. During the optimization process, Evolver tries first to find a feasible solution (a solution 











For this study, once the optimization parameters are specified, all variables are initialized by 
the setting of the initial values that represent any conflict state, and the optimization 
experiments are carried out for each example. Each experiment is run until a cancellation 
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criterion is met. This criterion is set to a population size of 50 with 1000 trials or with a 















The Genetic Algorithm optimization tool (Evolver) will change the values representing the 
options for each simulation run within the predefined constraints and without violating other 
constraints until it finds an option with a combination of values that yields the best value for 
the selected objective function. This best decision is the result of calculations based on the 
stability concepts of Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ stability. The final best decision will be a 
decision that satisfies the maximum payoffs for both prisoners (DMs) without any bias. In the 
privatization problem, a criteria weight will adjust this bias to reflect variations in its 
importance. By the end of the optimization process, an output screen presents the final 
decision, as shown in Figure 4.14. It should be noted that the proposed model interacts with 
the preference payoff vectors based on the ordinal ranking of its values, and not on cardinal 
values. 
 
Figure 4.13: Evolver Parameters 
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Using the GA optimization model, the best option combination is found to be (2, 2), which 
corresponds to the decision of not cooperating by the two DMs. The resulting decision 
matches exactly the results obtained by the manual calculation and by GMCR II, as shown 
previously in Tables 4.5 to 4.8 and in Figure 4.8.  
 
The experimental results for the Prisoner’s Dilemma example show that GAs, when applied to 
a Graph Model of the privatization problem, are very promising. In addition, the number of 
DMs and alternatives can be increased to cover all stakeholders and criteria, each with its 
relative strength represented by its weight. The GA also considers the concept of Info-gap 
theory. It is important to note that while the Prisoner’s Dilemma problem is simple, and it 
requires careful effort for it to be modeled on Excel. The privatization problem is more 
complex and requires a more extensive modeling effort. The model created for this study 
offers much-needed decision support that uses optimization to arrive at the best decision.    
 
4.4.5 Uncertainty:  Information Gap Theory  
Due to the complex nature of the privatization decision and the difficulties associated with 
covering all related circumstances, the concept of Information Gap Theory or Info-gap theory, 
as described in Chapter 2, is utilized to solve the problems of missing or insufficient 
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• Experimenting with Prisoner’s Dilemma 
In this section, an experiment is performed using the Prisoner’s Dilemma, which is explained 
in previous sections. The purpose of the experiment is to demonstrate the advantages of 
extending the concepts of Info-gap theory to the proposed DSS model. Such enhancement will 
allow the DMs in the construction conflict and infrastructure privatization decision-making 
process to analyze uncertainty in the preferences of the various DMs involved. The 
experiment illustrates how the concepts from info-gap modeling and robustness can be utilized 
a privatization decision and how strategic insights can be gained through a careful 
examination of the robustness of equilibrium solutions to uncertainty.   
 
1. The Info-gap uncertainty model 
 




1P  = (0, 0, 100, 0) is the nominal payoff function of DM 1; 
P2 = (75, 100, 0, 50) is the payoff function for DM 2; 
α     is the uncertainty parameter which represents the “distance” from the nominal  




αα  is the payoff function of DM 1, which differs from the nominal vector by   
              not more than a single preference change; 
Q           is the the set of equilibrium states for the conflict; 
Q1        is the constrained subset of equilibrium states which are conditioned by the   
             option “Yes” or “No”; 
then the information-gap uncertainty model can be defined as 
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               =α  0, 1, 2, …                                                         (4.1) 
 
where Q (α , 01P ) is the set of all payoff functions of DM 1, which differ from the known 
nominal payoff function by no more than a change in rank. 
 
The collection of sets Q (α , 01P ), α =  0, 1, 2, …, is a family of nested sets 
α  < β  implies that Q (α , 01P ) ⊂  Q ( β , 
0
1P )                                                  (4.2) 
It can be seen that Q (α , 01P ) is the set of payoff functions whose distance from the nominal 
payoff function 01P  is no more than α : 










, 01P ) ≤  α }               =α  0, 1, 2, …                     (4.3)    
 
Q (α , 01P ) is defined for any non-negative integer α , indicating that it is a family of nested 
sets. It is this nesting, together with the distance measure, which gives the uncertainty 
parameter α  its meaning as an information gap. 
 
2. The robustness of strategy in the conflict 
In the next step, the robustness measure illustrates the powerful approach of information gap 
theory in helping DMs who might be reluctant to choose the best satisficing decision. This 
approach is utilized in the proposed DSS to overcome the situation of scarce information that 
is crucial to finding the most satisficing decision. 
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The established uncertainty model is used to measure the robustness of the strategy of DM 2 
in the presence of missing or insufficient information regarding his or her opponent’s 
preferences and strategy. This measurement can be achieved by performing a stability analysis 
to determine all stable and equilibrium states which are contained in the equilibrium set Q. 
Next, a segregation procedure is used to classify {Q} sets based on the focal DM’s strategy of 
his available options of “Yes” or “No”. Accordingly, a new equilibrium subset {Q1} is 
constrained by elements entailed in the implementation of option or strategy σ =“Yes” or 
“No”. 
The robustness γ  of strategy σ = “Yes” or “No” is the greatest number of occurrences of the 
constrained equilibrium subsets {Q1} which are associated with that strategy. The robustness 
is represented by the following equations: 
γ  (σ ) = max {Q1 (P2) σ = Yes}               for the Yes option                (4.4) 
 γ  (σ ) = max {Q1 (P2) σ = No }               for the No Option                (4.5) 
The best strategy or decision is the one that has the maximum number for robustness. 
 
3. Experiments 
As can be seen in Figure 4.7, when the first DM remains fixed on choosing C for his strategy, 
the second DM can unilaterally cause the game to move from state 1 to 2 by changing his 
selected option from C to D. If DM 2 is allowed to change his decision from D back to C, he 
or she also controls the movement from state 2 to 1. In addition, when the first DM has fixed 
his or her strategy on D, the second DM can also control the movement between states 3 and 
4. Following the same arguments, DM 1 controls the unilateral movements between States 1 
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and 3 and between states 2 and 4, if the second DM has fixed his or her strategy on C and on 
D, respectively.  
 
As Figure 4.7 shows, the payoff function for the second DM is P2 = (75, 100, 0, 50), which 
indicates that the greatest preference for him or her is for state 2 (DC), in which he or she 
receives the freedom sentence for not cooperating, and the first prisoner cooperates by not 
confessing). The next preference is for state 1 (CC), in which both DMs cooperate (by not 
confessing, and hence, both receive a one-year jail sentence. The third preference is for state 4 
(DD) in which both receive a five-year jail sentence, and the least preferred state is state 3 
(DC), in which he or she cooperates (does not confess) and DM 1 does not. This state 
represents the worst scenario for DM 2, in which a ten-year jail sentence will be imposed on 
him and the other DM will be set free. Using the same reasonable preference thinking, the 
payoff function for the second DM is P1 = (75, 0, 100, 50).  
 
In choosing his best option, let us assume that the only state DM 2 is completely certain about 
with respect to his opponent is that his opponent’s highest preferred state is state 3, in which 
he or she will receive the ultimate payoff by gaining his or her freedom and letting the first 
DM stay for 10 years in prison. In other words, the first DM’s payoff function is 01P = (0, 0, 
100, 0), in which DM 1 is indifferent to any other outcome. 
 
As noted previously, there are many definitions of stability and equilibria in games. With 
respect to Nash stability as defined before, a state is Nash stable for a given DM if he or she 
has no incentive for moving from that state. That is, state m is Nash stable for DM i if i’s 
preference for state m is no less than his preference for any other accessible state for the fixed 
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strategy choices of the other DMs. State m is stable for DM i if  Pm,i ≥   Pk,i   for all states k in 
which the strategy choices of the other DMs are the same as in state m. It should be recalled 
that a state is in equilibrium if it is stable for both DMs. Table 4.10 shows the stable and 
equilibrium states for the Prisoner’s Dilemma problem, with the payoff functions that have 
been adopted. It can be seen that the two states 2 and 4 are in equilibrium, since according to 
the specified payoff functions and the Nash stability definition, neither DM has an incentive to 





DM 2 DM 1  
Equilibrium 
1 u   u    
2 s  s  E  
3 u  s    
4 s              s E 
 
State 4, for example, is Nash stable for prisoner 2 because he or she prefers state 4 more than 
state 3, and from state 4 he or she can move only to state 3. It should be noted that for both 
states 3 and 4, the first prisoner has a fixed strategy of D to not cooperate (by confessing). 
From prisoner 1’s point of view, state 4 is Nash stable for him because he prefers state 4 over 
state 2, whereas prisoner 2 has a fixed strategy of D for do not confess. Since state 4 is Nash 
stable for both DMs, it constitutes a Nash equilibrium. 
 
The analysis of uncertainty can now be considered by employing the robustness of Equation 
(4.1) and adopting the perspective of prisoner 2. The payoff function for prisoner 2 is P2 = (75, 
100, 0, 50). His knowledge of prisoner 1’s preferences is uncertain. However, he is certain 
about the nominal payoff function of his opponent, prisoner 1, of 01P  = (0, 0, 100, 0).  Based 
Table 4.10: Nash Stability Analysis and Equilibria with a Payoffs Function of P2 = (75, 100, 0, 
50). 01P = (0, 0, 100, 0) 
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on the nominal payoff function  of prisoner 2, it is found that the set (Q) of equilibrium states 
contains states 2 and 4 as shown in Table 4.11. 
Q (P2 , 01P ) = {2, 4}                                              (4.6) 
Accordingly, the set of equilibrium solutions constrained to entail option “No” by prisoner 2 is 
the subset of Q1 (P2 , 01P ) that contains states 2 and 4: 
Q1 (P2, 01P )  σ  = No) = {2, 4}                                                 (4.7) 
Likewise, the set of equilibrium solutions constrained to entail option “Yes” by prisoner 2 is 
the subset of Q1 (P2, 01P ), which is an empty set φ :  
Q1 (P2 , 01P )  σ  = Yes) = {φ }                             (4.8) 
 
In a similar fashion, the collection of all equilibrium sets can be constructed for all the payoff 




Level of Uncertainty 
(σ ) 
0






Constrained Equilibrium with 
Yes Option for DM 1 
Q1 (P2 , 
0
1P ) σ  = No) 
Constrained Equilibrium with 
No Option for DM 1 
Q1 (P2 , 
0
1P ) σ  = Yes) 
(0) 
0
1P  = (0, 0, 100, 0) 
{2, 4} {2, 4} φ  
(1) 
0
1P  = (50, 0, 100, 0)….….. 
{2, 4}, {2}, {4) {2, 4} φ  
(2) 
0
1P  = (50, 0, 100,50)…….. 
{2, 4}, {2}, {4) {2, 4} φ  
(3) 
0
1P  = (50, 50, 100,50)…… 
{2, 4}, {2}, {4) {2, 4} φ  
1. Ben-Haim and Hipel (2002) explain the procedure for obtaining payoff functions of various levels 01P .    
Table 4.11: Equilibrium Sets with Increasing Uncertainty with the Payoff Functions of  
P2 = (75, 100, 0, 50) and 01P  = (0, 0, 100, 0) 
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Table 4.11 shows that, when 1=σ , implying uncertainty of no more than one step away from 
0
1P , more than a single equilibrium solution set exists: the previous set as well as the  new 
singular sets of states {2} and {4}. 
 
Next, and in order to determine the robustness of prisoner 2’s decision, a classification for the 
equilibrium states is performed based on the possible options available for him or her. These 
constrained subsets are used to measure the robustness of his or her decision. Thus, the 
constrained solution set for option =σ  “No” contains states 2 and 4. However, for the option 
=σ  “Yes”, the constrained set is empty, implying that the desired option does not lead to an 
equilibrium with a payoff function for prisoner 1 at an uncertainty level of =σ 1. This 
situation also recurs at uncertainty levels =σ 2 and =σ 3, as shown in Table 4.11. 
 
From Table 4.11, it can be seen that if prisoner 2 chooses option =σ  “No” (not cooperating) 
by choosing to confess, then he will always reach an equilibrium for any payoff function of his 
opponent, prisoner 1 (up to and including an uncertainty level of  =σ 3). Additional 
experiments for uncertainty levels beyond =σ 3 may lead to an equilibrium set if the first 
prisoner chooses the option “Yes” (cooperate) and does not confess. In short, the conclusion 
that can be made from the results shown in Table 4.11 is that the conditional robustness γ  for 
the two options available to Prisoner 2 is 
γ  = Q1 (P2)  σ  = No) = 3                     (4.9) 
 γ  = Q1 (P2)  σ  = Yes) = 0                     (4.10) 
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these values show that, option “No” is much more robust than option “Yes”, with respect to 
prisoners 2’s uncertainty about his opponent’s preferences. In other words, it is better for 
prisoner 2 not to cooperate with his partner, and hence, choose to confess.  
 
In this research, the proposed DSS model is extended to incorporate the concepts of Info-gap 
theory, in order to allow consideration of the strategic consequences of uncertainty that may 
be present in the preferences of one or more DMs involved in a conflict. As illustrated by the 
Prisoners’ Dilemma problem, the uncertainty analysis concept of the Info-gap model 
possesses a rigorous axiomatic basis and can be readily applied in infrastructure privatization 
decisions; it furnishes a systematic procedure for investigating concepts of robustness under 
the uncertainty of DMs’ preferences. Although from one point of view, Info-gap modeling 
could be interpreted as a comprehensive approach to executing sensitivity analyses, it does, in 
fact, go beyond traditional sensitivity analysis and constitutes a mathematical procedure for 
formally modeling and analyzing large levels of strategic uncertainty. In addition to its use for 
the uncertainty related to preferences, Info-gap models could be designed for tackling other 
kinds of uncertainties arising in conflict conditions, such as option and strategy selection as 
well as coalition formation (Ben-Haim and Hipel, 2002). 
 
4.5 Summary 
Infrastructure systems are typically complex systems interconnected with many technical, 
economic, social, environmental and political factors. Decision-making in such complex 
systems is not an easy task; it requires thorough analysis and study.  Combining the MCDA 
methodology with the advantages of the advancement in computer technology yields a 
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comprehensive decision support system that provides a powerful tool for decision makers and 
project managers. 
 
Making the decision to privatize and later selecting the optimum proposal are especially 
complex and difficult tasks. They involve analyzing all stakeholders’ perspectives in 
conjunction with socio-economical and political factors. Hence, they are conflict analysis 
problems characterized by the necessity to reconcile technical, socio-economic, 
environmental, and political value judgments, which explains the difficulties associated with 
the solution process and the absence of straightforward decisions. Rather, the final decisions 
are acceptable, compromise solutions that represent common ground for all the parties and 
stakeholders concerned. In most cases, the decisions lack a precise evaluation methodology, 
and that explains why most privatization processes and contracts result in serious disputes. 
Multi-criteria evaluation and selection techniques aim to provide such a missing set of tools 
through a comprehensive analysis methodology, with a flexible approach capable of dealing 






MODEL IMPLEMENTATION AND 
CASE STUDY   
 
 
5.1   Introduction 
This chapter presents the implementation of the decision support system (DSS) model 
described in Chapter 4 into a working prototype. The prototype integrates the Elimination 
Method for shortening the number of solutions, the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution 
to determine the best solution that satisfies all stockholders’ preferences, and Information 
Gap Theory for considering uncertainty in the decision preferences. The prototype DSS is 
implemented on a spreadsheet program. To demonstrate the decision support capabilities 
of the prototype, details of its implementation are presented using a case study of an actual 
construction conflict. 
 
5.2   Implementation Media 
The proposed decision support methodology described in Chapter 4 lends itself well to 
spreadsheet modeling, in which each module can be represented on a different sheet. 
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Furthermore, spreadsheets have many advantages and powerful features that enable rapid 
prototyping of the proposed methodology, which facilitates validation and testing.  
 
Spreadsheets were among the earliest software innovations that had a profound effect on 
the widespread use of personal computers. Among their strong features are their intuitive 
cell-based structure and their simple interface that is easy to use even for a first-time user. 
Underneath the structure and the interface are a host of powerful and versatile features, 
from data entry and manipulation to a large number of functions, charts, and word 
processing capabilities. To increase productivity, newer spreadsheet versions have also 
added programmability options, a number of add-in programs, and features that allow 
Internet connectivity and workgroup sharing. Because of their wide use, spreadsheets have 
proven suitable as a tool for developing computer models that require ease of use, 
versatility, and productivity, such as those for decision support methodologies. 
Spreadsheets have already been applied successfully in many infrastructure applications 
such as planning and cost estimation for highway projects (Hegazy and Ayed, 1998), 
Critial Path Method (CPM) and time-cost trade-off (TCT) analysis (Hegazy and Ayed 
1999), construction delay analysis (Mbabazi et al., 2005), and infrastructure asset 
management (Hegazy et al., 2004). In this study, Microsoft Excel software was selected 








5.3   Prototype Decision Support System 
Using the macro language of Microsoft Excel, a DSS (ConGres) was developed. The 
development of the prototype involved substantial programming effort in order to code 
and test the different modules in order to develop a unified user-friendly interface, and to 
experiment with several case studies. Basically, the decision support system was 
developed as a workbook that contains several worksheets, including a main screen with a 
simple interface and buttons to activate the step-by-step options, as shown in Figure. 5.1. 
A schematic diagram of all the prototype components is shown in Figure. 5.2 
 





- Shortlisting of 
solutions 
- Scoring and selection 







- Ranking of shortlisted 
solutions according to 
stakeholders’ (DMs) 
preferences  
- Stability Analysis 
- Robustness Analysis







The interface automates all of the computations involved and allows the user or decision 
maker to interact with the system to obtain decision support. 
 
The prototype provides decision support in two ways, as shown in the two branches in 
Figure 5.1 and 5.2:  
 
Figure 5.1: Main Menu Screen 
Decision Making using 
Conflict Resolution 
Group Decision 
 Making  
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       Figure 5.2: Components of the Proposed Prototype 
Details: Figures 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8  
Step 2 
Step 1 
Details: Figure 5.4  
Details: Figures 5.9 and 5.10 
Step 3 
Details: Figures 5.16, 5.17, and 5.18  
Step 5 
Step 4 
Details: Figure 5.15  
Group 
Decision Making 






Details: Figures 5.1 and 5.3 
Main Screen
Decision Making Using
 Conflict Resolution 
(Steps 1, 2, 4 and 5) 
31 
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a) Using a simple static scoring approach to have a group decision making and to 
prioritize possible solutions (left-hand side branch, i.e., Steps 1, 2, and then 3). 
b) Using a conflict-resolution approach to simulate negotiation tactics and arrive at 
the most stable solution for all decision makers (right-hand side branch, i.e., steps 
1, 2, 4, and then 5). 
In the next section, a case study of a construction conflict decision is used to describe the 
two approaches in detail. 
 
5.3.1  Case Study: Construction Conflict 
In this conflict, a dispute arose in a building project in Meaford, Ontario, Canada, between 
an Owner and a mid-sized Contractor; names have been omitted for confidentiality. The 
total value of the project was $6 million Canadian, and the Contractor was awarded the 
job, as being the lowest bidder. The project was under restrictive time constraints, so the 
process of designing, bidding, and awarding the job was done in a speedy manner. The 
Contractor started mobilizing resources and construction immediately after signing the 
contract. Later, when the job was almost 12% complete, a memo from the consulting 
office was sent to the Contractor questioning the delay in the submission of a shop 
drawing for a particular item. At that time, the Contractor discovered that he had omitted a 
$450,000 item in his bid (almost 7.5% of the total contract value). Because of the tight 
market and tense competition, the Contractor did not include a profit margin, depending 
solely on discounts from subcontractors and suppliers for obtaining profit. The maximum 
discount he obtained, however, was only about 3%, and almost all the subcontractors 
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refused to renegotiate their prices. The Contractor realized that his company would go 
bankrupt unless the Owner agreed to cover the missing item. His main arguments were 
that the bid documents were not clear, the bidding time was short, and many addenda were 
issued during the bidding period. 
 
Although he officially rejected the Contractor’s request, the Owner needed a speedy 
completion of the construction, which put some constraints on his negotiation options. The 
Owner did not want to extend the negotiation time, take legal action, or assign a new 
contractor. The Contractor, on the other hand, threatened to declare bankruptcy but 
preferred to find a way to complete the work. The construction conflict was formally 
modeled using ConGres, following the general steps depicted in Figure 5.1, which are 
explained in detail in the following subsections. 
  
5.3.2  Decision Support Using Simple Weighting for Group 
Decision Making 
Using a simple weighting approach, the prototype reached an optimum decision through 
the following steps. 
Step 1. Identify the stakeholders and their options. Clicking on the “Stakeholders and their 
options” button (number 1 in Figure. 5.3), transfers the user to the Stakeholders’ sheet to 












In this case, as shown in Figure 5.4, two DMs are specified for the construction conflict: 
the Owner and the Contractor. The DMs and their options are described in the specified 
spreadsheet cells. The Owner is specified to have four decision options: No Comp.: the 
owner will not pay the contractor any compensation; Full Comp.: the Owner will 
compensate the Contractor in full for the missing item; Partial Comp.: the Owner will pay 
the Contractor only partial compensation; and Legal: the Owner will sue the Contractor if 
the latter does not complete the job. On the other hand, the Contractor has three decision 
options: Conti. w/o Comp.: Continue without compensation; Accept Payment: accept 
payment (either partial or full) from the Owner; or Bankrupt: declare his bankruptcy, 
given that the Owner will not agree to compensate. It is noted that the specified options 
represent each DM’s mutually exclusive choices. The DMs’ preferences among these 
options, however, are not specified at this stage. It should also be noted that for future 

















Once all the DMs are specified with their options, the user can return to the main screen 
(Figure 5.3) to continue with other steps in the decision-support process. It should be 
noted that the step of specifying the decision makers and their options is the most crucial 
step in the process. It needs to be carried out carefully so that no important party is 
omitted. The options also need to represent realistic courses of actions that each party can 
take based on extensive consultation with its associated group and that may involve 
surveys, expert opinion, and/or brainstorming. Once the decision makers or stakeholders 
and their options are specified, the program then lists all possible solutions (decision 
states).  The total number of decision possibilities is the multiplication of the number of 
Decision Options listed in column 2, in this case 4x3 = 12. These 12 decision states 
represent all possible decision states. For example, State 6 (Soln 6) in Figure 5.5 
represents a solution in which the owner will agree to pay full compensation to the 




















Step 2. Rank possible solutions. Since there are a large number of decision states that 
represent possible solutions, it is important to identify and exclude any infeasible solutions 
so that the most promising ones can be shortlisted. Therefore, this step activates a new 
sheet, which applies the Elimination Method (described in Section 4.4.1), as shown in 
Figures 5.5 and 5.6.  
 
The elimination process requires the user of the program to analyze the decision makers’ 
important rules that affect their desire to reject or accept 12 possible solutions. This 
process may include common knowledge, surveys, and interviews with the decision 
makers. The purpose is to define the decision makers’ minimum acceptable threshold 
value (range). Once this information becomes available to the user, the elimination process 
can be carried out. 
Details in 
Figure. 5.6 
All decision states before elimination 
Details in Figure 5.8 
Rules for accepting/rejecting 
solutions are entered here 
(Elimination method). 
Figure 5.5: List of Possible Decision States before Elimination  
2 
12 Decisions states 
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First, the acceptance rules are entered into the program in a ranked order, starting from the 
most important at the top and finishing with the least important at the bottom (Figure 5.6). 
As shown in the figure, four rules were specified as a screening filter to consider a solution 
acceptable if  
1) the consequent project delay (days)  ≤  15 days  
2) the project cost increase (%)  ≤  10% 
3) the Contractor’s reputation remains good (b or better) 








As shown in Figure 5.6, the program automatically assigns numerical values to the rules to 
reflect their decreasing importance. The weight for any rule of a rank i is calculated as the 
factorial of (N-i+1), where N is the number of rules. For example, the most important rule 
(project delay) is ranked first (i.e., i=1) and is assigned the highest score of (4-1+1)! = 4! = 
4x3x2x1 = 24. In this manner, the rules exhibit exponential decay in their importance. 
Accordingly, the four listed rules are assigned the numerical ranks of 24, 6, 2, and 1, 
respectively. 






(These weights can also 
be changed by the user) 
Decision Makers’ 
acceptance thresholds  
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It should be noted here that the acceptance rules are selected in a manner that considers the 
points of view of both decision makers. In addition, one of the strengths of the Elimination 
Method is the ability to deal with alphabetical and numerical values for the threshold 
values since in real life, evaluation scales can be set alphabetically as A, B, C, etc. or with 
real values that reflect physical quantities (e.g., cost). In the present case study, the top two 
rules are assigned numerical values. Alternatively, the third and fourth rules are assigned 
alphabetical values. 
 
Once the acceptance rules are specified, the user evaluates each of the possible solutions 
and assigns a score for each rule as shown in Figure. 5.7, using the specified scales for 
each rule. For example, in Figure. 5.7, the user specifies that the consequences of solution 
1 (Soln 1): “Contractor to continue without compensation” are 5 days of delay, 10% 
additional cost, Contractor reputation of b, and continuity of projects of c. Accordingly, 







Similarly, values are entered for the rest of the possible solutions. For example, solution 
12 (Soln 12) failed with respect to the first rule since its project delay (60 days) exceeds 
Figure 5.7: Shortlisting Solutions Using the Elimination Method 
To be filled in by the user
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the threshold of 15 days. Because the first rule is top-ranked, failure to meet this rule 
means that solution 12 is ranked very low. Thus, based on the weights of the rules and the 
user’s evaluation, the system ranks solutions depending on how many rules have been 
satisfied. The rank is shown below each solution. Based on this ranking, the user can 
manually specify any undesirable solution for deletion, by selecting the (Yes) button, as 








Once a solution is deleted (eliminated), the system rearranges the remaining solutions 
based on the acceptable rules. At the end of this process, the user has a short list of 
decision solutions for the next step in the decision support process. In this case, the 
shortlisted solutions are 1 and then 2, as shown in Figure. 5.9. This example demonstrates 
that the strength of the Elimination method is its simplicity in identifying and eliminating 
less desirable solutions in order to provide a feasible short list of the potential solutions to 
the problem.  
 











Step 3. Get best solution. After shortlisting using the Elimination Method, the shortlisted 
solutions are ready for a more detailed multiple criteria analysis through a simple scoring 
method to determine the best solution. This step can be activated by the third button 
shown in Figure 5.3, which transfers the user to a new spreadsheet that displays only the 
shortlisted solutions. The process involves defining the important evaluation criteria ( ijv ) 
and soliciting their relative weights (wi) from the decision makers, as shown in Figure 
5.10. For example, a weight of w1 = 0.4 is assigned to the first criterion of “Satisfying 
Both Parties”, while a weight of 0.3 is assigned to each of the second and third criteria, 
“Smooth Progress” and “Avoid Litigation”. In reality, a panel of experts or representatives 
of the various decision makers can be assembled to define the criteria and assign their 
weights with respect to the type of project being considered. The weights represent 
relative importance and indicate the relative preference of all parties for the final decision. 
 
  
Figure 5.9: Final Results of the Elimination Method 











Once the criteria and their relative weights, which sum to a total of 1.0, are determined, 
the evaluation process proceeds. In this process, decision makers’ scores ( ijv ) are averaged 
for each shortlisted solution, with respect to each criterion.  As shown in Figure 5.10, 
scores are assigned on a scale of 1 to 100. For example, a score of 21v = 65 for solution 2 
with respect to “Satisfy Both Parties“ is the average of the scores given by the various 
decision makers. Similarly, scores of 22v = 50 and 
2
3v = 55 are achieved for the second and 
third criteria, respectively. Accordingly, an aggregate for each solution is calculated as  




i i i i i i
q q j q
j
v w v w v w v w v w v
=
= + + + + = ∑  
Where q is the total number of criteria. Substituting the values for solution 2 yields 
Overall score for solution # 2 = (0.4*65 0.3*50 0.3*55) 58+ + =∑  
Figure 5.10: Criteria, Weights, and the Solutions’ Scores 
3 
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Thus, the total score for each solution is automatically calculated, and the solution with the 
highest total score is highlighted by an upward arrow underneath (solution 2 in Figure 
5.10), the solution requiring the Owner to offer the Contractor partial compensation. He 
will satisfy his constraint of meeting the project deadline. On the other hand, the 
Contractor’s agreement to complete the job will keep his company from bankruptcy and 
his reputation intact.  It should be noted that the scores ( ijv ) can be determined through 
interviews with the decision makers/stakeholder groups or through surveys.  
 
5.3.3  Decision Support Employing Conflict Resolution  
While the Group decision support using scoring is simple and highly consistent with the 
current processes utilized by private and government sectors in construction and 
infrastructure decision making; however, it is static and does not reflect interactive 
negotiation tactics. Conflict resolution, therefore, is employed as a more powerful and 
dynamic decision support tool. Through the second option (Figure 5.1), the process 
examines the stability of solutions with respect to decision makers’ (stakeholders’) 
preferences and has powerful features that can consider the uncertainty in the process 
using Info-gap theory, as described in Chapter 4. 
 
The decision support process starts with the same two Steps 1 and 2 described earlier: 
defining the stakeholders and their options as well as shortlist possible solutions. In this 
example, the process results in the two feasible solutions shown in Figure 5.9. The process 










It should be noted that conflict resolution was applied to this case study in a previous 
effort by Kasssab et al., (2006), utilizing the GMCR II program. Table 5.1 (left side) 
shows GMCR II’s screen after information related to the decision makers and their options 
was entered. In this representation, each decision state is represented by a combination of 














Decision States DMs/Options* 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Owner               
    1. Full N Y N N N N N N N N N N N N 
    2. Partial N N Y N N N N N Y N N Y N N 
    3. New N N N Y N N N N N N N N Y N 
    4. Legal N N N N Y N Y N N Y N N N Y 
Contractor               
    5. Continue N N N N N Y Y N N N N N N N 
    6. Accept N N N N N N N Y Y Y N N N N 
  7. Bankruptcy N N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y 
Table 5.1: Feasible States using GMCR II 
* Same as defined in Figure 5.4









As such, the conflict has (27 = 128) possible decision states. Subsequently, GMCR II has 
four approaches to identify infeasible states, as shown in the upper part of Figure 5.12. For 
example, selecting the “Mutually Exclusive Options” approach enables the user to specify 
the states that must be eliminated because they involve options that could not exist 
together (i.e., are mutually exclusive), as shown in the lower part of Figure 5.12. 
Following the elimination process, 114 of the 128 decision states were removed, leaving 




















Once the feasible states are defined, the program allows the DMs to define their  relative 
preference statements as shown in Figure 5.13, which can be interpreted as set out in 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3, where the numbers refer to the option numbers and a negative sign 
means the option is not taken. 
 













Once the preferences were entered, the stability analysis was conducted. GMCR II 
calculates the stability of each feasible state for every DM with respect to all the solution 
concepts previously mentioned in Chapter 4. In general, a state is stable for any DM when 
he or she cannot move away from it without suffering negative consequences. When a 
given state is stable for all DMs according to a given stability concept, it is deemed to be 
an equilibrium or compromise resolution since no DM has an incentive to move away 
from it (Hipel et al., 1997).  
 
Preference Statement Explanation 
-1 Owner most prefers not to give full payment to the Contractor. 
(-1, -2, -3, -4) IFF 5 Owner prefers not to take any action if and only if (IFF) the Contractor continues without extra payment. 
2 IF 6 Owner would like to provide partial payment if the Contractor agrees to continue without extra payment. 
4 IFF (-5, -6) Owner would take court action if and only if the Contractor refuses to continue the job. 
3 IFF 7 Owner prefers to acquire a new contractor if and only if the Contractor declare bankruptcy. 
Preference Statement Explanation 
- 5 Contractor most prefers not to continue the job without compensation from the Owner. 
(5 & -7) IF 1 Contractor prefers to continue the Job if the Owner agrees to pay full compensation. 
6 IFF 2 Contractor would complete the job if and only if the Owner agrees to pay him partial compensation. 
-4 Contractor does not prefer legal action.  
7 IFF 4 Contractor  would  declare bankruptcy if and only if the Owner takes legal action. 
Table 5.3: Contractor’s Preference Statements  
Table 5.2: Owner’s Preference Statements  




Based on the stability analysis, Figure 5.14 shows the states that are in equilibrium 
(equilibria). The results showed that the two most stable states are States 9 and 14, since 
they are stable according to all of the solution concepts. This result means that if the 
conflict were to arrive at one of these states, it would stay there since it would be in 
equilibrium. This means that  
- in State 9, the Owner will pay part of the requested expenses, and the Contractor 
agrees to complete the job; 
-in State 14, the Owner will refuse to pay the Contractor any compensation, and 















While GMCR II is useful and applies the Graph Model concepts, it was not used in the 
development of this thesis due to some drawbacks, including the following: 
- It uses “yes” and “no” representations for the DM options, thus resulting in 
a very large number of decision states (128 as opposed to the 12 with the 
present DSS). 
Figure 5.14: The Final Equilibrium Results  
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- It is not flexible enough to be integrated with the Elimination Method, the 
Info-gap Theory, and Genetic Algorithms. 
 
Applying conflict resolution using the DSS of this thesis is detailed as follow in Steps 4 
and 5 below: 
Step 4. Specify stakeholders’ preferences. The shortlisted solutions are transferred to a 
new spreadsheet as shown in Figure 5.15. Rather than asking the decision makers to define 
evaluation criteria and collectively score the solutions through averaging, the conflict 
resolution option requires DMs to enter their preferences for each solution using a 
numerical scale of 0 to 100 to reflect each DM’s point of view. The use of a 0-to-100 
range is reasonable for this application. The values represent each DM’s payoff from each 
solution. For example, the first preference row in Figure 5.15 shows the point of view of 
the Owner, who indicates a high preference (100) for solution 1 “No Compensation”, and 
a lower preference (75) for solution 2 “Making Partial Compensation to the Contractor”. 
From the Contractor’s point of view, on the other hand, a preference value of zero is 
assigned to the first solution since the Contractor does not accept any solution with “No 
Compensation”. The Contractor also assigns a preference value of 50 for the second 
solution “Partial Compensation”.  It should be noted that the system could be expanded in 
future work to include an option prioritization method of listing stakeholders’ preferences 










Step 5:  Conduct stability analysis. The program now analyzes each specified solution 
using the Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ stability analyses. As shown in Figure 5.16, 
solution 2 is analysed and given a total score of 9250; equilibrium was achieved in all four 
stability tests. The Nash stability result indicates that no other decisions bring a better 
payoff. The GMR stability analysis also indicates that the opponents' counter-actions are 
safe. The SMR stability result shows that the opponents' counter-actions are safe and not 
harmful to the opponent. Lastly, the SEQ stability result indicates that the opponents' 
beneficial counter-actions are safe. Once these analyses are completed, the program 
presents the report shown at the bottom of Figure 5.16.  
 
To calculate the score for any solution, the following formulation is used: 
Score = (Sum of payoffs assigned by the DMs) x 10 
          + Bonuses for solution stability with respect to Owner (B1 + B2 + B3 + B4) 
          + Bonuses for solution stability with respect to Contractor (B5+ B6 + B7 + B8) 
where,  
Figure 5.15: Specifying Decision Makers’ Preferences 
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- the payoff represents the values of the preferences assigned by the DMs; 
- B1 to B8 are bonus values assigned by the program if the examined solution passes the 
Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ analyses (with respect to each of the DMs). 
 
For example, in Figure 5.16, solution 2 has total payoff values of 50 (Owner) plus 75 
(Contractor). In addition, the solution successfully passed the Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ 













value of 1000 to the final score, and hence, the total score becomes 










Score = Total payoff (75+50) x 10 + Owner stability (1000+1000+1000+1000) 
             +   Contractor stability (1000+1000+1000+1000) = 9250. 
In the present example, testing solution 1 results in a total score of only 9000, and 
therefore, with the highest total score, solution 2 is the better solution.  
 
In Step 5, while the system allows the user to enter and test a solution manually, it also 
contains two processes – process automation and uncertainty analysis – which are 
explained in the following sections. 
 
• Process Automation: the prototype has an interesting option for automating an 
exhaustive search for the best solution. The “Find the best solution” button in Figure 
5.16 activates a macro program that tests all the shortlisted solutions, automatically 
calculates and compares their total scores, and presents the best result to the user 
(Figure 5.17). In the case of an extremely large number of shortlisted solutions, it is 
possible to use GAs to search for the optimum one. 
 
• Uncertainty Analysis: Some decision makers may be certain about their preferences; 
however, in real life, many are not. The model can handle cases in which the DMs’ 
preferences are ambiguous by using information gap theory to calculate the robustness 













Using the “Sensitivity to Prefs” button shown in Figure 5.16, the prototype asks the user to 
express the level of uncertainty associated with the preferences as a ±  percentage (Figure 
5.15). In the present example, for demonstration, it is assumed that the users specify the 
following uncertainty levels: 
DM    Uncertainties 
Owner      Original preference value    ±  10% 
Contractor   Original preference value    ±  15% 
 
Next, the system presents the user with a dialogue box where he can enter the number of 
random experiments to be considered for the uncertainty analysis, as shown in Figure 
5.18. Figure 5.19 is a flowchart for uncertainty analyses for 100 experiments carried out 
by the system for this case study. In this process, 100 random scenarios are generated with 
random preference values within the uncertainty level specified. Accordingly, each 
Automated Testing 
Figure 5.17: Finding the Best Solution Using the Automated Feature 
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scenario has a best solution, and the model counts the occurrence of each solution being 
the best as an indication of the robustness of the solution. Accordingly, the final decision 
in the construction example is solution 2, which shows high robustness because it was 













































User input of initial preferences 
among solutions 
User input of uncertainty levels 
Owner ±  10% 
Contractor ±  15% 
Scenarios:  i = 1 to 100  
No. of experiments 
Generate random preferences 
within the user-specified range of 
uncertainty levels 
Stability analysis 
Determine best solution for 
scenario i 




Example showing solution 3 with 
41% robustness 
Loop 
i =  i + 1 
Figure 5.19: Flowchart for the Uncertainty Analyses Process  
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Interpretation of Results 
The results provided by the developed DSS show that solution 2 is the wisest decision that 
the two DMs could reach with the minimum possible loss for both parties. In this state, the 
Owner admits some responsibility for the uncertainty caused by the bidding procedure and 
the very restricted time constraints. On the other hand, the Contractor, who had already 
completed 12% of the project, would lose any chance to recover his expenditures if he 
declared bankruptcy and pulled out of the job. 
 
In reality, what happened in this conflict matches this result. After several meetings 
between the representatives of both parties and intense negotiations, the Contractor agreed 
to continue and complete the project in exchange for a cost compensation for the missing 
item, which matches solution 2. This state represents the best equilibrium state, since no 
DM has an incentive to move away from it. Notice that this type of cooperation reflects 
the kind of cooperation that can take place in the generic game of the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
previously explained in Chapter 4. 
 
The main benefit of solution 2 is that both parties met halfway to resolve the conflict, and 
a win/win situation was reached. The Owner won by 
• not paying the full compensation that the Contractor initially requested, 
• having the Contractor guarantee that  the project would finish on time, and 
• avoiding the messy situation of hiring a new Contractor if the current Contractor    
         pulls out. 
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The Contractor also gained by 
• gaining payment for the cost of the missing item; and 
• not having to declare bankruptcy, which saved him significant financial loss and  
        preserved his reputation in the market place. 
 
The final resolution was possible because the Owner was under time constraint in this 
project. The Contractor was fully aware of this fact. As a result of this conflict, the Owner 
expressed sensitivity in future dealings with this Contractor, and a memo was issued by 
the Owner’s head office, modifying the bidding procedure to avoid automatic awarding of 
construction work to the lowest bidder or to unreasonable bid. 
 
5.4   Summary  
This chapter presented the implementation and the prototype development of a decision 
support system for conflict resolution. The presented system was implemented on a 
spreadsheet program because of its ease of use and powerful operating features. The 
prototype was developed using macro programs written in Excel’s Visual Basic for 
Application language. The development of the system involved a substantial programming 
effort in testing and coding the different modules and in developing a friendly, unified user 
interface.  
 
An example application of an actual construction conflict was presented to demonstrate 
the capabilities of the developed system and to validate the usability of the different 
modules of the DSS. The ability to measure the decision robustness in the presence of the 
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uncertainty associated with stakeholders’ preferences is a powerful feature of the 
developed system. While the presented example is small, it served as a useful test for the 











6.1   Introduction 
To demonstrate the applicability and practicality of the developed decision support system 
(DSS). This chapter is devoted to the application of the model for a real-life infrastructure 
privatization project, the Hamilton Wastewater Treatment Plant. A description of the case 
study project is presented along with the information required in order for the project to be 
analyzed using the proposed DSS. The use of the developed prototype suggesting the best 
privatization option for the case study is then explained, taking into consideration 
stakeholder preferences and the level of expected uncertainty. 
 
6.2   Case Study Overview 
In December 1994, the Regional Municipality of Hamilton-Wentworth, (Ontario, Canada) 
signed a ten-year, $180 million contract, with a new, one-year-old company, Philip 
Utilities Management Corporation (PUMC). The contract between the two entities 
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transferred the region’s water and sewage system operation, management, and 
maintenance responsibilities to PUMC. When the deal was signed, it was the largest 
Private-Public Partnership (PPP) agreement of this type in North America. 
 
The details of the decision-making process that resulted in the use of an Operation & 
Maintenance (O&M) type of PPP option in Hamilton are not available. However, Loxley 
(1999) published a detailed report that highlighted the flaws in this PPP agreement and its 
failure to meet the actual needs of the citizens. The data from that report are included in 
this study. Loxley took a broad approach by analyzing the Hamilton privatization 
experience of the wastewater treatment plant with respect to six aspects: 1) efficiency and 
cost savings, 2) financial risk transfer, 3) environmental risk and quality of service, 4) the 
issue of accountability and transparency, 5) the impact of the project on workers and the 
community, and 6) the economic development benefits. These six thus represent key rules 
and thresholds that can be used to accept or reject any PPP option for the case study. They 
can be used directly by the proposed DSS for eliminating infeasible PPP options. 
 
The background related to the privatization project and the history of the project that 
resulted in the failure of the privatization are useful for an understanding of the parameters 
involved in such a project and are described below.   
 
The 18.6 million annual contract between the Regional Authority (RA) and the Philip 
Utility and Maintenance Company (PUMC) transferred the operation, management, and 
maintenance of the water and sewage plants to PUMC for a 10-year period. Hence, PUMC 
possessed total control of the municipally owned water treatment plant and three other 
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water treatment plants (Woodward, Dundas, and Watertown) as well as 129 pumping 
stations and outstations. 
 
PUMC agreed to keep all existing employees and contracts for the first 18 months, in 
addition to respecting successor rights legislation. In addition, Philip Services (PS), 
PUMC’s parent company, made an additional commitment to create 100 new jobs over the 
next five years and to guarantee overall contract performance.  However, according to 
Section 3:04 of the contact, Philip was exempt from any liability if the system failed due 
to such factors as 
• the quality or quantity of the influent; 
• the limits of the capacity of the facilities; 
• the RA’s failure to make capital, regulatory, or emergency expenditures; 
• the operating parameters of the outstations. 
 
PUMC had an asset base of about $125 million according to Leo Gohier, Acting 
Commissioner Regional Environmental Department. However, at the time PUMC won the 
Hamilton contract, it had absolutely no record of running any equivalently sized water 
facility. 
 
In addition, while the parent company (PS) was Hamilton-based, (a major criterion for 
winning the contract) it later sold about 70% of PUMC to company based in the United 
States (USA). Thus, the ownership of PUMC was transferred to a foreign company after 




Both the Government and PUMC argued that the form of privatization (O & M) would 
provide the following benefits:  
1) increase an economical, cost-effective means of providing treatment services 
2) be the most cost-effective means of providing capital improvements to facilities 
3) allow access to financial resources 
4) allow access to emerging technologies 
5) create a higher level of operating efficiency 
6) transfer risk/responsibility from the city to the contractor 
7) enhance water quality and protect the environment 
8) fill the gap created by the downsizing of government operations 
In reality, however, Loxley’s (1999) report revealed the actual performance of the 
privatization, as shown in Table 6.1: 
 
Perceived Benefits Actual Performance 
Efficiency and Cost Saving 
• The private sector will share in maintenance 
costs 
• PUMC will be responsible for any maintenance 
costs less than $ 10, 000. 
• The RA will be responsible for any 
maintenance costs more than $ 10,000 
 
• Because the entire wastewater treatment plant 
needs major renewal, the RA has to make all 
capital expenditures. 
• While PUMC made no renewal investment, it 
     will gain from operating the renewed system. 
• Taxpayers, not the private sector, will 
ultimately provide the funding for the renewal. 
 
Risk Transfer 
• A major reason for privatization is that risk is 
transferred to the private sector. 
 
• Design: the RA bears the full burden of the 
design. 
•  Construction and Maintenance: the RA bears 
the risk of any maintenance exceeding $ 
10,000/ year. 
• Financial risks: the RA is responsible for 
arranging financing for any upgrades. 
• The RA faced financial and operating risks 
from the instability of its private partner 
(PUMC). 
 
Table. 6.1: Perceived Benefits Versus Actual Performance of the Contract  
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Perceived Benefits Actual Performance 
Environmental Risk and Quality of Service 
• Private sector will keep maintaining the sewage 
treatment plant Certificates of Approval (C of 
A); rates are set by the province. 
 
 
• Private sector will maintain the baseline 
performance criteria (BPC) for effluent quality 
after treatment as set by the RA and as 








PUMC did not fulfill their environmental duties. 
Some indications include: 
• In January 1996, a major spill occurred at the 
main pumping station at the sewage plant under 
Philip’s control.  In this accident, the worst 
disaster ever to affect the system, 180 million 
litres of raw sewage were spilled into Hamilton 
Harbour and surrounding areas. 
• More than 115 houses and businesses were 
flooded in the Stoney Creek area. 
• In September 1996, a report by Rand Rosell of 
the RA’s legal department said PUMC was 
responsible for the spill.  Filer Consultants (an 
independent company) put the blame on 
mechanical and operational failure caused by 
PUMC. 
• RA ultimately had to pay for all damage. 
• PUMC has often failed to meet governmental 
or Remedial Action Plan (RAP) standards for 
the discharge of effluents. 
• It is estimated that 4.33 billion litres of 
untreated sewage flows into the harbour each 
year. 
• The treated effluent from PUMC plants often 
falls below government standards. 
• Hamilton Bay water contains high levels of 
phosphorous and ammonia which contribute to 
poor water quality. 
• For total phosphorus content, the average 
exceeded the BPC over almost four years. 
• In at least eight months, standards were 
surpassed considerably. 
• Some observers feel that PUMC is choosing to 
operate at a much higher level of risk of 
environmental problems in order to reduce 
costs and increase its profits. 
 
Accountability and Transparency 
• While the contract contains a requirement for 
an annual performance review (Article 17), 
there is no stipulation that this review be made 
public. 
 
• The reporting criteria to the RA and the 
Ministry of Environment are very vague. 
• No quarterly or monthly reports are required. 
• Public reporting criteria are non-existent. 
• The contract itself was awarded to PUMC 
without being tendered publicly. 
•  PUMC’s performance in the first year, on a 
scale of 1 to 4, is a 1.   
• PUMC has not even bothered to file its taxes or 
report its financial position to the RA. 
 
Table 6.1: Perceived Benefits versus Actual Performance of the Contract (Cont’d) 
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Perceived Benefits Actual Performance 
Impact on Workers and the Community 
• Philip Services would guarantee employment 
opportunities by creating 100 new jobs 
somewhere in the RA over five years. 
• PUMC promised to pay $1 million, or $10,000 
for each job Philip did not create. 
• Workers were offered an equal 10% share in 
any expenditure reductions. 
 
• In April 1996 layoffs began.  Philip cut about 
60 of the 120 or so workers, leaving 58 staff, 
including management, by the end of 1999. 
• No CUPE members remained beyond the end 
of 1999. 
• There were also 19 vacant positions at the 
operations when PUMC took over.  These 
positions were never filled. 
• No decent lay-off compensation was provided. 
• PUMC is paying laid-off workers the strict 
minimum of one week’s pay for one year’s 
work.  
• No job guarantees or decent severance 
packages were included in the agreement. 
• PUMC is attempting to multitask and multi-
skill most jobs.  The CUPE jobs in 
administration and cleaning were eliminated. 
Economic Development Benefits  
• One of the main reasons there was no tendering 
for this contract was to bring economic 
development benefits to the Hamilton-
Wentworth region, and Philip was a local 
company.  
•  Philip promised to  
a. develop an environmental enterprise centre, 
b. establish an international training centre with 
Mohawk College and spend $15 million on new 
capital projects over five years, 
c. build a new head office building and even 
collaborate with McMaster University. 
 
• The only one of these initiatives undertaken 
was the moving of Philip’s head office to 
Hamilton.  




Based on the Loxley’s (1999) report and the analysis in Table 6.1, the following changes 
should take place: 
• The RA should have the ability to terminate the contract in case of defaults such as 
not paying to creditors, or in case of processes related to bankruptcy or insolvency. 
• The RA should appoint an independent regulatory body composed of independent 
observers to monitor and examine contact compliance in a public and transparent 
fashion. 
Table 6.1: Perceived Benefits versus Actual Performance of the Contract (Cont’d) 
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• No more privatizations should be implemented without a full public discussion and 
an election on the issue.  Then, if the proposal is approved, there must be a full 
public tendering process. 
• Immediate publication is required off all financial items related to the PUMC 
contract, including the audited PUMC annual statements. 
• Companies which are the subject of RA or City contracts should not be permitted to 
contribute financially to the campaigns of municipal candidates. 
• All laid-off workers at PUMC should be given a fair severance package paid for out 
of Philip profits from the cuts. 
• Annual reports on contract compliance should be available. 
• The contract and all subsequent changes should be published. 
• All information regarding the quality of drinking water, effluent, and spills should 
be made public on a monthly basis. 
• The quality of Hamilton’s water and wastewater should be benchmarked against 
other large Ontario regions and published on a regular basis. 
 
 
6.3   Case Study Implementation 
The proposed decision support system (DSS) is to be used for the Hamilton Treatment 
Plants (HTP) privatization project. It should be noted that this case study was analyzed 
after the fact: the decision had already been made, and many data were not available due 




The DSS process begins with the identification of the stakeholders and their options. Next, 
the elimination method is used to shortlist the privatization alternatives. Then, two 
decision support techniques are used: Group Decision Making using simple scoring, and 
the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution. Finally, Info-gap Theory is used to help select 
the best decision in view of the uncertainty that may be associated with stakeholders’ 
preferences. The step-by-step analysis is described as follows: 
 
6.3.1  Group Decision Making Using Simple Scoring  
The group decision-making process consists of the following three steps: 
Step 1: Identify stakeholders and their options. Five stakeholders are specified in this case 







The first stakeholder is the Private Sector, representing PUMC, which has four options: 
rebuild and operate (R&O), renovate-operate-manage (R&O&M), operate and manage (O 
& M), and finally Purchase the whole facility (purchase). 
5 stakeholders  
Figure 6.1: Stakeholders and their Options 
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The second stakeholder in the case study is the Employees, represented by their union. It is 
assumed that they have two conditions for approving any proposal: a guarantee that no 
employee be fired and a guarantee that the facility will remain unionized.   
 
The third stakeholder represents Public Users. This group is assumed to have two options 
for approving proposals: fee increases must be less than 2%, annually and open 
competition must be allowed in order to prevent a monopoly.  
 
The fourth stakeholder is the Environmental group (Environmentals), which has two 
conditions: installation of a filtration system to screen out any hazardous materials, and 
regular quality control and tests by an independent party.   
 
Finally, the fifth stakeholder group is the Government, which has 2 conditions: the private 
sector should be a Canadian company, or at least 51% of the private-sector contractors 
should be owned by Canadian shareholders. 
 
Specifying the stakeholders and their options resulted in a total of 64 “decision states” (4x 
2 x 2 x 2 x 2), as shown in Figure 6.2. These decision states represent all possible 
decisions that could be made as a result of the combination of all possible stakeholders and 
their desired options. For example, decision state 4 (Soln 4) represents a privatization 
solution in which the local (no foreign shareholders) private sector buys the facility with a 
guarantee that no employee will lose his or her job, that a maximum increase of 2% in the 
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users’ fees will be implemented annually to overcome inflation, and that an effective 









Step 2: Shortlist feasible solutions. Given 64 decision states, it is important to identify and 
exclude any solutions with infeasible options, and then shortlist and focus on the most 
promising ones. Hence, activating the elimination spreadsheet allows the user to enter 
thresholds rules for shortlisting solutions.  
 
In the present case study, based on comprehensive brainstorming results, the following 







Figure 6.2: List of Possible Decision States before Eliminations 
Table 6.2 Accepted Rules 
Public and Social Impact should be less than C 
Technology Transfer should be more than 5% of the yearly budget  
Operational Efficiency should be more than B 
Economic Cost Reduction should be less than $ 3 million 
Degree of Risk Transfer to Gov. should be less than 10% 
Environmental Protection should be more than B 
Political (Foreign Shareholders) should be less than 51% 
Accountability and Transparency should be more than 90% 
Economic Development Benefits should be more than 5% 
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These acceptance rules are explained as follows: 
1. Public and Social Impact should be less than C: 
It is important that any decision taken by the government not be harmful to the 
public, either socially or environmentally. However, in real life it is very hard to 
find an ideal project without an undesirable cost, but this anticipated cost should 
not be more than a level D on a scale of A, B, C, D, and F.  
2. Technology Transfer should be more than 5% of the yearly budget: 
The new company should invest at least 5% of its yearly profit in updating and 
improving the existing facility.  
3. Operational Efficiency should be more than B: 
PUMC should utilize the latest technology in the wastewater treatment market by 
implementing its related software and hardware to improve the efficiency of the 
plan so that it reaches level B. 
4. Economic Cost Reduction should be less than $ 3 million: 
PUMC should work at saving operating costs, which will be allocated on a 60/40 
basis between PUMC and the Government. 
5. Degree of Risk Transfer to Gov. should be less than 10%: 
PUMC should be responsible for any risk resulting from managing, operating the 
facility, and arranging for financing. The Government is committed to helping up 
to a maximum of 10 % toward these duties. 
6. Environmental Protection should be more than B: 
PUMC should be very sensitive and give extra attention to avoiding pollution of 




7. Political (Foreign Shareholders) should be less than 51%: 
PUMC has the option of being owned by a single Canadian company or by 
shareholders; however, the percentage of Canadian shareholders should always be 
more than 51% to protect the interest of local citizens and businesses. 
8. Accountability and Transparency should be more than 90%: 
PUMC should have its records open for inspection despite being owned by 
shareholders, except for special cases that do not affect public interest. 
9. Economic Development Benefits should be more than 5%: 
PUMC should invest at least 5% of its profits in the City of Hamilton.  
 
Once the rules and thresholds values are entered, the DSS assigns a relative weight to each 









Next, the Elimination Method is applied to shortlist the feasible alternatives. Once the 
acceptance rules are specified, each of the possible solutions is entered with respect to the 
rules, as shown in Figure 6.4. The values shown in Figure 6.4 are entered for 
demonstration purposes. 
Ranked Criteria: 
Weights are assigned automatically to 
reflect decreasing importance. 
















Once the assigned values are entered as shown in Figure 6.4, the program identifies and 
highlights the failures for each solution. For example, solution 38 (Soln 38) fails with 
respect to the Sixth and Seventh rules since its level of environmental protection and 
concern is less than level B, and its foreign ownership of the facility exceeds the threshold 
rule limits of 49%. Thus, based on the weights of the rules and the evaluation values, the 
system ranks solutions depending on how many rules are satisfied. For example, solution 
40 is almost last in ranking since it violates six rules, and hence it is ranked 63 in the 
ranking row below. 
 
The next step is for the infeasible solutions to be eliminated (Figure 6.5), thus producing a 
short list of feasible alternatives. In this example, after elimination, ten solutions are 
shortlisted, as shown in Figure 6.6.  
Figure 6.4: Shortlisting Solutions using the Elimination Method 
Evaluating the solutions with 
















 Step 3: Produce final group decision. After shortlisting the solutions using the 
Elimination Method, the shortlisted solutions are ready for more detailed analysis, using 
the simple scoring method of Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) to determine the 
best solution. This process involves defining the important evaluation criteria and 
soliciting their relative weights from the stakeholders, as shown in Figure 6.7. The 
weighting numbers on the left in Figure 6.7 are obtained from a panel of experts 
(representatives of the various stakeholders) who can be assembled to define the criteria 
    
Figure 6.6: Ten Shortlisted Solutions 
Figure 6.5: Identifying Infeasible Alternatives for Deletion 
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and assign their weights. The weights represent the relative importance and indicate the 







Once the criteria and their relative weights, which sum to total of 1, are determined, the 
evaluation process proceeds. In this process, the stakeholders’ scores are averaged for each 
shortlisted solution, with respect to each criterion.  As shown in Figure 6.8, scores are 
assigned on a scale of 1 to 100. For example, in solution 6, the stockholder’s options are 








Figure 6.7: Specifying Criteria and Their Weights 
Figure 6.8: Simple Scoring Method  
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- PUMC will choose the option of R&O&M, as it will be a government investment project 
with a budget larger than that of R&O alone. Hence PUMC will make a larger profit from 
renovating the old facility, updating its machinery, and increasing efficiency. 
- The Employees will agree to privatization if they have a union representing them, which 
will eliminate their fear of unemployment due to privatization. 
- The Public users appreciate this type of privatization as it guarantees a maximum rate 
increase of 2% with government approval. Although an open competition may reduce 
users’ future utility bills, there may also be an accompanying sacrifice in quality.  
- The Environmental group prefers this privatization alternative since it addresses their 
concerns. Regular quality tests mean that PUMC will always be scrutinized, and that a red 
flag will be raised for any violation of the approved environmental standards. 
- The Government (RA) likes this option since it will be relieved of this responsibility. As 





As shown in Figure 6.8, the criteria are ranked from most important at the top to least 
important at the bottom. This ranking can be assumed to have been set by the Government 
and represents its preferences. In solution 6 for example, the most important issue for the 
Government is the “efficiency and cost saving” criterion which corresponds to PUMC 
being able to perform the job and save the Government money. Efficiency and cost saving 
Stakeholders Solution 6 
Private sector R&O&M 
Employees Unionize 
Public users <2% Increase 
Environmentals Regular Tests 
Government No Share 
Table 6.3 The Best Solution and its Options Using Simple Scoring 
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are the main problems facing public infrastructure management. Hence, the Government 
assigned it a score of 90. The second criterion is “Financial risk transfer” because it 
represents other serious problems facing the local government and indeed most 
governments around the world, which are budget cuts and emergency financing. The 
Government assigned a score of 70 to reflect its importance to them. The third criterion is 
“Operational efficiency”, which scored 70 due to the importance of saving money and 
providing adequate service. Next, the “Environmental risk & quality of service” criterion 
scored a value of 50, and the “Issues of accountability and transparency” scored a low 
value of 20 because the union and the environmental groups will be monitoring PUMC’s 
performance. Next, the “Impact on workers and community” criterion also scored a low 
value of 20 due to the existing union, and the absence of foreign ownership and the 
inclusions of environmental monitoring. The final criterion, “Economic development 
benefits” has been assigned a high score of 90 as one of the main reasons for outsourcing 
these facilities is to help the local economy.  
 
As a result of this input, the total score for each solution is automatically calculated using 
the embedded formulas of simple scoring, and the solution with the highest total score is 
highlighted as shown in Figure 6.8. Based on these scores, the shorlisted solutions are then 




Solution 6 5 2 3 1 4 7 8 10 11 9 
Score 67 65 63 61 59 58 57 57 56 55 54 
Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 7 8 9 10 
Table 6.4 Scores and Ranks of the Shortlisted Solution 
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Solution 6 achieved the highest score of 67, followed by solution 5 and solution 2, etc. The 
best solution (Figure 6.8) represents the case of R&O&M which is Renovate-Operate-






The next best solution listed in Figure 6.8 is solution 5 of ROM. It is ranked second due to 
the employees’ stakeholders assigning a lower score for the option of “no firing”, thus 
giving a total score of 65 for this solution. This value is very close to that of the first 
solution. This narrow gap in score difference explains the need for a different decision 
selection tool that performs further tests to rank and select the best decisions. Steps 4 and 5 
in the next section explain this process.  
 
6.3.2  Decision Making Using Conflict Resolution  
In this process, the mechanism of the Graph Mode for Conflict Resolution is used, and the 
process examines the stability of the solutions with respect to the stakeholders’ 
preferences. The decision support process starts by following the same two steps 1 and 2 
described earlier: identifying the stakeholders and their options and shortlisting possible 
solutions. The process then proceeds to steps 4 and 5. 
Weight (wi) Criteria Scores (si) 
0.2 Efficiency and cost savings 90 
0.25 Financial risk transfer 70 
0.1 Operational efficiency  70 
0.15 Environmental risk & quality of service 50 
0.1 Issues of accountability & transparency 20 
0.05 Impact on worker and the community 20 
0.15 Economic development benefits. 90 
 67 




Step 4: Assigning stakeholders’ preferences to Alternative Solutions. In this step, the 
shortlisted solutions obtained in step 2 using the Elimination Method are transferred to a 
new spreadsheet as shown in Figure 6.9. 
 
Conflict resolution requires stakeholders’ preferences for each solution. These preferences 
are entered using a numerical scale of 0 to 100 to reflect each stakeholder’s point of view. 








• Private Sector: 
- RO:  for this option, PUMC assigned a value of 90, since renovating the facility will 
increase the contract volume, and hence increase the company’s profit.  
- ROM: for this option, PUMC assigned a value of 80. Despite receiving a high score, this 
option falls below the RO score because PUMC wishes to avoid any future complaint 
from the public or the government about mismanagements. 




- No Firing: despite the security associated with the promise of “no firing”, which has 
convinced the employees to assign 65 points for this option, other employees’ rights are 
not guaranteed. The company may force the employees to multitask rather than hire new 
employees. On the other hand, a union may guarantee these and other future benefits for 
its members.  
- Unionization: the employees prefer this option even if no permanent employment is 
guaranteed. Furthermore, the local population will increase in the future, and hence the 
plant capacity must increase, which will lead to greater job security. The union will also 
protect employee’s rights, so they have assigned 85 points for this solution. 
 
• Public Users: 
- 2% increase: The public users have two preferred options. The first is a maximum 
increase in fees of 2% per year. Public users assigned this option a score of 60, which 
reflects the fact that any increase is not appreciated; however, it is better than the second 
option of “Open competition” which may drastically lower the service quality. 
 
• Environmental Groups: 
- This group has two options, “Filtration” and “Regular Testing”. They assigned a score of 
55 to filtration, since they believe that the new filtration system will yield a well-defined 
outlet quality. However, due to past experience with large corporations, not to mention the 
Ontario Walkerton Tragedy, the Environmental group would prefer to have regular test 
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reports by independent parties. PUMC will then automatically be forced to have reliable 
filtration systems. Accordingly, they assigned a score of 80 to “Regular Testing” . 
 
• Government (Hamilton Municipality, RA) 
- The government has two preferred options in these shortlisted alternatives. The first 
option is “No Share” for foreigner investors. In this case, PUMC must remain purely 
Canadian, since it manages a vital facility serving a Canadian population. The second is 
“51%”; that is, no foreign shareholder has the right to have more than 49% of the PUMC, 
thus, retaining an effective influence over operation and decisions. Therefore, the RA has 
assigned a higher score of 70 to the option of a Canadian-controlled PUMC and assigned a 
lower score of 50 to the option involving foreign shareholders. Yet the two scores are not 
as disparate as one may readily expect, so it is plausible that the government is taking a 
neutral but decided stance. 
 
Based on the entered preference information, the alternatives and their option scores are 
listed as shown in Figure 6.9. For example, the column for solution (Soln 2) in Figure 6.9 
shows the point of view of the employees as a preference value of 85, indicating their full 
support for project unionization to protect their jobs and interests. However, the 
Government are in a neutral position regarding the percentage of foreigner stakeholders 
having 51% of the ownership of the project The reason for this position is probably that 
the Government does not want to discourage foreign investors from contributing to the 
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local economy, but they also do not want to upset the local voting public by selling a 
national asset to foreign entities. 
 
Once the preferences are specified, the program examines and compares the shortlisted 
solutions using the stakeholders’ payoff (preferences) values. Utilizing the conflict 
resolution analysis that involves the stability analyses of Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ, it 
determines the best solutions. The best decision is the one that achieves the highest 
number of equilibria as shown in Figure 6.10. In this case study, solution 6 (ROM) is 
chosen as the best decision because its total score is 24166 and stability equilibrium was 






















Step 5: Accounting for uncertain information: In this step, uncertainties are assumed about 
the stakeholders’ preferences due to the associated ambiguity. These uncertainties could 
have resulted from unexpected future results of the projects, previous experience, or public 
hesitation about the private sector in fulfilling its promises. The program uses Info-gap 
Theory to furnish the user with the ability to optimize the results to produce decisions. The 
robustness of the best decisions is then calculated according to the stakeholders’ 
preferences in calculating the solution stability in the Graph Model for Conflict 
Resolution.  
 
For this case study, the stakeholders are certain about their goals and preferences. For 
example, the private sector is certain about their preferences and expected benefits, and the 
government is certain about its own budget preferences and the final privatization 
decision. Other DMs or stakeholders, on the other hand, may not be certain about their 
preferences. For example, the public users many not trust the private sector to run an 
important facility. In this case, the DSS is capable of using the info-gap Theory to test the 
solution’s robustness in the presence of the uncertainty associated with each stakeholder’s 
preferences.  
 
For the Hamilton case study, Table 6.6 lists the percentage of the assumed uncertainty for 
each stakeholder.  
  
      
DM Uncertainty % 
Private Sector     5 
Employees 40 
Public Users 30 
Environmental Group 20 
Government 5 
Table 6.6 Uncertainty for the Stakeholders  
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The Private Sector (PUMC) had 5% uncertainty in their preferences. The Government also 
assigned a value of 5% uncertainty to their preferences. Hence PUMC and the government 
are both very certain about their own budgets and final goals. However, the Employees 
assigned a high value of 40% uncertainty to their preferences, showing that they do not 
trust the privatization. In contrast, the Public Sector assigned a 30% uncertainty to their 
preferences. The Public Sector is happy about any decision leading to a reduction in the 
government deficit; however, they still have doubts about PUMC’s goals in taking over a 
facility from the government. Environmental group assigned a 20% uncertainty to their 
preferences, since they believe that the private sector is always capable of finding a way to 
accumulate profit and escape strict regulations. It should be noted that the uncertainty 
values for the preferences would be collected from a panel of selected experts as well as 
from a questionnaire distributed to the stakeholders and their representatives. 
 
As shown in Figure 6.11, these values are entered, and 100 are requested in the dialogue 
box. The DSS is then committed to performing 100 experiments. In each experiment, new 
values for the uncertainties of the preferences are randomly selected from within a 
specified uncertainty range (± a value). For example, the DSS carries out 100 experiments 
that consider uncertainty values within the range of ± (20) for the Environmental group, 
and so on. The DSS then runs the required experiments to test and identify the most robust 
decisions and presents the results in the form of a histogram graph. In this case study, two 
histogram graphs are presented, one with a value of 71 and the other with a value of 29, as 



















Figure 6.11: Testing the Robustness of the Best Decisions in the Presence of Uncertainty  
 
OPTIMIZATION 
     Robustness of 
     Best Decisions 
     in the presence of 





identified solution 6 as the best solution, followed by solution 2, which was selected as the 
best solution in 29% of the experiments. 
  
The technique of conflict resolution analysis, together with Info-gap Theory has again 
identified decision solution 6 (ROM) as the best solution with the best robustness. It 






Once the best PPP option is selected, the next step in the decision process starts by inviting 
well-known companies or consortiums to submit their proposals and experience. The best-
qualified company based on the threshold rules specified earlier can then be selected to 







Figure 6.13 Privatization Decision Process  
 
Select best PPP option 
& report the acceptance 
thresholds to bidders
Select best company 
 (Private Sector) & draft 
contract with thresholds 
Call for Bidders
Figure 6.12: Robustness of the Optimum Decisions  
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6.4   Discussion of Results 
The developed prototype DSS makes possible a comparison and evaluation of various 
privatization alternatives. A large problem such as the Hamilton Wastewater Treatment 
Plant project could be analyzed and its 64 alternatives reduced to only ten feasible 
solutions, from which the best solution was chosen. 
 
The results of using two different decision-making approaches, simple scoring and conflict 
resolution, show that both approaches are useful to the decision maker. Figure 6.12 shows 
that once the shortlisted privatization alternatives are available, both approaches determine 
solution 6 “Renovate-Operate-Manage (ROM)” to be the best decision, better than the 
failed decision of “Operate and Manage (OM)” actually made by the Government. 
However, despite its success in selecting the best decision, the simple-scoring method has 
drawbacks. It listed other solutions with close-to-best solution scores, which may easily 
mislead the DM(s), particularly if slight changes are made in the weight values. These 
slight changes can easily push up the second or third best solutions in the ranking list and 
hence move the genuine best decision down. 
  
Using the conflict resolution approach together with Info-gap Theory also led to solution 6 
as the best decision. This solution is “Renovate–Operate–Mange (ROM)”, which is 
characterized by unionization, less than 2% annual rate increase, regular quality testing of 
facilities and product, and no share for foreign investors. The solution score of 24167 was 
successful in meeting the four stability concepts of Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ. In 
addition, the solution achieved a high robustness value of 71% in uncertainty testing, 
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compared with 29% achieved by the second best score (solution 2). The robustness test 
was useful in indicating the stability of the solutions, which is not easily possible using the 
simple scoring method. 
 
The advantages of using the elimination method of an MCDA tool in the prototype system 
were clearly noticeable. In this case study, with 5 stakeholders, 7 criteria, and 9 acceptance 
rules, the number of possible alternatives was quite large (64 decision alternatives). 
However, that number was dramatically reduced to ten feasible alternatives by using the 
elimination method of MCDA for screening.   
 
Figure 6.12 shows the two solution alternatives for the privatization of the Hamilton 
wastewater Treatment Plant that were suggested by the developed DSS. Figure 6.8 shows 
the best decision available through the use of a simple scoring method. The results shown 
in both figures (ROM) differ from the real-life decision of OM, taken by the RA. The 
differences may be due to the following factors: 
 
- The developed system uses a systematic approach to analyze and specify all the 
stakeholders’ preferences and their rules, while apparently the decision made by 
the RA did not involve an organized procedure.  
- There are no specific threshold rules or guidelines to show how the RA selected a 
short list of potential alternatives. 
- There are no standard guidelines or methods for the project staff to use in choosing 
and evaluating a private sector company to take over the facility.  
- Accurately defining the possible scores of the acceptance rules, criteria and 
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preferences (using a 0-to-100 scale among various options) greatly affected the 
rankings of the prospects and hence solidified an effective final decision. 
- The optimum final decision of ROM (Figure 6.12) is very different from the actual 
decision of OM, because of the addition of the task of renovating the old facility. 
In addition, it considered the preferences of all stakeholders and not just those of 
two of them: the RA and PUMC.  
- All the possible alternative decisions selected by the DSS share the option of 
renovating, showing that the OM decision taken by the RA was not optimal. 
- Part of the actual failure of the real-life project was due to the exclusion of 
renovation regardless of the skills and capability of the private sector. 
- Accordingly, consideration of the current condition of the utility must be part of 
any decision related to infrastructure outsourcing and should be included in any 
future research. 
  
6.5   Summary 
In this chapter, a case study for the real-life project of the Hamilton Wastewater Treatment 
Plant was used to demonstrate the capabilities of the developed prototype decision support 
system (DSS) in choosing the best privatization alternative. The case study showed the 
ability of the DSS to generate optimum privatization alternatives that suit different 
stakeholders’ preferences and values, while considering the robustness of the solution and 
the uncertainties involved. Two decision-making processes were utilized in the DSS 
procedure: First, the Group decision making using the simple scoring method. Second, the 
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decision-making process using conflict resolution. Both processes were successful in 
identifying the optimum decision. 
 
The main limitation on the case study is that the test data are relatively limited, and 
although Loxely’s (1999) report about the Hamilton Wastewater Treatment Plant did 
provide historical information that was beneficial for validation testing, more case study 
details would enable a more comprehensive analysis. This limitation resulted from three 
main factors: 1. The field of PPP projects is relatively new in many countries, so there are 
limited implemented cases; 2. Within this field, data from the public sector is considered 
sensitive and confidential; and 3. For the case study of Hamilton, in particular, is subject 








7.1   Overview 
This chapter presents a review of the contents of this study as well as a summary of its 
conclusions. It also highlights recommendations and suggestion for future studies regarding 
the construction conflict and infrastructure privatization decisions.  
 
The research developed a practical and efficient methodology for infrastructure privatization 
decisions and conflict resolution in construction projects. The developed decision support 
system (DSS) methodology can be used to consider all stakeholders’ preferences and to 
support decisions related to construction conflicts and infrastructure privatization.  
 
A thorough analysis of the characteristics of the problem and the procedures that decision 
makers use in the field of infrastructure privatization and construction conflict resolution was 
performed along with a study of the diverse tools that can be used to support decisions. A 
new decision support methodology was then developed by integrating the Elimination 
Method for MCDA, the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution, Genetic Algorithms for large-
scale optimization, and the Info-gap Theory for uncertainty analysis. 
 188
The integrated decision-making process methodology has been demonstrated to work 
effectively on the example applications of two case studies: a construction conflict resolution 
and an infrastructure privatization decision. The developments made with respect to both of 
these decisions demonstrate the benefits of combining different intelligent concepts to utilize 
their individual capabilities of producing good solutions. The result is a DSS with a prototype 
capable of handling and solving large-scale, practical, complicated infrastructure and 
construction problems. Two decision-making processes were utilized in the system: Group 
decision making using simple scoring and decision making using conflict resolution. The 
methodology may contribute to current automation efforts in infrastructure and construction 
management decision-making by linking the developed system to a comprehensive decision 
making system capable of handling all construction and infrastructure management issues 
such as planning, scheduling, dispute resolutions, and asset management. The main 
characteristics of the developed methodology that make it an efficient tool for decision 
making in construction and infrastructure management include the following: 
- It applies to any user-defined Multiple Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) problem 
and is not limited to a privatization decision or construction conflict resolution 
decision.  
- The Elimination Method proved to be efficient in screening feasible alternative 
solutions with little subjectivity, which adds to the clarity and strength of the final 
decisions.  
- It permits the use of a wide range of numerical and alphabetical scales that can 
describe precisely the quality of a solution. 
- It works for either consequences or values of the criteria.  
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- It incorporates a powerful Graph Model for Conflict Resolution to study the actions 
and counter-reactions that take place in disputes. 
- It examines the stability of solutions by using the stability concepts of Nash, GMR, 
SMR, and SEQ tests to reach a final decision equilibrium. 
- It uses Info-gap Theory to provide direct help in testing and choosing the best 
decisions in the case of uncertainty in the stakeholders’ preferences, thus 
automatically evaluating the strength and robustness of the decisions.  
- The decision process accommodates input from various decision-making groups, thus 
helping the decision makers to accommodate diverse judgments.  
- It has been implemented on a spreadsheet program that practitioners in infrastructure 
and construction management are accustomed to using.   
- It enables the user to run a what-if analysis at different stages of the decision process.  
 
A study of the results of the two case studies shows that the proposed DSS can satisfactorily 
be used to support decisions with respect to both construction conflicts and infrastructure 
privatization. The developed system is simple to apply and can therefore save time and avoid 
the costs associated with wrong decisions. 
 
7.2   Contributions 
The developed framework is expected to help in re-engineering the traditional conflict 
resolution process, particularly for construction conflict resolution and infrastructure 
privatization decisions. The framework provides decision support at the management level 
through four successive decision support processes related to: 1. Screening of feasible 
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solutions using MCDA, 2. Group decision making using the simple scoring method, 3. 
Decision making using conflict resolution, and 4. Considering of uncertainty in preferences 
using Info-gap Theory.  
 
The model developed in this research is expected to provide the following important 
contributions: 
1. It acts as a proposal-selection guide that helps the public and private sectors to select 
various criteria for evaluating and selecting the best privatization alternatives. 
2. It is a DSS tool that can provide decision advice in two systematic ways of group 
decision and conflict resolution. 
3. It can save decision makers in the public sector a great deal of time and effort. 
4. It encourages the private sector to bid on projects by providing a clear and fair selection 
process in a competitive fashion. 
5. It introduces a powerful yet simple tool that can deal with both quantitative and 
qualitative criteria. 
In addition, this study introduces knowledge and experience related to infrastructure 
privatization decisions and construction conflicts. The field practice regarding decision-
making methods normally used by governments has been reviewed and compiled, and 
information related to construction conflict resolution has been included as well. Despite 
confidentiality and the difficulties associated with obtaining the required information and 
data, the author was able to build a practical case study to mimic real-life case scenarios.  
 
This research has also made a number of specific contributions within the individual modules 
of the system: 
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1. Screening of Alternatives: The proposed methodology of listing and screening all 
possible alternatives for various stakeholders’ strategies to shortlist feasible alternatives is 
very useful, due to the powerful and practical nature of the Elimination Method in dealing 
with cardinal and ordinal values as well as consequences and values. These results are 
possible because the acceptance rules used by the Elimination Method screen out all 
defective alternatives, remove any subjectivity, and improve the accuracy of assessing the 
shortlisted alternatives. This process also results in speeding up the decision-making process 
and makes the system suitable for less-experienced individuals to use. In addition, a new 
approach for using the preference tree decision in MCDA based on the option prioritization 
idea is presented.   
  
2. Conflict Resolution Technique for actions and counter-actions:  A new decision-
making system is presented not only to support a simple ranking decision, but also to choose 
the best decision based on the solution stability concepts of game theory. The technique 
utilized the main stability concepts used in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution to test 
the best solution stability and determine the maximum equilibrium using the Nash, GMR, 
SMR, and SEQ stability tests based on the stakeholders’ preference payoffs. This technique 
will further eliminate subjectivity from future decisions analyzed by this DSS. In addition, 
when a large number of feasible solutions exist, a GA-based optimizing methodology can be 
used to optimize decisions, as demonstrated in Chapter 4.   
 
 3. Uncertainty and Risk Management: The presented model for infrastructure 
privatization and conflict resolution in construction is capable of determining the best overall 
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decisions given the presence of uncertainty that may associated with the stakeholders’ 
preferences and values. This feature will help decision makers to avoid future risk and to deal 
realistically with the problem at hand. The formulation of the Info-gap Theory technique is 
simplified for the average user, so all the mathematical procedures are hidden. A simple 
histogram graph is used to illustrate the final best decisions and their robustness. Real life 
contains many uncertainties, especially with respect to a unique case study. For example, 
differences could result from the facility functions and conditions, from the type of 
stakeholders and their preferred options, and from government agendas and policies. These 
and others factors will produce enormous hesitation for stakeholders when they are listing 
their preferences. Hence, no one will assign 100% support for any decision. Therefore, using 
this technique to deal with these uncertainties is useful and practical. 
 
In addition to the above contributions, this thesis has successfully structured a comprehensive 
DSS for resolving construction conflicts and supporting infrastructure management systems. 
Although the focus has been on a wastewater treatment plant privatization decision, the 
proposed system can easily be adapted to other types of infrastructure privatization decisions 
such as those related to highways, power plants, airports, and hospitals. The proposed 
research is expected to aid engineers, project managers, and decision makers both in the 
private sector and in public sector, municipalities and government agencies to make 
appropriate decisions that will ensure the sustainable operation of the infrastructure assets 




7.3   Recommendations for Future Work  
Despite the capabilities and benefits of the developed DSS for infrastructure privatization 
decisions and construction conflicts, it has limitations, and a number of improvements would 
be beneficial:  
- Add a fourth module to assess the current condition of the facility to be privatized. 
Such a module will help the government and the private sector make better estimates 
and better PPP decisions.  
- Add a fifth module for costing and budgeting as a main step for the government 
when it is deciding whether to privatize.  
- Add a sixth module for the private-sector selection procedure using available tools, 
such as the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) for selecting a qualified contractor. 
- Examine the applicability of the DSS for other types of infrastructure assets and 
determine improvements that would allow more generalized use.  
- Build a privatization library that contains information about previous privatization 
experiences, history, criteria, successes, and failures. In addition, compile another 
historical library about private-sector participation in the business domain, which 
would contain information about the company’s reputation. 
- Incorporate other factors in conflict resolution that reflect human behaviour in 
conflicts, such as emotion and attitudes. For example, some people are calm and 
simple to deal with in conflict, while others are hard negotiators and easily become 
angry and make harsh decisions.  
- Introduce changes to the uncertainty test algorithm formulation to speed up the 
procedure. 
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- Create an Internet application from the current system to enable multiple users to 
benefit from the system. 
-  Consider the cost of delays due to disputes in construction projects or due to wrong 
decisions in infrastructure privatization processes. 
- Conduct an extensive investigation of the construction industry to cover all types of 
conflicts raised in construction projects and their method of solution based on site 
practicality. 
- Expand the DSS to handle situations in which not all options are mutually exclusive. 
- Besides weighting, expand the system to include option prioritization for both Group 
decision and Conflict Resolution process.  
  
It is believed that the developed model will make the decision process clear, transparent, and 
easy to track for all parties. These advantages will likely help decision makers in both the 
public and private sectors make better decisions about selecting Public-Private-Partnership 
alternatives and will encourage the private sector to bid with competitive prices. 
Furthermore, the model will help project managers find the best resolution of conflicts in the 
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